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INTRODUCTION
The present report is devoted to the analysis of reform progress in the housing and communal
service sector, one of the most socially important sectors of the economy. The sector’s problems
have attracted much political attention in the recent years. To date, however, no significant positive
changes have occurred. Moreover, there is multiple evidence of the deterioration in both the
technical and financial situations of the sector. The housing and communal service sector plays the
role of the last bastion of (communism) socialism, characterized by inflated and thus unfulfilled
social mandates of the state, absence of real economic relations, and low quality of services
produced. The deep depreciation of fixed assets, grave financial state of the sector enterprises, and
social demagogy in place of clear and understandable rules of the game make the sector
unattractive for private businesses.
It is quite evident that the complexity and systemic nature of the sector’s problems call for
responsible political and economic decisions at the highest level of government.
However, while the housing and communal service sector is one of the biggest sectors of the
national economy, its enterprises are scattered over the entire territory of Russia and fall under the
jurisdiction of local governments. Attempts to implement sector reforms from the center alone
look like trying to boil the ocean. No real changes can be achieved until a system of positive and
negative motivation for all stakeholders, first of all local governments, is in place. In order to
check once again the correctness of the strategic goals, characterized by the successes and failures
in the selection of tactical reform steps, it is necessary to present the overall experience
accumulated in the ten years of transformations in the housing and communal service sector,
review the results achieved, and distinguish with maximum clarity the negative and positive
experience acquired.
This report presents the results of an analytical survey of the experience of housing and communal
service sector reforms in the past ten years, contrasting this experience with the declared reform
goals and objectives, comparing the progress of reforms in different municipalities of Russia,
identifying reasons for their successes and failures, and developing proposals for improving the
efficiency of reform measures at the state and municipal levels on the basis of these analytical
conclusions.
Of special note is that the research was intended to initiate a professional discussion of the results
and of ways to further reforms in this sector of Russia’s economy that is of vital importance to
every citizen, rather than to provide recipes based on the analysis of the current practices.
The research was conducted with the use of statistical and expert data on the state of the housing
and communal service sector in over 30 big and small municipalities. The authors are sincerely
grateful to all leaders and specialists of various housing agencies in different parts of the country
for their assistance in this work.
1. The Goals and Objectives of the Housing and
Communal Service Reform
In the period preceding the reforms the housing and communal service sector was characterized by
rigid state regulation of all housing relations and the predominance of state ownership.
The distinctive features of this system are:
• centralized allocation of all resources, including allocation of newly constructed housing
among citizens depending on the need and waiting lists for improving the housing
conditions; an almost complete unavailability of the credit mechanisms of finance;
• a state monopoly in housing maintenance and utility services, with the loss-bearing
activities of these respective organizations strongly subsidized by the state;
• the rights of housing owners were practically no different from the rights of tenants in the
state housing stockownership rights;
• state enterprises were assigned the function of providing housing to their employees and
maintaining this housing.
The progress of housing and communal service sector in Russia is an illustrative example of the
complexity and controversial nature of the political and social transformations in Russia in the
1990’s. It would suffice to note that the 1992 price liberalization in the period of Gaidar’s reforms
left this sector of the economy, exclusively undisturbed assigning it the role of a temporary social
cushion for the period of market reforms. However, already by the end of 1992 a federal law, On
the Fundamentals of the Federal Housing Policy <1>,1 was enacted to establish the key goals of
the national housing policy for the period of transition.
The law envisages the key goals of the federal housing policy as: providing social guarantees of
the citizens’ housing rights; developing private ownership and ensuring protection of the rights of
entrepreneurs and owners in the housing sector; promoting competitiveness in the construction,
maintenance and repairs of the housing stock and in the production of building materials.
The transition to market relations in the housing sector is associated with changes in the conditions
for financing housing and utility services, and with the gradual  reduction of budget subsidies to
the sector. Article 15 of the Law defines the procedure for a phased transition to a new system of
payments for housing and utility services including the necessary measures of targeted social
protection of low-income households. Throughout the course of the reforms, this Article has
suffered from many political compromises.
The main reform goals for that stage may be defined as follows:
1. Addressing the issue of housing provision. First of all, the changes should concern the
principle of providing residential premises to the households – from the predominant
allocation of housing built with the capital investments of the state to the predominant
construction or purchase of housing at the expense of the citizens’ funds, retaining benefits
for socially vulnerable population groups.
                                                
1 Here and later the references are for the list of literature provided at the end of the report.
2. Changing the conditions and procedures for paying for housing and utility services. The
fundamental principle of the law is that payments for housing and utility services should
cover the costs of housing maintenance and repairs, and utility services, subject to targeted
social protection of poor households;
3. Developing competitive market-oriented approaches for improving housing maintenance
and ensuring the preservation of the housing stock.
Other key regulatory legal documents at the federal level defining the goals of the housing and
communal service reforms in the Russian Federation include:
• The Concept of Housing and Communal Service Reform in the Russian Federation
(hereinafter – Concept) <2>;
• The Program for Demonopolization and Development of Competition on the Market for
Housing and Communal Services in 1998-1999 <3>;
• The Subprogram “Reform and Modernization of the Housing and Communal Service
Complex in the Russian Federation” within the Federal Targeted Program “Zhilische” for
2002-2010 <4>.
The main areas of transformations in the sector, including the time frame for the reform (1997-
2003) were identified in the Concept of Housing and Communal Service Reform. Pursuant to the
Concept, the main goals of the sector reforms are:
• ensuring that living conditions meet the set standards of quality;
• curtailing the costs of service providers and reducing respective tariffs without impairing
the quality of the services delivered;
• alleviating the process of rent reform for the citizens upon transition of the sector to loss-
free operations.
The main ways of attaining the above goals are:
• improving management, maintenance and control systems in the housing and communal
service sector;
• introducing contractual relations, developing competition, providing consumers with the
opportunity to influence the volume and quality of the services consumed, predominantly
competitive selection of organizations for management and maintenance of the housing
stock, provision of materials or equipment for utility companies and design and
construction services;
• improving the system of payments for housing and utility services, including the
introduction of higher tariffs for housing space and utility services that exceed the
established standards, and introducing differentiated payments depending on housing
quality and location;
• improving the system of social protection by streamlining the existing system of social
benefits and strengthening the targeting of the funds allocated for this purpose.
The purpose of the Program for Demonopolization and Development of Competition on the
Market for Housing and Communal Services in 1998-1999 is to support the formation of a
competitive environment in the housing and communal service sector that would effectively
promote the reduction of costs and respective tariffs without impairing the quality of the services
delivered. The implementation of the goals and objectives of the Program for Demonopolization
and Development of Competition on the Market for Housing and Communal Services is directed
at:
• finalizing the segregation of the functions of the housing owner, the management company
(customer service) and the maintenance company in the state and municipal housing stock;
• introducing contractual relations between producers and customers of maintenance and
utility services;
• attracting enterprises of all ownership form to the sector.
It should be acknowledged that the 1998 financial crisis and the reshuffling of the political forces
in the country have lead to the curtailment of housing sector reforms that essentially blocked the
governmental program and postponed the implementation of the Concept. With the onset of the
crisis the housing and communal service sector once again assumed its “cushion” role, curtailing
the decline in the population’s incomes. This could not have failed to affect the sector’s economy.
Sector enterprises did not have sufficient income to produce the housing and communal services
and became, in essence, insolvent.
The financial and technological crisis in the sector in the background of general economic growth
in the country called for new solutions, which were reflected in the Subprogram Reform and
Modernization of the Housing and Communal Service Complex in the Russian Federation adopted
by the Government in late 2001 as a part of the Federal Targeted Program Zhilische. The
subprogram formulates the most topical goals and tasks of the state policy for the housing and
communal service sector as of the beginning of 2003.
The main goals of the Subprogram are improving the efficiency, stability and reliability of life-
supporting systems, attracting investments to the housing and communal service sector, improving
the service quality along with the reduction of costs, and providing targeted social support to the
households in payments for housing and communal services.
The main objectives of the Subprogram are:
• improving the financial health of sector enterprises through: (a) restructuring and
liquidation of arrears, bringing the tariffs for housing and communal services for the
households and other consumers to economically reasonable level; (b) strict compliance
with the established payment standards by the households; (c) transition from the
subsidizing of housing and utility enterprises and the granting of category-based benefits to
the subsidizing of low-income households; and (d) liquidation of cross-subsidized tariffs.
• reduction of costs and increase of the quality and affordability of housing and communal
services, formation of the investment attractiveness of the housing and communal service
sector through the development of competition for the delivery of housing services,
creation of coordinated procedures for tariff regulation of utility companies and natural
monopolists – enterprises of the fuel and power energy complex;
• state support for modernization of the housing and communal service complex based on
modern technologies and materials in the form of budget funds and state guarantees for
attracted investments.
The program documents reviewed above establish the general direction of the housing and
communal service sector reforms, consistently declaring the commitment to market-oriented
transformations along with the provision of appropriate guarantees for the population. Each of
these documents, in turn, poses concrete tasks, the implementation of which should promote the
attainment of the general reform goals.
However, actual developments in the housing and communal serviced sector are markedly
different from the envisaged goals.
2. Key Trends
Several sustainable positive trends may be identified that allow for the conclusion that despite all
deficiencies, the housing sector reform is being implemented in accordance with economic,
market-oriented principles. The key positive trends are:
- the appearance of a multitude of private owners of housing as a result of privatization of
the state (municipal) housing stock;
- the market for sale and purchase of housing has become an integral part of housing
relations;
- the divestiture of departmental housing stock and other objects of social infrastructure to
municipalities is almost complete, relieving industrial enterprises from the substantial
burden of social functions and thus enabling them to improve the efficiency of operations;
- the unit weight of households’ contribution to the payments for housing and utility services
has increased substantially, while the share of budget subsidizing of the sector has
decreased, but low-income households received targeted social protection;
- Russia has implemented the first targeted social assistance program, the Housing
Allowance Program.
At the same time, today it is evident that the overall goal of the housing and communal service
reform – improving the quality and reliability of housing and communal services through the
development of economic relations in the sector, opening of the sector for private businesses,
effective regulation of natural monopolies, stimulating energy saving, and promoting the initiatives
of housing owners – has not been attained. For the majority of the population the reform is
associated only with higher payments for the housing and communal services. Because this
perception of reforms is universal it should be acknowledged that the relatively unsuccessful
reform is not the result of poor performance of one local leader or another, but that it represents a
systemic phenomenon that calls for analysis and decisions at the federal level.
Before we start our analysis of the reform practices in the housing and communal service sector,
let us review the results of a rapid assessment of the financial and economic situation in the sector.
2.1. Finance and Payments2
Based on the established tariffs, the cost of housing and communal services delivered to the
housing stock in 2001 is estimated at 360 billion rubles. Residents’ payments covered 170.6 billion
rubles (47.7 percent), budget funds 129.1 billion rubles (35.5 percent). Thus the deficit may be
estimated at 60.3 billion rubles (16.8 percent). This deficit is revealed in two areas:
- failure to pay for services already delivered, primarily heating; in this case the result is
higher arrears of housing and power enterprises;
- failure to deliver services or perform works required by the standards and provided for in
the tariff rates, the most important item here being capital repairs; this results in the
growing depreciation of the housing stock and utility infrastructure, with the costs moved
to future generations of users.
                                                
2 This section uses materials from: Bezhaev O. G., Issues in the Financial Support of Housing and Utility Sector
Reforms. Journal of the Manager and Chief Accountant in the Housing and Utility Sector. 2002. September. Part II.
The above balance does not show the effects of cross-tariffs for gas, electricity, water supply and
wastewater collection. At first sight, the liquidation of these tariffs should increase the cost of
utility services. The reality is more complicated. Cross-tariffs for gas and electricity for the
households are subsidized by industrial enterprises (Fig.1). This includes housing and utility
enterprises, whose goods and services are paid for by households’ payments for housing and utility
services. Therefore, gas and electricity to the households is subsidized by other users on the one
hand, while on the other hand cross-tariffs for gas and electricity increase the cost of other housing
and utility services.
The 2001 budget expenditures have three components:
- tariff rate subsidies (108 billion rubles);
- compensations for benefits to service users (17 billion rubles);
- compensations for housing allowances (4 billion rubles).
The deficit occurs mostly as a result of budget non-payments. For example, total benefits in
payment for housing and utility services provided in 2001 amounted to about 50 billion rubles,
while only about 17 billion rubles of budget funds were provided (Fig.2). Households’ arrears in
this period did not exceed 10 billion rubles (Fig.3).
Therefore, financing needs for the housing and utility services to the households in 2001 (based on
the effective tariffs) may be estimated at 180 billion rubles, of which 129.1 were actually spent.
However, this figure does not represent total spending for communal services. According to expert
estimates (no exact data is available), maintenance and utility services to the buildings of public
organizations cost about 80 billion rubles (2001). Of these, 80 percent (about 65 billion rubles)
were actually paid. By early 2002, official payables of public organizations amounted to 46 billion
rubles.
A special form of budget expenditures is “preparation for winter”. Practically no budgets have the
item. However, every year, and in the past two years – at an increasing scale, budget funds are
used in every legal and illegal way to finance housing and utility enterprises for buying fuel,
repairing the nets, replacing boilers, and other works. Most of these expenditures are accounted for
in different items, but not in the Housing and Communal Service Sector item, while preparations
for winter hide in the Capital Expenditures item. These expenditures may be revealed in the
Capital Expenditures, Fuel, and other such items in the budget performance reports for 2001.
Based on expert analysis, these expenditures may be estimated at 30 billion rubles. As a result,
these funds partially and uncontrollably compensate the financial deficit, which, as noted above,
exceeded 60 billion rubles in 2001.
Therefore, total budget financing needs of the housing and communal service sector in 2001
equaled 260 billion rubles, actual spending (including preparations for winter) amounted to about
225 billion rubles (2.5 percent of GDP). These figures demonstrate that the state is carrying an
excessive burden of social obligations in the area of housing and communal services, and these
obligations are poorly fulfilled (by about 86 percent) even in a favorable fiscal year. The hostages
of this situation are housing and utility enterprises, which have de-facto became bankrupt due to
persistent non-payments of budget funds.
Till the end of 2001, budget expenditures for the housing and communal service sector grew in
parallel with the gradually increasing households’ coverage of the service costs. For example, in
2001 consolidated budget appropriations across the Russian Federation increased by 22 percent as
compared to 2000. This was primarily the result of a better budget payment discipline.
The situation changed substantially in 2002. Households’ coverage of the service costs continued
to grow, and at a fairly high pace. On the average, by the end of 2002 households in Russia paid 70
percent of the established tariffs for the housing and communal services. As a result, nearly all
regions have reduced the share of housing and communal service sector expenditures in their
consolidated budgets. For example, as of August 1, 2002 out of all subjects of the Volga Federal
District only Tatarstan failed to follow this trend. The tension in the relations with the energy
giants has been slightly alleviated. Many jurisdictions financed current payments and debt
repayment, though the total volume of outstanding payables of the sector enterprises resumed
growth. However, external debts were often repaid at the expense of the financial status of
municipal housing and communal enterprises.
Table 1. The share of Housing and Communal Service Sector Item in Respective Budgets
Consolidated budget of the RF
Subjects, %
Municipal budgets, %
January – October 2002 12.6 19.1
January – February 2002 13.9 20.1
January – December 2001 17.5 24.6
January – February 2001 21.2 30.1
At the same time, the cost of housing and utility services to the households increased dramatically
in 2002. While the total volume was estimated at 360 billion rubles in 2001, in 2002, according to
the information obtained at an extended collegiate meeting of Gosstroi of Russia in Cheboksary on
April 2-3, 2003, it reached 512 billion rubles. This rapid growth was explained primarily by the
“unfreezing” of the tariff policies of 1998-2000, when in the wake of the financial crisis the stable
tariffs once again served as an additional social support under the rapidly changing financial
conditions. However, this situation could not last and the critical financial and economic
conditions in the sector lead to the reverse process – starting in 2001 prices for the housing and
utility services grew faster than consumer price index. (This situation is discussed at length in
Section 3.1.)
In 2002, households paid 240 billion rubles for the housing and utility services, that is, the
payments increased by more than 40 percent, while the number of participants in the housing
allowance program grew by a mere 2 percent to the total of 10 percent (average for the country),
which is, evidently, not a critical level.
On the whole, one should note an improvement in the budget discipline of expenditures for the
housing and utility sector. Subsidies were financed in the amount of 173.6 billion rubles out of the
180 billion rubles of actually delivered services; benefits got 26 billion rubles out of the required
50 billion rubles; and housing allowances – 12 billion rubles out of the 15 billion rubles of actually
originated allowances, according to the expert data of the IUE. The structure of compensations for
the expenditures of the housing and utility sector in 2001 and 2002 is presented in Table 2.
Table 2. Expense Structure of the Housing and Utility Service Sector in 2001 and 2002
2001 2002
Provided
(bln.rubles)
Paid (bln.rubles) Provided
(bln.rubles)
Paid (bln.rubles)
Total services to
the households
360 299.0 512 451.6
Budget:
- subsidies 127.6 108 180 173.6
- allowances 48 17 50 26
- households 5.3 4 15 12
Deficit 180 170.6 267 240
- 60.4 - 60.4
The deficit remained the same in absolute terms, decreasing in relative terms from 17 to 12
percent.
Expenditures for utility services to budget-funded institutions increased in approximately the same
proportion as the housing and utility payments of the households, and are estimated at 140 billion
rubles. However, the payment discipline with respect to these expenditures deteriorated because
the 2002 budget priority was declared to be wage increases for the public sector employees.
According to the expert estimates, the expenditures amounted to over 100 billion rubles and
covered about 75 percent of the services delivered.
Administrative resources were once again mobilized for getting ready for the heating season.
Budget expenditures for this purpose are estimated at 40 billion rubles.
Therefore, budget expenditures for the housing and utility service sector in 2002 amounted,
according to the estimates, to nearly 400 billion rubles. Of these, financing was provided for 350
billion rubles, or 88 percent of the services delivered. Interestingly, this figure is very close to the
level of household payments collection.
2.2. Financial and Economic Status
The financial and economic status of the sector is characterized by the high level of depreciation of
capital assets (Fig.4), chronic losses of the majority enterprises (Fig.5), and substantial levels of
overdue payables and receivables.
In 2002, losses of housing and utility enterprises exceeded 90 billion rubles. By the end of the year
overdue payables reached 280 billion rubles, adding 24 billion rubles more since the beginning of
the year. However, overdue receivables amounted to just 185 billion rubles.
Table 3 schematically shows the structure of debts in the sector. Its analysis revealed the
following: debts to the energy giants alone (UES and Gazprom) equaled 85 billion rubles, while
another 72 billion rubles were equally spread among tax arrears and debts to the state extra-
budgetary funds. Thus total debt equals 157 billion rubles (without accounting for debts to
providers of fixed assets, materials, and others). In turn, budget arrears with payments for the
utility services delivered to budget-funded institutions equaled 31 billion rubles arrears of the
households 45 billion rubles, and arrears of other service users 37 billion rubles, adding up to a
total of 113 billion rubles in arrears.
Table 3. Debt Structure in the Communal Sector
Payables Financial Losses Receivables
Accounts payable to vendors
and contractors
Budget underfinancing Accounts receivable from
institutions financed by all
levels of budget
Arrears with taxes and other
deductions to the budget
Unbalanced tariff policy Non-payments of the residents
Arrears with payments to the
state extra-budgetary funds
Inefficiency of communal
enterprises
Accounts receivable from
commercial users
100% 33% 67%
The difference between the figures for receivables and payables indicates double counting.
Actually, official statistics gives the debt figure as the sum of the debt of all sector enterprises,
which includes mutual settlements between the enterprises. For example, a heating utility may
have debt to the water utility, while the latter incur debts to the power supplier because of non-
payments for the water delivered to the heating utility. Thus the chain of non-payments results in a
double, or even triple count. Analysis of receivables alone gives the figure for the double counting
as 72 billion rubles (185 billion rubles – 113 billion rubles). This means that payables without the
double counting will amount to 208 billion rubles.
The 95 billion rubles by which the payables exceed receivables reflect the losses of sector
enterprises as a result of budget underfinancing, unbalanced tariff policies, and inefficient
operations.
Thus, there is a vicious circle: the budget undercollects taxes from the housing and utility
enterprises because no budget funds have been provided for the services delivered by these
enterprises, while the enterprises incur debts to the budget and contractors because of non-
payments from the budget (compensations for the difference in tariffs, excess of the limits by
budget institutions). Under these conditions, no real competitive market for the housing and
communal services may be formed. The sector has thus become the hostage of the excessive social
obligations of the state.
The efficiency of the housing and communal service sector remains extremely low. Moreover, the
administrative interference becomes stronger because contractual relations do not work in an
unstable financial environment; the sector is characterized by very poorly developed mechanisms
of competitive market operations, cost-based tariff regulation of monopoly enterprises, and the
high and irrational levels of power consumption. The dominating role of administrative system and
the incomplete financing (primarily – out of the budget) eliminate every incentive for reducing
unproductive costs.
Many regions have initiated bankruptcy proceedings against utility enterprises. The reasons are
either the creditor’s desire to acquire liquid municipal property (utility infrastructure) in repayment
of the debts or attempts of the local authorities to move fixed assets to a new enterprise with a
healthy balance sheet. However, neither option addresses the issue of current payments or accrued
debts.
Thus at present the housing and communal service sector is essentially an arm of the
administrative apparatus rather than a line of business. It may not evolve into a business unless a
political decision is taken for acknowledging and restructuring budget debts, and ensuring current
payment discipline, including the budget funds.
2.3. Investments
Starting in the Soviet period, the housing and communal service sector developed at the expense of
budget funds. At present, the need for private investments is declared at the policy level, but in
reality the sector is still financed by a limited volume of budget resources.
The investment potential of utility enterprises that may be mobilized within the framework of the
existing tariff regulation system (depreciation, capital repairs funds, profit) may be estimated at 60
billion rubles annually. This estimate coincides with the estimate of the deficit, because it is this
money that is lacking in most cases. However, this investment volume will be absolutely
inadequate for a qualitative change in the conditions of the sector. An additional investment
potential (technological and managerial inefficiency) is of about the same scale. However, it may
be utilized only if a proper system of economic incentives for cost reduction is installed.
The sector’s potential attractiveness to investors is based on the nearly fully guaranteed realization
of the products and transparent pricing (regulation) rules for the monopolies, enabling investors to
minimize their risks. In Russia, tariff regulation is still a disorganized and politicized process. No
private investment for the sector will be available unless this problem is addressed. However, even
after these problems have been addressed, some time will still be necessary to construct efficient
schemes for interaction with the businesses (guarantee agencies, etc.). Thus even according to the
“optimistic” forecast of the Subprogram Reform and Modernization of the Housing and Communal
Service Complex these processes are unlikely to start before 2005.
Therefore, at this time we should work from the assumption that budgetary funds, as well as funds
of the enterprises, will be sufficient for financing the most urgent investment programs.
Regretfully, these programs more and more often move into the category of “liquidation of the
consequences of emergencies”, and until the trend for the growing depreciation of the housing
stock and utility infrastructure is upturned, this factor should be taken into account when
forecasting the need for budget financing.
2.4. Political Environment
The politicized nature of the housing reforms became clearly visible with the beginning of the
2002/2003 heating season. Accidents in the heating nets in several regions “provoked” political
activity around this issue. Every political party had its own recipe for “unfreezing” the country.
Why all this sudden talk about the “communal catastrophe”? The answer is clear – it is election
time. And what is a better way to attract the electorate than a promise of warm homes and low
tariff? Also, mobilizing budget funds for the purpose is not a bad idea – there will be enough
money to spend.
The situation in the housing and utility service sector is indeed grave. However, what happened
last winter was essentially a normal occurrence. The country has lived this way through every
winter since 1999, though the topic of “winter preparations” never leaves the agenda. To the
contrary, it moves from “miscellaneous” to the “main issue”.
The spectrum of political solutions is broad. The main battles are fought around two questions:
“How much to pay?” and “How to organize the work?”.
As regards the first question, the communists and Yabloko have taken a similar stand: to abolish
the governmental program, abolish the transition to full coverage of service costs by the
households or – as a better option – freeze the tariffs. The Union of Right Forces calls for
scheduled tariff reviews with regard for the growth of population incomes, and speaks against the
dependence of tariff rates on the political situation and elections, and against bringing the situation
to the brink of crisis when the “shock therapy” will be unavoidable.
As regards the second question – organization of the sector – the left wing and, partly, the center
demand a stronger direct state interference in the housing and utility service sector with the
creation of a management vertical. This position does not stand up under scrutiny. The idea of
managing the sector from the federal level resembles the task of boiling the ocean. What is needed
is not the management vertical, but clear “rules of the game” for municipalities, businesses, and
consumers.
Yabloko and Union of Right Forces advocate the attraction of private businesses and development
of competition, the strengthening of stronger control over monopolies, and the promotion of
private initiative. However, Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces have a diametrically different
understanding of these processes.
The Yabloko’s recipe is “benefits, benefits, and benefits again” in taxes, tariffs, and every other
thing possible for small businesses, for homeowners’ associations, for those who have installed
meters. The state coffers are already incapable of compensating the excessive volume of existing
benefits. What would happen to the new ones is an easy guess.
The position taken by the Union of Right Forces looks better grounded from the viewpoint of the
economy. It is aware that the sector’s problems can not be addressed at the expense of the budget
alone. Moreover, local budgets must not be turned into a “dumping ground” of unfunded state
mandates. What this sector of the economy needs is: limiting the powers of the monopolies by
transparent tariff regulation and auditing; creating a competitive environment and private
businesses; attracting private investments, first and foremost into utility infrastructure and energy-
saving technologies.
And there is an almost universal drive to “rediscover America”. Each new assertion is often
presented as the ultimate truth and a cure for all problems – as if the country has not lived through
the ten years of transformations, the ten years on a hard and contradictory road of reforms that
includes both mistakes and major successes.
In this context it is important to make an in-depth analysis of the work performed in the past ten
years, to identify problems and weak points in the approaches to the formation of the economic
relations in the housing and utility service sector, and to determine the ways of addressing these
problems.
3. Analytical report
The analysis of the following key aspects of housing and communal sector reform was
carried out:
• price setting mechanisms;
• housing and utility payments policy;
• development of competition in the delivery of housing and communal services;
• development of associations of homeowners.
3.1 Price setting mechanisms.
Breakdowns in district heating services in Russia during the truly frigid winters of 2001–2002 and
again in 2002–2003 grabbed headlines around the world. Local municipal enterprises that provide
the heat claim that they had insufficient resources to maintain distribution pipes and boilers
adequately or that they did not have the money to purchase coal or gas to generate the heat. Others
believe the problem rests primarily with the inefficiency of the enterprises, which could do much
better with the funds they do receive.
In fact, at least five factors determine the quality and costs of providing this type of service:
1. the technical procedures followed by the utility in determining the funds required to
provide services, and if necessary expand them;
2. the process at the municipality for reviewing the tariff request made by the utility,
including the level at which tariffs are set (adequate or insufficient to do the job);
3. the process at the municipality for acting on the recommendation from the review
process;
4. the extent to which payments due to the utility for providing services are actually made
(by households, commercial clients, and budget organizations, i.e., local governments
and their associated agencies); and
5. the efficiency with which the available resources are applied by the utility.
Generally, municipalities set tariffs for district heat services and for water and sewage services. In
the following, we review the formal legal base, cite its shortcomings, and then empirically examine
the behavior of a sample of municipalities in setting these tariffs from 1997 to 2002.
We find that little progress has been made in establishing a rational system for setting tariffs, that
decisionmaking is highly politicized, and that in times of extreme inflation, tariff increases lag
even further behind inflation. To judge from a review of World Bank documents, these problems
are common in the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States but much less so in
Eastern European and Baltic countries.3
                                                
3 This is based on a review of the descriptions of problems in these sectors contained in Bank project appraisal reports
for urban water and district heat projects in the region; in particular, World Bank (1995, 1998a, 1998b, 1999, 2000a,
2001b, 2001c, 2002a, 2002b).
3.1.1 Tariff Reform in the Russian Federation
Under the Soviet system, municipal enterprises providing communal services operated on a cost-
reimbursable basis. Investments were funded separately. Cost was divided into two parts: base
costs and profit. Base costs covered regular expenses. In addition, certain classes of expenses, such
as extra contributions to the employee funds for vacations or training and other “add-ons,” were
covered by “profit.” Profit was set by municipal officials as a percentage of base costs, often in the
absence of any analysis. These Soviet accounting rules are still in force and have a profound
impact on the operations of utilities. Utilities cannot include most investment spending—including
interest expense—in base costs, and the share of profits that can be used for investment is strictly
limited, as is the maximum profit rate.
It is important to distinguish between two possible cost bases that could be used for regulatory
purposes. Under one, the regulations determine tariffs for monopoly communal service firms,
particularly water and district heat companies, as the cost of goods (or services) produced (or sold)
by these enterprises. Thus, for a water utility it is the cost of a unit of water delivered to the
boundary of the customer (e.g., connection to the internal network of a multifamily building). The
regulation of tariffs for communal services for Russian households is based on an alternative
approach. It differs from the standard western tariff regulation of utility monopolies in three
important ways:
- The tariff may include not only the tariff for the services of the utility enterprise, but also
the cost of works and services of other organizations engaged in the service delivery (in
case of water supply, the cost of maintaining internal building nets, water meters in
buildings or apartments, etc.).
- The tariff for services to the households may cover only a portion of the cost of service
delivery, with the remainder covered by other sources: the municipal budget (subsidies for
the difference between full costs and the tariffs) or higher tariffs for other consumers
(cross-subsidization).
- Tariffs for the households typically regulate not just the cost of a service, but also a
normative volume of service consumption in cases where metering equipment is
unavailable; thus the payment rate for the service equals the value of the regulated tariff
multiplied by the regulated normative consumption rate. Metering for residential use of
water and district heat, even at the building level, is extremely rare.
In the first days of the transition, the federal government transferred to municipalities the
ownership of state housing (mostly of state enterprises), municipal housing, and the communal
service assets associated with it. In practice this meant that municipalities became the owners of
the great majority of district heat and water-sewerage service enterprises. (As discussed below,
some large facilities that co-generate electricity and heat are regulated by the Subjects of the
Federation, that is, the regional governments.) The main regulatory document issued in September
1993 on reforming the prices of housing and communal services empowered local administrations
to establish tariffs for housing and communal services. It also called for the development of a
methodology for the determination of economically reasonable rates and tariffs.4 A 1996
Government Resolution confirmed that households should pay the full costs of these services by
                                                
4 Resolution of the RF Council of Ministers, On Transition to a New System of Payments for Housing and Communal
Services, and Procedures for Granting Compensations (Subsidies) to Citizens for Housing and Communal Services
Payments. (No. 935 as of September 22, 1993).
2003 but again failed to address the structure for setting tariffs. Several subsequent regulations
continued this pattern.
It wasn’t until 2001 that a regulation was issued that actually addressed the setting of tariffs at the
municipal level.5 It spoke of the need for tariffs to be substantiated by the production and
investment programs of the regulated enterprises. For the first time, it declared the need for
developing procedures linking tariff regulation at the municipal and regional levels, and
established that the tariff structure should correspond to the system of contractual relations in the
housing and communal service sector.
At the end of 2002, the determination of tariffs for municipal communal services was influenced
by the federal, regional, and municipal levels of government, because the production of these
services involves inputs that have prices regulated by the federal and regional authorities. The
effective legislation assigns each level its own regulatory powers. More specifically, the
distribution of responsibilities is as follows:
I. At the federal level:
- approving the federal standards of the cost of housing and communal services that are used
in computing the federal contribution to locally paid housing allowances, which  subsidize
communal service payments;
- establishing tariffs for electricity and gas delivered to the wholesale market by all
participants in this market; and
- establishing limits for fuel and energy consumption by organizations financed by the
federal budget.
II. At the regional (Subject of the Federation) level:
- regulating tariffs for the electricity, gas, and heat procured on the wholesale market from
enterprises of the fuel and energy complex (FEC), for all consumer groups;
- establishing regional prices and tariffs for the electricity and heat produced by large
cogeneration plants operating in the region sold on the retail market;
- establishing tariffs for the electricity and heat, as well as water supply and wastewater
collection for private enterprises producing these goods and services for sale in the retail
market; and
- exercising control over compliance with the existing regulatory legal acts of local
governments.
III. At the municipal level:
- regulating prices and tariffs for water and heat for municipal enterprises;
- establishing normative rates for the consumption of housing and communal services; and
- establishing rates for households’ payments for communal services.
The above listing reveals multiple overlapping authorities. Prominent among these is that the
cognizant regulatory agency in the area of heat and water supply depends on the type of owner.
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Housing and Communal Service Complex in the Russian Federation” of the Federal Targeted Program “Zhilishche”
for 2002–2010.
Private entities are regulated at the regional level even if they provide services only within a
municipality. This creates serious, sometimes irresolvable,  problems in attracting private
businesses for management of municipal communal infrastructure.
It is important to note that the existing legislation does give some direction to the tariff-setting
process by stating that municipalities should establish
rates and tariffs for the housing and communal services (except tariffs for electricity and
gas) subject to the implementation of cost-reduction measures as a result of unjustified
expenditures revealed through expert examination of the tariffs for goods, works, and
services counted in their price. The decision to review the rates and tariffs for the housing
and communal services should be preceded by an obligatory expert examination of the
economic feasibility of the tariffs for goods, works, and services counted in the price of
respective services.6
This statement and the assignment of tariff-setting authority to local governments constitutes the
entire legislative base.
In addition to these laws and regulations, three methodological documents have been issued by the
national government.
1. Methods for planning, counting and calculating the self-cost of the housing and communal
services (hereinafter – Methods) <9>.
2. Guidelines for forming economically feasible tariffs for the housing and communal services
(hereinafter – Guidelines) <10>.
3. Methodological recommendations on the financial substantiation of the prices for water
and sewerage (hereinafter – Methodological Recommendations for Water) <11>.
4. Methodological recommendations on the financial substantiation of the prices for heat and
heat supply (hereinafter – Methodological Recommendations for Heat) <12>.
The first two comprehensive documents are based on the concept of an economically feasible tariff
for a housing or communal service (EFT), which is understood as a fee charged for maintenance or
repairs of housing (including capital repairs) or the delivery of a utility service ensuring minimum
cost recovery necessary for an expanded reproduction with account for the owner’s program for
the development of the facilities subject to compliance with the service quality standards. The EFT
entails the identification of the production cost, i.e. the self-cost, and the profit required for normal
reproduction. It is recommended to calculate expense items based on normative indicators that
adjust the current costs to make them more rational, rather than on the actual data for the preceding
period.
The Methodological Recommendations for Water pursue similar goals, defining self-cost based on
the adopted production and investment programs, effective norms and standards for material,
labor, and money costs with regard to the reported data of the organizations for the preceding
period. The price of a unit of service is defined as a fraction of the sum of funds and the planned
production volume.
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Communal Services.
According to the Methods, the self-cost of services is calculated based on the data characterizing
efficient use of fixed assets, materials, energy and labor resources subject to compliance with the
minimum state standards for the service quality.
Despite that all the above documents declare the principle of the priority of financing available for
the implementation of an enterprise’s production and investment programs, the calculation of the
EFT is reduced to calculation of the self-cost and profit based on a certain profitability standard.
The main attention is given to item-by-item calculation of the cost of service production, with each
item budgeted according to the unit cost standards.
Stated otherwise, these methods presume normative cost-accounting. On the one hand, this
approach is appropriate for production processes involving similar or recurring operations, such as
water supply, wastewater collection or heat supply. On the other hand, this approach imposed very
high requirements on the definition of standards, which should take into account the current state
of fixed assets, technologies used, organizational arrangements and qualification of the staff.
Moreover, the standards-setting process is not just a determination of some values, but an
instrument of motivation. In other words, the standards are designated to address the issues of
stimulating cost reduction, improving labor efficiency and quality of the product, etc. However,
experience proves that the existing standards fail to address these tasks.
Evidently, it is impossible to abandon the standard-based method in many aspects of the tariff
calculation, but it would be unreasonable to give them exclusive attention. This method may be
efficient if the standards are periodically reviewed to capture changes in technological and other
production factors.
The mechanism for calculating planned profit required for the implementation of the production
and investment programs is described ambiguously in both the Methods and the Guidelines. On the
one hand, they speak about an absolute sum of the profit, while on the other, for no evident reason,
propose to calculate planned profitability rate.
Despite the correctness of the interpretation of many provisions on the application of self-cost
calculations, the mechanism for calculating planned profit and others, these documents still:
- ignore the distinction between constant and variable costs in the self-cost calculation;
- do not make it possible to calculate a two-rate tariff for a given service.
Overall, one can say that practically all methodological recommendations reduce the tariff
rate calculation to base-costs, disregarding or merely declaring the need to take into account the
development goals of the regulated enterprises. These recommendations say nothing about a
system of tariff regulation at the municipal level, tariff regulation procedures, etc.
While these methodologies are not binding for local governments, they have gained broad
acceptance because of the opportunity they offer to begin to fill the regulatory vacuum.
3.1.2 Tariff Setting in Practice
The result of the weak legislative and methodological foundation provided to
municipalities is very poor decision making on tariffs. Specifically, analysis of tariff regulation
practices in Russian municipalities reveals several typical problems:7
1. Almost universally, tariff regulation acts are a belated response to changes in external
conditions for the operation of the enterprises, such as general inflation or increases in
electricity tariffs. There is no understanding of tariff regulation as a component of the
property management system for utility enterprises.
2. Tariffs are, as a rule, determined as “costs plus profitability.” Being based on cost-tied
principles of tariff formation, this system in no way stimulates utility enterprises to
control costs.
3. Tariffs are set without accounting for the true investment needs of enterprises. Several
vital expense items (e.g., investment projects for expanding production and
modernizing fixed assets) may be financed from “profit” only. Since profit is
determined as a specified percentage of self-cost, it often turns out to be insufficient
both for investment needs and for the financial viability of the firm.
4. The majority of municipalities lack formal tariff regulation procedures. There is no
formal definition of the reasons for which a tariff may be reviewed, or of the effective
term of tariffs (in the majority of municipalities tariffs are established for an
unspecified term). Also absent are tariff application review procedures and procedures
for reconciling the needs of the enterprise and the paying capacity of consumers. Tariff
review processes are nontransparent and do not provide for the participation of all
interested parties.
5. Because no formal procedures are in place, tariff rates turn into an instrument for heads
of local administrations or representatives to use for their political objectives. As a
result of populist decisions, municipal utilities are deprived of the financial resources
they need for normal operations, which leads to depreciation of the fixed assets and
reduced service quality.
6. In practically all municipalities the tariff review and approval process is unrelated to the
budget process. As a result, the budget is based on the tariff rates effective when the
budget is formulated. If tariffs are reviewed and increased during the budget year, the
increase results in overdue payables from public organizations.
This is a formidable list of deficiencies, and it will take comprehensive federal legislation to
address most of them.
3.1.3 Analysis of the Cost Dynamics of Housing and Communal Services
In the recent time many politicians have spoken about excessive tariffs for housing and communal
services and the impermissibility of their further increases. At the same time, no real analysis of
the changes in the tariffs for these services has been made. Let us fill this gap and review the
changes in the cost of housing and utility services in the past five years. It should be noted that
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with World Bank observations. See in particular, World Bank (2000b, 2001a) and Frienkman (1998).
when analyzing the overall structure of the housing and communal services it is critically
important to give separate treatment to electricity and gas. These resources represent independent
utility services on the one hand, and on the other  contribute substantially to the cost of other
services (heating, hot and cold water supply). Another important point is that the prices for
electricity and gas are regulated in a manner different from the regulation of other housing and
utility services.
Cost Structure of Housing and Communal Services
As of the end of 2002 the cost structure of the housing and utility services (per 1 sq.m. of total
floor space), taken as an overall average for the country, had the following structure:
Electricity – 9.4 percent;
Water supply and wastewater collection – 13.6 percent;
Heating and hot water supply – 48.6 percent;
Gas – 5.8 percent;
Housing maintenance – 22.6 percent.
Compared to international practices, the share of housing maintenance in the structure of housing
and utility services is low. In international practices it reaches 50 percent. The cost structure in
Russia is partly explained by the climate and the highly inefficient energy consumption in the
sector. However, the main reason is that at present the payment for maintenance of the housing
stock reflects only current costs (albeit in an inadequate volume) and a portion of the costs of
capital repairs, but does not include payment for land, funds for renovation and capital repairs, or
insurance. The formation of the full structure of a housing maintenance payment would increase its
amount by several times.
As noted above, apart from household use, substantial volumes of electricity and gas are used in
the production and delivery of nearly all housing and communal services. Gas serves as the main
fuel for the production of heat, electricity supports water and heat supply for the housing stock, etc.
Electricity constitutes about 30 percent of the cost of water supply wastewater collection. In the
cost of heating, electricity constitutes 7 percent, and in maintenance of the housing stock about 10
percent.
The full share of electricity in the cost of housing and communal services was calculated as
follows: the share of electricity is extracted from the share of each service in the cost structure of
housing and communal services, and then the figures are added to obtain the cost of indirect
consumption of electricity in the cost structure of housing and communal services (Table 4).
Table 4. Indirect Electricity Consumption
Service Calculation
The share of indirect
electricity consumption in
the cost structure of housing
and communal services
Water supply 13.6%*0.3 4.08%
Heating 48.5%*0.07 3.4%
Housing maintenance 22.6%*0.1 2.26%
Total indirect electricity 9.74%
consumption
Adding this result to the figure for direct electricity consumption, we obtain the total share of
electricity in the cost structure of housing and communal services:
9.4%+9.7% = 19.1%
The adjusted cost structure of housing and communal services will look as follows:
Electricity (direct and indirect consumption) – 19.1 percent;
Water supply and wastewater collection (without the electricity component) – 9.5 percent;
Heating (without the electricity component) – 45.1 percent;
Gas – 5.7 percent;
Housing maintenance (without the electricity component) – 20.3 percent.
Gas consumption in the housing and communal service sector also includes both the direct
consumption, and the indirect consumption through electricity and heat power. The share of gas
sources in the production of heat amounts to 60 percent. Gas cost in the price for heat produced
with the use of gas sources amounts to 35 percent. The share of electricity produced with the use of
gas sources amounts to 50 percent. Gas cost in the price for electricity produced with the use of gas
sources amounts to 35 percent (Table 5).
Table 5. Indirect Gas Consumption
Service Calculation Indirect Consumption
Electricity 19.1%*0.5*0.35 3.3%
Heat 48.5%*0.6*0.35 10.19%
Total indirect consumption 13.5%
The direct and indirect consumption of gas in the cost of housing and communal services amounts
to:
5.7%+13.5% = 19.2%
The cost structure of housing and communal services adjusted for indirect gas consumption will
look as follows:
Electricity (direct and indirect consumption) – 15.8 percent;
Water (without the electricity component) – 9.5 percent;
Heating (without the electricity and gas component) – 34.9 percent;
Gas (direct and indirect consumption) – 19.2 percent;
Housing maintenance (without the electricity component) – 20.3 percent.
As demonstrated by the adjusted cost structure of the housing and communal services, together gas
and electricity constitute a substantial portion of the cost – 35%. Because gas and electricity prices
are external to the sector’s system (i.e., their dynamics is driven by gas and electricity tariff
regulation in all sectors of the economy), our forecasts for the changes in the cost of housing and
communal services take them into account as individual variables.
For the third variable, we took the growth of the sector’s own expenditures. These expenditures
were taken into account in the cost structure of the housing and communal services by adjusting
the shares of water, heating, and maintenance of the housing stock.
Thus the cost dynamics of the housing and communal services was calculated on the basis of three
components, which change following different patterns: growth of prices for gas, electricity and
growth of the sectors own expenditures.
Retrospective Analysis of the Cost of Housing and Communal Services
From 1998 to 2001 prices for housing and communal services fell behind inflation. The gap was
the greatest in 1998 when the annual inflation reached 84 percent, while the prices for housing and
communal services grew by only 12 percent.8 Annual inflation in 1999 equaled 36.5 percent, while
the prices for housing and communal services grew by only 25 percent. The immediate
consequences were low attractiveness of jobs in the sector, high debts to suppliers, and lack of
competitiveness. Subsequent dynamics of the prices for the housing and communal services shows
that the response to this critical situation came in the form of faster tariff growth, which for the
first time exceeded inflation in 2002.
It should be noted that in 1998-1999 prices for electricity grew even slower than prices for the
housing and communal services. As with the housing and utility enterprises, electricity producers
were forced to curb their current expenditures in the period of high inflation. However, starting in
2000, the growth of electricity prices outpaced inflation, enabling the sector enterprises to provide
relatively normal financing of their current expenditures. Unlike the housing and utility
enterprises, since 2000 electricity producers have been able to reduce deferred expenditures
because the electricity prices grew faster than inflation. In the housing and communal service
sector the compensation for deferred inflation is just beginning, and because in the past four years
prices for the housing and communal services were kept below inflation levels, the accumulated
effect of deferred inflation grew higher and higher (Table 6)
Table 6. Growth Dynamics of the Cost of Housing and Communal Services, and Electricity
Year CPI
Average cost
of housing and
communal
services in
Russia per 1
square meter
Growth of
electricity
prices
Gas
Growth of
prices for
housing and
communal
services
1998 184.5 9.2 102.2 108.6 112
1999 136.5 11.5 119.7 113.6 125
2000 120.2 12.8 141.7 162.0 111.3
2001 118.6 14.2 137.0 129.0 110.9
2002 115.7 19.1 125.0 130.0 134.5
Therefore, from 1998 to 2001 prices for the housing and communal services grew much slower
than inflation. The sector was used as a cushion against the high inflation of 1998-1999. Keeping
the cost of housing and communal services low in the period of high inflation, the government
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communal services, which are approved by the RF Government on an annual basis. Despite the certain conditionality,
this indicator allows for demonstrating and evaluating the key trends.
tried to preserve social and fiscal stability at the expense of deterioration of the financial and
productive status of the sector enterprises. As a result, enterprises were unable to finance their
current and capital expenditures, and had to dig deeply into their capital assets.
Another consequence of this situation was the slowing of the economic transformations in the
sector. The “programmed” underfinancing made administrative intervention necessary. The
resource shortages, which theoretically should have promoted energy saving and general
efficiency, in reality resulted in the freezing of these processes.
In 2002, the effect of deferred inflation finally struck back. The growth of prices for housing and
communal services exceeded inflation by 20 percent. Of this, 12 percent is attributed to the
sector’s own expenditures, excepting gas and electricity. Total inflation for 1998-2001 was 2.86
times higher than growth of prices for the housing and communal services. Stated otherwise, prices
for these services fell behind inflation by 186 percent. The faster price growth in 2002 could
compensate only 20 percent of the deferred inflation.
Growt h dynamics o f  housing  and  communal sect o r 's own exp end it ures,  housing  and  communal 
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Deferred inflation may be calculated in the following way.
First, we take data on the average cost of housing and communal services per 1 square meter per
month from 1998 to 2002. Then we assume that increases in the average cost of housing and
communal services per 1 square meter per month equal actual price growth. Then, because the
housing and communal services include direct and indirect consumption of gas and electricity,
these components should be excluded to obtain the growth rates for own expenditures in the
housing and communal service sector.
In order to make such calculations, we need data on the cost structure of housing and communal
services in the period from 1998 to 2002(Table 7).
Table 7. Cost Structure of Housing and Communal Services in the Period from 1998 to 2002
(%)
Electric
ity
Wate
r Heat
Housing
Stock Gas
Direct
and
indirect
electricity
consumpt
ion
Direct and
indirect gas
consumpt-
ion
Total
share of
gas and
electrici-
ty
1998 6 13 52 26 3 13.2 17.1 30.3
1999 6 13 52 26 3 13.0 16.8 29.8
2000 7 13 50 24 5 14.4 18.4 32.8
2001 9 14 49 23 6 15.8 19.5 35.3
2002 9 14 49 23 6 15.3 19.1 34.4
Knowing the value for the direct and indirect consumption of gas and electricity, we can calculate
the growth of own expenditures in the housing and communal service sector from 1998 and 2002
with the use of the formula:
Yi = (Ci – Ei * xiе - Gi * xig)/(1- xie - xig)
Where:
Yi – growth of the sector’s own expenditures (without gas and electricity) in the period i;
Ci – growth of the average federal standard for Russia in the period i;
Ei – growth of electricity prices in the period i;
Gi – growth of gas prices in the period i;
xiе – share of electricity in the cost of services in the period i;
xig – share of gas in the cost of services in the period i.
Using this formula, we derive the price dynamics for the services provided by the housing and
communal service sector (Table 8).
Table 8. Comparative Dynamics of Own Expenditures, Electricity Prices, and CPI
CPI Electricity Gas OwnExpenditures
1998 184.5 108.6 108.6 113.8
1999 136.5 119.7 113.6 128.7
2000 120.2 141.7 162.0 90.9
2001 118.6 137.0 129.0 99.1
2002 114.7 125,0 130.0 138.0
Then, to find the effect of deferred inflation, we calculate growth of CPI and service prices in a
running total to obtain the figure for the delay in the price growth (by the number of times) (Table
9):
Table 9. The Deferred Inflation Effect
CPI, running
total
Growth of
service prices
in running
total
The deferred inflation effect in running total
(delay in the growth of the housing and
communal service sector, by the number of
times)
1998 184.5 113.8 1.62
1999 251.8 146.4 1.72
2000 302.7 133.1 2.27
2001 359.0 131.8 2.72
2002 411.8 182.0 2.26
According to the data in the last column, by 2003 inflation outpaced prices by 2.26 times. The
effect was already evident in the 2002 prices for housing and communal services, as a result of
which growth of own expenditures in the sector exceeded inflation by 24 percent.
The above analysis of the cost of housing and communal services disproves the assertion about the
accelerated growth of prices for the services of the housing and utility complex, and largely
explains the dire financial and technical situation in the sector. From the economic viewpoint, in
this context an accelerated growth of prices for the services in order to liquidate the “deferred
inflation” could result in substantial improvements of the sector’s finances. However, 2003 and
2004 are the years of federal elections in Russia, and it is quite obvious that political
considerations shall prevail over economic reasoning.
3.1.4 Statistical Analysis
The broad findings outlined above are widely accepted. In this section we formulate specific
hypotheses about the local tariff-setting process and then test them with data from nine cities.
Hypotheses. We have formulated three hypotheses based on the foregoing analysis.
1. Decisions on increasing tariffs are deferred until elections are over.
2. Municipalities in which tariff review decisions are the responsibility of the local legislature
(Duma) are less willing to review and increase tariffs.
3. Local authorities use tariff policy to shelter the population from the adverse impacts of the
transition on household incomes, particularly in periods of very high inflation.
4. Activities of the regulatory authorities of different levels of governments are not
coordinated
Obviously, these hypotheses do not cover the entire spectrum of the problems reviewed earlier.
Testing them, nevertheless, may provide insight into the current situation in municipalities.
Variable Definitions and the Data Employed. To test these hypotheses, the following
model was estimated for four dependent variables: the ratio of a tariff index (January 1997 = 100)
to the consumer price index (same base) for heat and water services, for residential and industrial
users. The mean values of the four variables are:
Water–households .90
Water–industry .67
Heat–households .58
Heat–industry .51
The general reluctance to raise tariffs is clear from these figures. The cumulative shortfall in
maintenance and investment to renew systems suggested by these figures is large indeed. Since
heat costs are much greater for households than water costs, the figures also indicate that the
overall lag of tariffs for residential users behind inflation was probably around one-third during
this period. The lower average rate of increase for industrial tariffs compared with those for
households in part reflects a national policy of moving toward a unified tariff for each service.
During the Soviet period, industrial users faced tariffs several times those of households, and the
new policy is designed to make Russian industry more competitive. Even in 1996 in Perm, for
example, water tariffs for industrial customers were 20 times greater than those for residential
users; by February 2002 the ratio had fallen to about 6. The higher rate of increase shown above
for residential users compared with industrial users suggests this policy is being implemented.
The independent variables employed in the analysis are listed in Table 10 along with a summary
rationale for each included in the model.
Table 10. Independent Variables Included in the Analysis
Variable Definition/Rationale Mean value
D Var = 1, if the city Duma approves tariffs. Resistance to
increased tariffs is greater if the Duma, rather than the
mayor, approves tariffs. 0.90
EL Var = 1, during the six months prior to an election.
Pressure exists during all elections for the political
parties not to anger voters with tariff increases. 0.33
A Var = 1 when the rate of monthly inflation is greater
than 3 percent. Municipalities are likely to use restraint
in increasing housing and communal services costs to
consumers as a “shock absorber” during periods of
extreme inflation. The main inflation spike was after
the 1998 ruble devaluation.
0.20
E Index for electricity tariffs (Jan. 1997 = 100).
Electricity is an important component of operating costs
for both water and heat. Because there is no
coordination between regional and municipal
authorities on the timing of tariff increases, there is no
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Variable Definition/Rationale Mean value
firm expectation about the sign of the coefficient.
Ci Series of dummy variables for the included cities to
capture city-specific effects. Omitted city is
Cherepovets; see text for further explanation.
Cherepovets was selected as the base city (omitted category) because it differs from the other cities
in two important respects because of reforms implemented in 2000.
1. It is one of the few cities in Russia with a logical system for regulating the tariffs of its
housing and utility enterprises that takes into account the needs of both regulated
enterprises and consumers.
2. It has abandoned the practice of budget subsidies for housing and utility enterprises,
thereby increasing the total revenues of the enterprises (because the government was often
delinquent in its gap-filling payments) and strengthening the targeting of the remaining
subsidies, which are allocated through a means-tested housing allowance program.9
To estimate the model monthly data on tariff levels, various events were assembled for nine cities
for the period 1997–2001: Perm, Izhevsk, Petrozavodsk, Cheboksary, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk,
Ulyanovsk, Yoshkar-Ola, Magadan, and Cherepovets. These cities are drawn from several Russian
regions, including European Russia (Cherepovets), the Urals (Perm), and the Russian Far East
(Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Magadan). The cities have exhibited sharp differences in their interest in
housing and communal sector reforms over the years. For example, while Cherepovets and
Petrozavodsk have been progressive in housing and communal services reform generally,
Ulyanovsk strongly resisted adopting reforms until two years ago, when it was forced to begin by
its virtual bankruptcy. While the cities were selected, to some extent, for their diversity, they do
not constitute a representative sample.
The authors had good working relationships with these cities and could collect the necessary
data for the analysis from local administrations. In Perm, Cheboksary, and Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk,
data on electricity tariffs were not available. Consequently, only six cities are used in the analysis
of water tariffs, where electricity is a very important input. Models with and without the electricity
variable are estimated for district heat tariffs (i.e., samples of six and nine cities, respectively).
With electricity accounting for less than 10 percent of the production costs for district heat,
estimating both specifications seemed reasonable. Since the data is monthly, the total observations
range between 360 and 540.
Results
The results, presented in Table 2, generally confirm the hypotheses set out earlier, but the patterns
are complex. Six estimated models are included—one each for household water and industrial
water tariffs and two specifications (and samples) for district heat tariffs. The two sets of district
heat models differ in the inclusion of the variable indicating an increase in electricity tariffs.
                                                
9 These innovations are described in Sivaev et al. (2003). The housing allowance payment is operational throughout
Russia. For information on it, see Puzanov (1997) and Struyk, Lee and Puzanov (1997).
The results attest to the impact of municipal Dumas’ reluctance to raise water tariffs. For example,
for residential users, the ratio of the tariff index to inflation falls by 0.41, a decline of nearly half of
the average value when a Duma must vote on the increase. On the other hand, the Dumas’
reluctance is not evident in heat tariffs. Indeed, if anything, they seem more willing to increase
heat tariffs, particularly for industry, than are municipal administrations.
The hypothesis that tariff policy works to cushion the blow of severe inflation on household and
industry well-being is clearly supported: The dummy variable is highly significant in all six
models.
The impact of elections is more modest than we had expected. Interestingly, after controlling for
other factors, upcoming elections seem to have no influence on the level of water tariffs for
households. On the other hand, tariffs for industrial users for both water and heat (in the model
including the electricity variable) are maintained during the run-up to elections. One interpretation
is of a possible quid pro quo between election contributions and the cost of doing business.
Nevertheless, the coefficients of these variables are fairly small, suggesting that, after controlling
for other factors, the reductions are modest.
The fourth hypothesis, “activities of the regulatory authorities of different levels of governments
are not coordinated” is also confirmed by the results of the regression analysis. In all cases where
the independent variable for electricity was included its coefficients had significant values. On the
whole, low values of the b coefficient indicate that increases in electricity prices did not lead to
reviews of the heat and water tariffs. While one could expect the electricity tariffs to push up
tariffs for water and heat, the analysis showed that municipalities often ignored the growth of
electricity tariffs when approving the tariffs for heat and water. These policies resulted in a
universal accrual of debts by the housing and utility enterprises to the energy companies.
Consequently, the activities of tariff regulators were uncoordinated. An additional obstacle to tariff
reviews during a quarter after an increase in the electricity tariffs may be the slowness of the tariff
regulation system. Given the current tariff review procedures, one quarter may be insufficient for
approving the new tariff rates.
The results of the increase in electricity tariffs are highly significant in all four models where it is
included. The small quantitative effect is negative. One might have expected the opposite (i.e.,
higher electricity tariffs pushing up municipal tariffs). The negative sign could be interpreted as
demonstrating the lack of coordination between regional and municipal governments in tariff
setting.
It is also worth noting that during much of the analysis period, local utilities piled up huge debts to
the national electricity monopoly. This means that the electricity rate increases may not have
mattered much to some of the municipal utilities—a story consistent with the negative sign.
Table 11. Estimated Regression Models
Househol
d water
tariff
Industry
water
tariff
Househol
d heating
tariff
Industry
heating
tariff
Househol
d heating
tariff
Industry
heating
tariff
(Constant) 1.103 1.356 0.361 0.304 0.688 0.786
13.237* 27.820 9.737 10.236 8.592 15.292
Election hypothesis 0.022 -0.046 -0.034 -0.028 -0.063 -0.062
0.543 -1.888 -1.095 -1.095 -1.430 -2.198
Duma factor -0.405 -0.169 0.123 0.376 -0.042 0.131
-4.609 -3.290 1.808 6.881 -0.506 2.468
Inflation jumps more than
3%
-0.118 -0.081 -0.130 -0.106 -0.155 -0.141
-3.025 -3.545 -4.548 -4.621 -3.867 -5.476
Perm - - 0.241 0.045 - -
- - 3.353 0.780 - -
Izhevsk 0.139 -0.297 - - - -
1.643 -6.023 - - - -
Petrozavodsk 0.937 -0.165 0.118 -0.083 0.128 -0.068
11.111 -3.345 1.635 -1.449 1.620 -1.335
Cheboksary - - 0.171 -0.029 - -
- - 2.373 -0.511 - -
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk - - 0.255 0.054 - -
- - 3.540 0.939 - -
Ulyanovsk 1.513 -0.359 0.261 -0.028 0.304 0.036
17.836 -7.236 3.627 -0.481 3.804 0.694
Yoshkar-Ola 0.573 -0.218 0.357 -0.036 0.330 -0.075
7.198 -4.675 5.266 -0.659 4.411 -1.562
Magadan -0.205 -0.537 0.188 0.299 0.082 0.142
-3.300 -14.785 3.845 7.654 1.400 3.772
Electricity tariff growth -0.002 -0.001 - - -0.001 -0.002
-6.001 -6.151 - - -4.717 -10.886
R2 0.744 0.473 0.248 0.292 0.312 0.499
F-stat 113.186 34.954 15.496 19.328 16.484 36.219
n 360 360 540 540 360 360
 * t-statistics appear below the coefficients.
The inclusion of the electricity variable has significant impacts on the magnitude and significance
of the coefficients of other variables in the models for district heat. This result holds when the
sample of cities included in the regression where electricity tariffs are excluded is the same as in
the regression where the variable is included. The variable for elections is significant for the
models that include electricity. The coefficient of the Duma variable and many of the city-dummy
variables change sharply. This argues for the importance of controlling for the actions of regional
authorities in analyzing municipal tariffs.
A number of the city-dummy variables are statistically significant and impressively large.
Interestingly, there is not much of a clear pattern in the signs of these variables, either for the same
city across the four tariffs or for all the cities in a single model (i.e., relative to Cherepovets). For
example, in the model of household water tariffs, the coefficients for Petrozavodsk and Ulyanovsk
are positive, very large, and highly significant. But the coefficient for Magadan is highly
significant, small, and negative. Two reasons for the high variability in the results for the city
variables seem plausible. First, Cherepovets adopted its exemplar practices only in the past couple
of years, so it is not a steady reference point for the other cities. Second, tariff policy in many cities
has been highly variable, shifting dramatically with changes in administration and the posture of
presidential administrations in Moscow.
Testing the Hypotheses in Surveys
The hypotheses formulated for testing with the use of regression analysis techniques were further
tested in the course of the survey of municipal administration officers professionally interested in
the management of the housing and communal services sector and the regulation of tariffs for the
housing and utility services. The interviews were taken under the condition of anonymity.
The first question was about the factors that have the most important influence on tariff review
decisions at the municipal level. In the opinion of the respondents, the main influences are the need
to modernize fixed assets and improve service quality, as well as changes in the financial needs of
the enterprises as a result of higher energy prices.
Other reported reasons for tariff reviews are substantial volumes of outstanding payables and the
need to improve service quality. Characteristically, none of the respondents stated termination of
the effective tariff period as the reason. This is indicative of the dominating practice of setting
tariffs for an indefinite term.
The next question concerned the politicization of the tariff regulation process. An overwhelming
majority of respondents admitted one or another degree of politicization. The main politicization
factors were identified as election campaigns and the adoption of tariff rates by the legislative arm
of municipal governments. Some respondents reported a growing understanding of the sector’s
woes among the City Duma deputies, and cases when unpopular measures have been taken, though
such cases are rare. Interestingly, even a respondent from Cherepovets, which has the most
efficient tariff setting process, declared that the process was 100-percent politicized. The only
person who asserted that no politicizing is in place chairs the tariff commission. Evidently, this
respondent is an interested party, and the opinion expressed may not be regarded as objective.
The respondents were then asked to what extent the tariff policy is responsible for the current
status of the enterprises (technical condition of fixed assets, financial health). Summarizing the
answers, one may say that the respondents did not see tariff policy as the sole reason for the dire
state of enterprise assets. Other “contributors” were budget underfinancing and poor management,
though the respondents gave different weights to these factors. Speaking about the tariff policy per
se, the respondents stressed the cushion role of sector enterprises that had ensured public content
for many decades. “The current state of the enterprises is a direct result of the many decades of
tariff-freezing when the tariffs served as a cushion ensuring public content,” – noted one
respondent from Rostov oblast.
Several responses stated that the poor state of fixed assets is caused by lack of professional
specialists because the salaries in the sector are unable to retain people of required qualification.
For example, it was noted that the rank 1 rate for the sector employees is 405 rubles, while
specialists of the same qualification in other organizations are paid 1,200 rubles. Accordingly,
many specialists left, “the remaining ones are over 50, and young people stay away from the
sector that has lost its prestige.” (Rostov)
The respondents were unanimous on the issue of fixed-term (1 year) tariffs and mandatory tariff
reviews at the end of this period. All responses were positive. Additionally, wishes were expressed
that the proposed term (1 year) he regarded as minimal, and that the regulators should seek to
establish longer periods (2-3 years) to enable enterprises to make efficiency investments and
recover the costs.
Similarly, all respondents agreed that the legislation should include a list of grounds for mandatory
tariff reviews. Responses to this question also indicated the need for legislation that would prove
for automatic tariff adjustments upon changes in energy prices.
Opinions about the need to mandate public hearings for each tariff review were more mixed.
Evidently, some respondents are unclear about the purpose of public hearings. From their
responses it may be deduced that they understand public hearings as a direct discussion of the
tariffs with all stakeholders, though public hearings are just a way of informing the public about
the state of affairs in the sector and the tariff policy. Also, an opinion was voiced that the
population is not ready to take part in such events because “these issues are very difficult for a
common person”. (Yoshkar Ola)
Some respondents voiced concerns that public hearings would give the public community the
opportunity to influence tariff rates, and that residents or their representatives would be invited to
vote on tariff decisions. At the same time, the majority of the respondents recognized public
hearings as a usable measure if intended to inform the public about the reasons behind the tariff
rates. Moreover, they admitted that informing the public about the tariff policy could help alleviate
the social tension. Several examples are given below.
“Importantly, the hearings should make the people understand that a low tariff rate would result
in accidents and service interruptions. The hearings should have nothing in common with a vote.”
(Cherepovets)
“The public should have access to the information about what made one or another tariff
necessary.” (Rostov Oblast)
“Public hearings are necessary to give citizens an understanding of what is going on.” (Orenburg)
“Public hearings should take place, but they should not affect the rate levels; rather, they should
provide informational support. Tariffs are first and foremost economics, not voting.” (Yuzhno-
Sakhalinsk)
Some responses contained complaints about the unavailability of mechanisms for informing the
public about the tariff in some regional regulatory systems and the information substantiating the
tariff rates approved by regional energy commissions. (An example: “We are not informed about
what makes tariffs for gas and electricity grow.”) At the same time, several respondents noted the
public hearings held by regional energy commissions as an example of the type of  practices to be
replicated by municipalities.
All respondents were positive about the need to install coordination into the tariff decisions of the
regulatory authorities at all levels (federal, regional, municipal) and tie tariff formation to the
budgetary process. Many instances of tariff hikes for the heat and power energy produced by
enterprises of the Unified Energy System of Russia were reported after the budget had been
approved. In the opinion of several respondents, tariffs may be changed during the budget year
only in case of a force majeure.
And finally, most respondents were unable to identify the best incentive for municipalities to
pursue “good” tariff policies. Some noted that such incentives might include a clear delimitation of
the powers of different levels of government, predictable fiscal relations, and a unified regulatory
base for the tariff-setting process. Also named was the need to match financing and the volume of
services to be produced.
3.1.5 Conclusions
After reviewing the analysis presented, it is little surprise that the past two winters have witnessed
frequent crises in the provision of water and heat services in Russian cities. Over the past several
years, tariffs for these services have increased at a fraction of inflation, and the bills based on these
tariffs have often gone unpaid by local governments. The statistical analysis presented here
confirms the highly politicized decisionmaking on tariff increases. It also indicates that tariffs have
been restrained as a “shock absorber” to mitigate the impact of surges in inflation on the
population.
Politicization has take place on  two levels. The first is at the local level, as we have seen. But this
pattern could not have been sustained without the complicity of national energy monopolies in
tolerating unpaid bills from local communal service enterprises—and ultimately the municipalities.
This policy began to be reversed only after the election of Vladimir Putin.10 Unfortunately, the
Russian government has displayed great reluctance to take decisive action to put tariff setting on a
rational footing, both in determining appropriate rates and in adopting them. Until this is done,
more winters of crisis are likely in store.
                                                
10 See Hough (2001) for an excellent discussion of this implicit policy during the transition.
3.2. Housing and Utility Payments Policy
3.2.1 Analysis of regulatory and legal basis of the transition to a new system
of payment for housing and utility services.
Before adoption of the Law "On Foundations of the Federal Housing Policy", of December 24,
1992 (hereinafter  - the Law "On Foundations ..."), payment for housing and utility services was
regulated mainly by the norms set by the RSFSR Housing Code of July 24, 1983. The procedure of
payment for use of residential space in state11 and communal housing relied on state subsidies for
expenses on maintaining state and communal housing, which greatly exceeded payments made by
population. The state was spending huge amounts on subsidies to housing and utility sector, with
very low return. Housing and utility payments made by the population could not compensate these
expenses. Rent payments were collected in accordance with the Decrees of All-Soviet Central
Executive Committee and Soviet of People Commissars of RSFSR "On Housing Payments in
Cities and Worker's Settlements" of May 14, 1928, and "On Housing Policy" of January 4, 1928,
which set the rate of rent payments at RUR 0.132 for 1 square meter of residential floor area, and
for buildings with improved comfort conditions - at RUR 0.165 for 1 square meter (i.e. 25%
higher). These rates did not change for over 60 years and amounted to about 2% of a household
income (4% together with utility payments). In 1992, residents' payments covered only 1% of
maintenance and repair costs of state housing, and only 8% of utility services costs. This method
of payment for use of housing was not in line with the principles of the country's transition to
market economy.
Principles of the new system of payment for housing and utility services.
With the adoption of the Law "On Foundations ..." the procedure of compensating the expenses on
housing stock maintenance was changed. Pursuant to Article 15 of the Law "On Foundations ...",
payment for housing and utility services under a rent agreement is set in the amount covering the
cost of maintenance and repair, as well as utilities. Thus, federal law declares the principle of full
coverage of costs of maintenance and repair of housing and utility services with payments of
residents, who occupy residential space in state and communal housing under social rent
agreements12. Transition to the new system of housing and utility payments is aimed at
compensation of the actual cost of housing and utility services by consumers and implies
simultaneous introduction of targeted social assistance to families, depending on their income.
Thus, in 1992, it was declared that the goal of housing and utility payment reform is the
transition to full coverage of costs by residents' payments with simultaneous social protection
of low-income families.
Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation "On
Enactment of the Law of the Russian Federation "On Foundations of Federal Housing Policy"" of
                                                
11 At that time, "municipal" type of housing was not yet introduced. Absolute majority of residential buildings and
100% of apartment buildings belonged to the state housing stock (Art 5 of RSFSR Housing Code).
12 Later, the Government of the Russian Federation applied the same principle to owners of housing.
December 24, 1992, previously adopted legislative acts of the Russian Federation and subjects of
the Russian Federation can be applied as long as they do not contradict the Law "On Foundations
...". Therefore, the use of provisions of the Housing Code of RSFSR was limited and the Code
occupied a less important position in the hierarchy of legal acts regulating the procedure of
housing and utility payments.
Legislators assumed that introduction of full payment for housing and utility services by the
population with simultaneous social protection of population would result in significant decrease
in budget expenses, as the need to provide subsidies to housing and utility enterprises would be
eliminated and budget expenses would only be associated with compensation of benefits and
allowances provided to citizens.
Terms and stages of transition.
Article 15 of the Law "On Foundations ..." stated that the transition to the new system of payment
for housing and utility services should be done in stages within 5 years, i.e. from 1998 all budget
subsidies to housing and utility enterprises should have been terminated, while consumers should
have paid full cost of services. The transition should be done in stages, and the stages and the order
of transition to the new system of housing and utility payments is determined by the Government
of the Russian Federation together with authorities of the subjects of the Russian Federation.
The principle of full coverage of the costs of maintenance and repair of housing and utility services
by residents' payments, established by the federal law, is further regulated by the Resolutions of
the Government of the Russian Federation, which describe in detail the procedure for
implementation of the new payment system and set forth additional social guarantees for the
population.
On the grounds of Article 15 of the Law "On Foundations ...", the Resolution #935 of the
Government of the Russian Federation of September 22, 1993 "On Transition to New System of
Payment for Housing and Utility Services and Procedure for Providing Compensation
(Allowances) to Citizens for Housing and Utility Payments" (Paragraph 1) sets the terms of stage-
by-stage transition to the new system.
In addition to Resolution #935, another Resolution of the Soviet of Ministers of the Russian
Federation (#1329, of December 23, 1993) "On Supplementing the Decree #935 of the
Government of the Russian Federation, of September 22, 1993" authorized executive authorities of
the subjects of the Russian Federation to establish the level of residents' payments for maintenance
and repair of housing and utility services as percentage of cost, for each year and each region
(city), depending on the current financial situation and possibility of providing compensation
(allowances) to citizens for housing and utility payments from the budgets of the subjects of the
Russian Federation, with the goal of reaching the 100% level of residents' payments by 1998.
In 1994 - 1995, tariffs for housing and utility services were growing at such a quick rate that they
were no longer lagging behind the inflation rate. In these years, the share of housing and utility
costs covered by the population increased from 2 - 3 % to 20 - 40 %13. In 1995, real income of
population fell by 13%. As a result, politicians reconsidered their approach to the reform of
housing and utility payments and extended the deadline for transition of housing and utility sector
to full self-sufficiency.
Federal Law # 9-FZ, of January 12, 1996, "On Introduction of Changes and Amendments to the
Law of the Russian Federation "On Foundations of Federal Housing Policy" has changed the
initially established five-year term of transition to the new system to a ten-year term. Thus,
pursuant to federal law, the deadline for transition to full coverage of costs of maintenance and
repair of housing and utility services by payments of residents occupying residential space in state
and municipal housing under social rent agreements was moved to 2003.
Following the State Duma, in 1996, the Government of Russia decided not to set a unified
maximum level of residents' payments for housing and utility services. Paragraph 6 of the
Government Resolution # 707, of June 18, 1996, recommends that executive authorities of the
subjects of the Russian Federation set the level of residents' payments for housing and utility
services as percentage of housing and utility costs for each year of the transitional period. Such
regulation of terms of stage-by-stage transition to the new payment system should have been
performed on the basis of suggestions of local self-governments, depending on the current
financial situation. Due to the fact that Paragraph 7 of this Resolution authorizes local self-
governments to set tariffs for housing and utility services, the level of residents' payments,
established by executive authorities of the subjects of the Russian Federation, can be used only for
inter-budgetary relations between region and municipalities.
Timeframe for the reform of housing and utility payments (1997-2003) was fixed by the Concept
of Housing and Utility Sector Reform, approved by Presidential Decree # 425, of April 28, 1997,
"On Housing and Utility Sector Reform in the Russian Federation". However, in this new stage,
the Concept placed the main focus not on raising the tariffs for housing and utility services, but on
lowering the costs of service providers. The Concept indicated that crisis should be resolved by
way of changing the system of financing, i.e. by moving from budget subsidizing to full coverage
of housing and utility costs by consumers, while providing at the same time social assistance to
low-income families and economic incentives for improving the quality of services. In other
words, the Concept suggested sharp reduction of budget expenditures (first of all, the expenses of
the state) and corresponding increase of expenses of the population.
In 1999, the State Duma once again decided to move the deadline for transition to full payment for
housing and utility services. Pursuant to Federal Law # 113-FZ, of June 17, 1999, "On
Introduction of Changes and Amendments to the Law of the Russian Federation "On Foundations
of Federal Housing Policy", the transition to the new system of payment for housing and utility
services shall be performed stage by stage within 15 years, i.e. by 2008.
This Federal Law added the following provision to Article 15: "During the period of stage-by-
stage transition to the new system of payment for housing and utility services, the Government of
the Russian Federation shall continue to observe the procedure for providing subsidies (transfers)
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to budgets of the subjects of the Russian Federation for maintenance and repair of housing and
facilities of the housing and utility sector in the amount not covered by residents' payments". Thus,
the state has declared for the first time its obligation to compensate a part of expenses of regional
budgets, which are used to cover the losses of housing management, housing maintenance, repair,
construction, utility and specialized organizations, resulting from state regulation of prices for
housing and utility services.
RF Government Resolution #877, of August 2, 1999, "On Improving the System of Payment for
Housing and Utility Services and Measures of Social Protection of Population" (Part 2, Paragraph
8) authorizes local self-governments, during the period of transition, to set the maximum allowable
share of household expenditures for housing and utility payments by total family income, as well
as amount of residents' payments for housing and utility services provided. At the same time, the
Government recommends that, for the purpose of improving social protection of low-income
population groups, local self-governments  set the amount of payment for housing and utility
services within the limits of the federal standard of maximum allowable share of household
expenditures for housing and utility payments by total family income, per person. Thus, the
Government has consented to the fact that actual terms of transition to full coverage of housing
and utility costs will be determined at municipal level.
Distribution of authority on setting the rates of housing and utility payments for the
population.
Pursuant to Resolution # 935 (Paragraph 5), local administrations are authorized to approve norms
of consumption for housing and utility services, as well as rates and tariffs for housing and utility
services. This authority is determined by the terms and levels of residents' payments as percentage
of housing and utility costs, established by the Resolution.
Later, Presidential Decree #221, of February 28, 1995, "On Measures for Bringing Order into State
Regulation of Prices (Tariffs)" authorized the Government of the Russian Federation to determine
and approve the lists of goods, works and services, prices (tariffs) which are subject to state
regulation by the Government of the Russian Federation, federal bodies of executive power and
bodies of executive power of the subjects of the Russian Federation. Pursuant to this Decree, the
Government has approved Resolution #239 of March 7, 1995, which contains the list of goods,
works and services, prices (tariffs) which are subject to state regulation by bodies of the executive
power of the subjects of the Russian Federation. This list includes "payment for housing and utility
services by the population", as well as "water supply and waste water services" as a separate item.
However, Federal Law #154-FZ, of August 28, 1995, "On General Principles of Organization of
Local Self-Government in the Russian Federation", adopted later, established that prices and tariffs
for products (services) of enterprises, agencies and organizations, which are part of the municipal
property, shall be regulated by local self-governments (Article 31). Therefore, as the absolute
majority of housing and utility enterprises are part of municipal property, the authority of setting
rates of housing and utility payments remained primarily with local self-governments.
Furthermore, the authority of local self-government to approve norms of consumption of housing
and utility services, rates and tariffs for housing and utility services (except for electricity and gas)
was confirmed by the Resolutions of the Russian Government #707 (Paragraph 7), of June 18,
1996, and #887 (Paragraphs 7, 8 and 9) of August 2, 1999; this authority was applied not only to
municipal enterprises and agencies, but also to housing and utility service providers with different
form of ownership.
Ensuring social protection of citizens in connection with payment for housing and utility
services.
Article 15 of the Law "On Foundations ..." (as amended on December 24, 1992) states that bodies
of local administration provide compensations (allowances) to citizens, ensuring payment for
housing within the limits of social standard of housing floor area and norms of consumption of
utility services, taking into account total family income, existing benefits and approved budget.
Thus, federal law indicates that assistance provided to the family for payment of housing and
utility services should be based only on the amount of total family income.
Law "On Foundations ..." introduces the concept of social norm of housing floor area. The norm is
the amount of floor area of housing assigned to one person, which determines the limits for
housing and utilities compensations (allowances) (Article 1). Article 11 indicated that social norm
of housing floor area is equivalent to the minimum size of housing provided to the citizens, which
is established by bodies of within the federal level of the Russian Federation. This approach was
later duplicated in a number of resolutions of the Government of the Russian Federation,
regulating issues of payment for housing and utility services and provision of housing allowances.
Five years later, in 1997, Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation #621, of May
26, 1997, "On Federal Standards of Transition to New System of Payment for Housing and Utility
Services", set the federal standard for a social norm of housing floor area, which is being used for
interbudgetary relations. This standard, adopted in the majority of regions of Russia, amounts to 18
square meters of general floor area of housing per one member of a family of three or more, 42
square meters - for a family of 2 persons and 33 square meters - for a person living alone.
Resolution #935 has authorized local administrations to set the share of maximum allowable
household expenditures for housing and utility payments by  total family income, based on the
maximum level of such expenses, which was established as percentage of total family income (10 -
for 1994, 15 - for 1995, 20 - for 1998). The citizens were eligible for compensation, if the amount
of their expenses for housing and utility services, determined by the at residential space occupied
by them (within the limits of social norm) and accounting for existing benefits, exceeded the
maximum allowable share of household expenditures for housing and utility payments by total
family income, set for a certain period.
The Soviet of Ministers has established compulsory compensations (allowances) only for citizens
occupying residential space in municipal and communal housing. For citizens renting housing,
members of cooperative housing, as well as citizens who own their housing, there was only a
possibility of receiving such compensations. In 1999 (after adoption of Federal Law # 113-FZ, of
June 17, 1999), the owners and tenants of housing got equal rights to compensations (allowances).
Federal Law #9-FZ, of January 12, 1996, has introduced an addition to the Law "On Foundations
..." changed and cardinally the principles of providing compensations (allowances) for housing and
utility payments. Starting January 1, 1996, household expenses for housing and utility payments
should not exceed half of minimum wage established by federal law, if the total family income per
person does not exceed the established minimum subsistence level. Thus, legislators abandoned
the method of differentiating the amounts of actual payments to  all allowance recipients on the
basis of total family income and established a unified amount of payment (equal to half of
minimum wage) for a considerable number of citizens.
Resolutions of the Government of the Russian Federation #707, of June 18, 1996 "On Improving
the System of Payment for Housing and Utility Services" and # 887, of August 2, 1999, "On
Improving the System of Payment for Housing and Utility Services and Measures for Social
Protection of Population" have fixed and elaborated on both principles of allowance provision.
The second principle (basis), as mentioned above, implies that a considerable part of the
population has to pay for housing and utility services at the same price, equal to half of minimum
wage, regardless of the established rates of housing and utility payments and total family income.
This equalization of the allowance amount for citizens, whose incomes may differ substantially,
means elimination of the principle of providing assistance to citizens for housing and utility
payments based on their total family income. Moreover, the second principle of allowance
provision implies either sharp reduction (10 times or more) of the allowance amount or termination
of allowance provision if the total per capita household income exceeds minimum wage by 1
Rouble. These conditions are  evidence of the fact that the ways of ensuring social guarantees of
citizens in the housing sector are imperfect and unfair.
Privileges for rent and utility rates.
Privileges for rent and utility rates are a legacy of the Soviet system of supporting the population.
In the 1920s, local Soviets were allowed to reduce rent and utility rates paid by families with many
children by 5% to 15%. However, such privileges were not universal. As well, they were
recommended, but their introduction was not obligatory. Moreover, they were insignificant and
could be applied only to families with many children, which were the poorest ones, as a rule. It
should be pointed out that such privileges are still in effect in some cities, such as Novgorod and
Vladimir.
In their current form, reduced rent and utility rates were introduced in 1975, when, on the occasion
of the 30th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War, the CPSU Central Committee and
the USSR Council of Ministers introduced a 50-percent reduction of rent and utility rates for
disabled war veterans of the first and second groups and families of servicemen killed in action by
their joint Resolution No. 304, On the Additional Privileges for Great Patriotic War Veterans and
Families of Killed Servicemen, of April 18, 1975. Later, in the period between that year and 1991,
several more resolutions were adopted. They provided for reduced rent and utility rates for war
veterans and other similar groups of citizens, as well as for some other groups, such as specialists
who lived and worked in rural areas and people working in hospitals for lepers located in rural
areas.
A huge number of privileges were introduced in Russia in the post-Soviet time. During that period,
privileges were provided not only for services to the fatherland to Heroes of Russia and war
veterans, to families with many children, disabled people and other similar groups, but they were
also provided to people of particular occupations, such as customs officers, militiamen,
prosecutors, army officers, judges and others. More then ten new laws providing for reduction of
rent and utility rates for particular groups of citizens in 1991 through 2002, and more than 30
additions were introduced in them during the same period. Moreover, the privileges provided in
accordance with Soviet laws and resolutions are still in place. In many Russian cities, local laws
regulating social insurance and safety net matters contain provisions taken directly from Soviet
legislation or provisions that refer to them.
Thus, during the years of reform of the housing and utilities sector, the measures aimed at the
reduction of municipal spending on the housing sector were implemented simultaneously with
decisions that increased pressures on the federal budget. Moreover, the federal sources of finance
determined by legislation can hardly compensate the budget for the provision of privileges, while
financing of the implementation of the most costly law - the law on Veterans - is entrusted to
governments of the subjects of the Russian Federation, which, in their term, are unable to fulfill
such financial obligations.
In addition, many Russian city and regional governments have independently introduced local
privileges to certain groups of citizens, such as  privileges to honored citizens, participants in
operations in Chechnya, single mothers, people affected by natural disasters, etc. As a result, more
than 40% of Russians are now paying reduced rent and utility rates, according to the State
Statistics Committee of the Russian Federation (Goskomstat).
The current system of supporting particular professional rather then social groups, alongside with
the absence of a system for compensating business entities for subsidized rates, is destroying the
housing and utilities sector of the Russian economy. Even if higher level budgets provide
compensation for subsidized rates, the funds allotted for the purpose never reach service provides.
Most often, they disappear in local budgets.
In 1996, for the first time in Russian history, Resolution of the Government of the Russian
Federation No. 245 of March 6, 1996 introduced subsidized rent and utility rates for judges of the
Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation and ranked members of its staff. In addition,
Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 1210 of October 14, 1996 introduced
the same privileges for judges of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation and the Supreme
Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation and members of their staff. The resolutions provide for
full payment of rent and utilities by the above categories and compensation for such payments
upon the submission of appropriate payment-confirmation documents at the place of work. In
1998, the application of these rules was extended to two more categories: judges, prosecutors and
their staff members.
Such procedures for subsidizing housing-maintenance and utility services do not infringe on the
rights of people entitled to privileges, but it reduces the volume of non-payments to housing-
maintenance and utility enterprises. Provisions for compensation from budgets of particular
organizations can be regarded as the first step taken at the federal level to initiate the provision of
subsidies for housing-maintenance and utility services.
However, such procedure does not make it possible to come closer to the introduction of targeted
support to those people who actually need it. It's quite obvious that poverty can hardly be
attributed to particular groups of citizens entitled to reduced rates. There are poor young families,
pensioners and disabled people. There are strong people in good health who are temporarily
unemployed, the may be poor representatives of particular occupational groups who have many
dependents in their families. That's why it is not particular professional and social groups who
must be supported, but rather people of a particular family-income level.
Main directions for the improvement of federal legislation regulating payment for housing
and utility ervices.
The bases for the federal housing policy were established by the Federal Law on the Bases of the
Federal Housing Policy more than ten years ago. Though the law has been frequently amended
since its adoption, it has never succeeded to make the government housing policy any more
transparent, clear and consistent. During the same period, Russia's Civil Code was adopted,
development of the Housing Code began and certain provisions of the existing housing legislation
were amended. In addition, new problems were encountered in the process of reforming Russia's
housing and utilities sector. Their resolution also requires legislative action.
All this requires that new amendments and additions be introduced into the Law on the Bases of
the Federal Housing Policy. Since 1999, the Russian government has repeatedly made various
amendment proposals to the State Duma. In late 2002, the State Duma passed the draft law
submitted by the government in the first reading. The aim of the bill is to introduce the principles
of systematic revision of rates with account taken of changes in personal incomes, introduction of
targeted social support of particular families instead of the subsidizing of monopolies and
balancing of the state's obligations relating to payments for housing and utilities.
The proposed bill streamlines the provisions of Articles 15, 18 and 19 of the law and introduces a
number of new definitions reflecting changes in the housing and utilities sector introduced in
accordance with the sub-program named the "Reform and Modernization of the Housing and
Utilities Complex of the Russian Federation and implemented within the Zhilishche (Housing)
Federal Purpose-Oriented Program for 2002 through 2010 (Approved by Resolution of the Russian
Federation Government No. 797 of November 17, 2001). The bill also excludes the provision for
the division of powers relating to regulation of payments for housing and utilities between the
federal level, subjects of the Russian Federation and municipal formations. The time and
procedures for the transition to a new system of payment for housing and utilities shall be
established by subjects of the Russian Federation in accordance with decisions of the Government
of the Russian Federation.
It should be remembered that, since the adoption of the Conception of the Reform of the Housing
and Utilities Complex in the Russian Federation (Decree of the President of the Russian Federation
No. 425), the Russian government has not changed its opinion about the time of introduction of
non-subsidized rates of payment for housing and utilities (2003). Thus, municipal formation will
get a legal right to establish housing and utility rates at a level guaranteeing complete cost
recovery.
The law past in the first reading provides for the provision of targeted housing subsidies to families
depending exclusively on their income and its share used for payment for housing and utilities.
The proposed version of the bill contains no provision requiring that all citizens whose average
monthly income is lower then subsistence minimum in a respective subject of the Russian
Federation will pay only 0.5 of the minimum monthly wage for housing-maintenance and utility
services.  In other words, the new law provides for the abolition of the notorious "second basis".
According to the bill, the principles of the housing subsidy provision must conform to the
Regulations for the Provision of Subsidies for payment for Housing and Utilities approved by the
Government of the Russian Federation.
The law approved in the first reading provides for significant changes in the system of the
provision of subsidies for payment for housing and utilities to particular groups of Russians.
Earlier, the Russian government asked law makers to abolish reduced rates in their current form
and introduce targeted subsidies instead of them, but the proposal was not supported by law
makers. According to the law passed by the State Duma in the first reading, most privileged groups
will retain their current privileges and their amounts. At the same time, the law defines sources of
financing such privileges (subsidized rates) more precisely: part of them must be financed from the
federal budget, while the other part must be financed from budgets of subjects of the Russian
Federation. Moreover, the law contains a provision allowing subjects of the Russian Federation to
refuse to provide some privileges if their budgets can not afford them. This provision can come
into effect only in 2005. However, its possible efficiency is already being questioned by many.
Though the new version of the law contains a number of positive improvements, the most
important of which is the abolition of the "second basis" for the provision of subsidies, it is mostly
a product of compromise which is unable to resolve the main problem - optimization and reduction
of government obligations to subsidize housing and utility rates for different social and
occupational groups accounting for 40% of Russia's population.
The reform of the system supporting the population's payments for housing and utility services is
now the most important task from the viewpoint of both financial stabilization of the housing and
utilities sector and social justice. The subprogram titled "Reform and modernization of the
Housing and Utilities Complex of the Russian Federation" (which is part of the Zhilishche
(Housing) Federal Purpose-Oriented Program for 2002 through 2010) has established that "the
main idea of the economic reform in the housing and utility sector is the transfer of the right of the
disposal of budgetary resources that are currently allotted to subsidize the sector from the
municipal enterprises to citizens who are the persons most interested in the effective use of such
funds". The same document provides for the introduction of a system of citizens' personal social
security accounts. The use of such accounts will promote citizens' self-organization in the housing
sector and development of the market for professional housing-maintenance service market. It will
also increase the transparency of the use of funds and increase social orientation of the budgetary
policy.
Experimental provision of targeted housing subsidies using citizens' personal accounts, which
began in some Russian regions in 2002, was the first step towards the establishment of such a
system. Given the preservation of subsidies extending to the entire population of Russia and
privileges enjoyed by a significant part of Russians, it was impossible to transfer all the funds
concerned to personal accounts as of the start of 2003. The experiment began after the adoption of
Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 490, "On the Experimental
Application of the Economic Model of the Reform of the Housing and Utilities Sector", of July 1,
2002. In the development of that resolution, Russia's State Committee for Construction (Gosstroi)
developed the Procedure for the Performance of the Experiment Aimed at Targeted Social Support
of the Population in the Payment for Housing and Utility Services with the Use of Personal Social
Accounts and approved it on September 6, 2002.
According to the Procedure, the personal social account is construed as a bank account to which
subsidies used by citizens for payment for housing and utility services are transferred. The main
purpose of a citizens' personal social account is to serve as an instrument for citizens' settlements
with service providers, using the budgetary funds transferred into them.
In addition to housing subsidies, other government funds intended for the housing and utilities
sector may be transferred to such accounts. For instance, regional and municipal privileges can
already be expressed in money terms, while respective amounts can already be transferred to
personal social accounts on the condition that citizens enjoying privileges pay for housing and
utility services in accordance with the established rates. This will require amendment of Russia's
local laws and regulatory documents regulating the provision of such privileges.
Conclusions
Thus, having reviewed the initial goals of the reform of payment for housing and utility services,
stated in the Law "On Foundations ..." of 1992, as well as intermediate goals, described in later
legislative acts and governmental resolutions, issued over the decade, we arrive at the following
conclusions:
1. The goal of the housing and utility payments reform is the transition to full coverage of costs
by residents' payments with simultaneous social protection of low-income families. This goal
has not changed and is still being pursued by the legislative and executive authorities of the
Russian Federation.
2. The terms of transition to the new system of housing and utility payments have been repeatedly
moved to later dates. The legislators and the Government cannot reach a unity of opinion either
on the necessity of full transition to the new system as soon as possible, or on the methods of
such transition.
3. Due to the uncertainty of legislative authorities regarding the terms and stages of transition to
the new system and their ultimate refusal to set the stages of transition in federal laws, the key
decisions on actual terms of transition are being made at the municipal level and responsibility
for these decisions falls on local self-governments.
4. The initial principle of clear and direct correlation between the social assistance provided to a
family for housing and utility payments and total family income was eliminated when the
second principle of allowance provision was introduced, under which the amount of allowance
depends on minimum subsistence level and minimum wage.  As a result, the principles of
social justice in providing social assistance to the population were undermined.
5. During the years of the reform of the system of payment for housing and utilities,
simultaneously with measures aimed at cancellation of subsidies to the housing and utilities
sector and reduction of municipal government spending on that sector, legislative decisions
were made to introduce reduced housing and utility rates to particular groups of citizens. Such
decisions significantly increased pressure on the federal and municipal budgets.
3.2.2 The problem of consistency of the local and federal policies of housing
and utility payments.
Over the decade from 1992 to 2002, almost all Russian municipalities have been involved in the
process of reforming the system of housing and utility payments, but the process itself was full of
contradictions and developed unevenly.
Over the years, the following tendency was clearly displayed: considerable increase in the share of
residents' payment covering the costs of housing and utility services, decrease in budget subsidies
to the sector with simultaneous provision of social assistance to low-income families with the use
of municipal budget funds. After the crisis of 1998, the actual rate of increase of the level (share)
of residents' payments for housing and utility services has slowed down, and began to grow again
only in 2000. Moreover, in the last two years the changes have occured at a very fast pace.
In many regions of Russia, starting from 2000, the level of residents' payments for the cost of
housing and utilities services has increased significantly. This can be explained by  decreased local
budget revenues in 2000 due to a redistribution of tax allocations, as well as by a  strengthening  of
the payment discipline regarding the payments to RAO UESR. In the period from the beginning of
2000 to September 2002, the amount of housing and utility payments for a standard apartment (54
square meters per 3 persons) in administrative centers of the subjects of the Russian Federation has
increased on the average 2.96 times (from RUR 251 to RUR 742 a month).
Many regions successfully implemented the program of targeted social assistance in the form of
compensations (allowances) for housing and utility payments (hereinafter - housing allowance) to
low-income citizens. Over 8.2% of the families with the lowest income received such allowances
at the end of 2001, increasing to more than 10% in 2002, (according to Gosstroy’s data).
At the same time, the progress of the reform shows that solutions, which are being implemented at
the local level, very often are nothing but a distorted reflection of the federal policy. As an
example, such municipal indicators as level of residents' payments for housing and utility services,
prices for housing and utility services and maximum share of household expenditures for housing
and utility payments by  total family income do not match the federal standards.
Table 12. Data on housing and utility payments policy in some Russian cities (as of April 1, 2002)
№
№
City Amount of
Payment
for Housing
and Utility
Services in
Standard
Apartment
(RUR)
Amount of
Payment for
Housing and
Utility Services
in Standard
Apartment as
per Federal
Standard of
Maximum
Price for
Housing and
Utility
Services, for
200214 (RUR)
Residents'
Coverage of
Housing and
Utility Costs
(%)
Federal
Standard of
Residents'
Coverage of
Housing and
Utility Costs
for 200215
(%)
Maximum
Allowable Share
of Household
Expenditures for
Housing and
Utility Payments
in Total
Household Income
(%)
Federal Standard of
Maximum
Allowable Share of
Household
Expenditures for
Housing and Utility
Payments in Total
Household Income
for 2002 16
(%)
1 Ulianovsk 460 799 52 90 18 22
2 Dimitrovgrad 531 799 70 90 20 22
3 Ioshkar Ola 516 702 67 90 20 22
4 Cheboksary 398 702 90 90 20 22
5 Vladimir 414 799 80 90 8 22
6 Kovrov н.д. 799 100 90 16 22
7 Ryazan 529 761 60 90 16 22
8 Kaluga 746 961 80 90 20 22
9 Maloyaroslavets н.д. 961 80 90 15 22
10 Cherepovets 837 977 100 90 10 22
11 Tihvin н.д. 1107 72 90 19,5 22
12 Velikii Novgorod 729 1026 70 90 20 22
13 Murmansk 864 1728 50 90 17 22
                                                
14 According to Government Resolution dated November 19, 2001 # 804 "On Federal Standards of Transition to the New System of Payment for Housing and
Utility Services for 2002", this federal standard is established for the subjects of the Russian Federation
15 According to Government Resolution dated November 19, 2001 # 804 "On Federal Standards of Transition to the New System of Payment for Housing and Utility
Services for 2002" and the concept of reforming housing and utility sector in the Russian Federation, approved by Presidential Decree dated April 28, 1997, #425.
16 According to Government Resolution dated November 19, 2001 # 804 "On Federal Standards of Transition to the New System of Payment for Housing and Utility
Services for 2002"
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As indicated above, by resolutions of federal legislative power and the Government of the
Russian Federation, the authority to set rates and tariffs for housing and utility services was
transferred to local self-governments. At the same time, executive authorities of the majority of
the subjects of the Russian Federation adopt yearly decisions on setting the level (share) of
payments by the population for housing and utility services in the territory of the given Oblast,
Republic or Krai. In practice, depending on the situation in the region, the share of residents'
payments established by the Russian Federation serves either as the upper limit for local self-
governments or as regional standard of transition to the new system of housing and utility
payments. It should be noted that until recently regional standards usually were falling slightly
behind the federal standards, although current interbudgetary relations encourage the authorities
of the subjects of the Russian Federation to reduce this gap.
Municipalities, as a rule, are not in a hurry to increase housing and utility rates and tariffs to the
level set by the subject of the Russian Federation. Moreover, municipalities, which have
economic, budgetary and social conditions favorable for advanced transition to the new system
of housing and utility payments, are limited by the level of residents' payment set at the regional
level.
In legal terms, compliance with this level is not compulsory for municipalities. Pursuant to p.8 of
Government Resolution #887, the rates and tariffs for housing and utility services (with
exception of tariffs for electricity and gas) are set by bodies of local self-government. However,
Subparagraph 6 of Paragraph 7 of the same Resolution recommends that state authorities of the
subjects of the Russian Federation exercise control over the consistency of standards of transition
to the new system of housing and utility payments in the regions to federal standards. As a result,
attempts of some municipalities to "jump over" the level of residents' payments set by the subject
of the Russian Federation were, at the very least, not encouraged.
A bright example of such situation is the case of Cherepovets (Vologodskaya Oblast) which is
the first Russian city which made the transition to full coverage of the cost of housing and utility
services by the population and the first city which has experienced the consequences of such
step.
One of the reasons for the transition was the reduction of the revenue part of the city's budget
and, the subsequent decrease of possibilities to subsidize the enterprises of housing and utility
sector. The rates of housing and utility payments have not been raised since 1998 (when they
were frozen) and real increase in the cost of services was compensated by the increase in budget
subsidies. Good budget capacity allowed the city to cover the difference with budget funds. It
has to be noted that budget revenues in Cherepovets in 2000 have increased considerably due to
the  favorable financial situation of the biggest taxpayers in the city, allowing it to increase the
rates of payments for housing and utility services, while keeping the old rates for the population.
Unlike many other cities, where in 2000 serious problems were revealed concerning the
financing of housing and utility sector, especially energy, Cherepovets managed to avoid these
difficulties. Moreover, the budget not only financed current expenses, but also repaid credit
indebtedness of previous years. Nonetheless, growth of tariffs for housing and utility services
combined with frozen rates of payments by the population increased the budget burden
considerably. Moreover, in 2001, the budget had more modest financial capabilities due to
changes in tax and budget legislation and the reduction in profit of key city enterprises (e.g. the
reduction in income of OAO Severstal due to a drop in steel prices on the world market).
One of the decisive factors which enabled the city to make the decision on the transition to full
payment was high level of trust of the city residents to their mayor (the present mayor of the city
has been holding his position for over 8 years). The mayor was implementing reasonable socio-
economic policy and possessed significant political resources which allowed him to adopt this
rather unpopular decision. Before introducing full payment for services, within a year and a half,
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the city administration and experts were performing a thorough analysis of the state of the
housing stock and engineering infrastructure, population income, financial situation of
enterprises and budget capabilities. A new, more progressive system of tariff regulation was
designed and implemented.
Starting from July 2001, residents of Cherepovets have paid for housing and utility services in
the amounts covering its full cots. The budget has ceased to subsidize housing and utility
enterprises. The introduction of full payment in 2001 enabled the city to save RUR 400 mln.,
which is approximately one quarter of the city's budget. This also allowed the city to optimize
budget expenses, reducing them considerably and targeting them to social assistance to low-
income families, while as well increasing the volume of capital repairs of housing.
The increase in the level of residents' payment for housing and utility services was accompanied
by strengthened measures of social assistance. On the basis of analysis of the level of income of
the population, it was established that the share of housing and utility payments should not
exceed 10% of total family income (federal standard is 22%). This means that for a considerable
number of city residents with relatively low income, actual payments for housing and utility
services have decreased. The number of recipients of housing allowances in the period from
January to December 2001 increased from 5.3% to 19.3%, but by July 2002 the number of
citizens applying for allowances had already dropped to 14%. The housing allowance office was
transferred from the Department of Housing and Utility Sector to the Department of Social
Policy, which made it possible to optimize and ensure regular financing of the housing allowance
program.
One would think that such a step taken by local authorities in full compliance with the essence of
the reform would receive full approval from regional and federal authorities. However, in reality
this was not the case. This decision by the Cherepovets Mayor was met with strong opposition
from authorities of all levels.
Shortly after the introduction of full payments for housing and utility services in the city, public
statements made by Mr. G. Gref, the Minister of Economic Development and Trade, to the effect
that the population would never pay 100% of the cost have lead to the aggravation of  the
residents regarding the housing and utility payments policy implemented by the city
administration. Not only the level of payments collection drop 30%, but there were also public
protests. As a result, instead of being supported at the federal level, the Mayor was criticized
from all levels as a leader who has made a hasty decision.
The Mayor became a hostage of political games, as representatives of all levels of power kept
trying to gain political points by canceling the decision on the transition to full payments, and the
leaders of the Ministry of Economic Development and Gosstroy discussed the inadvisability of
the transition to full payment by the population for the cost of housing and utility services.
The transition to full payments by the population for the costs of housing and utility services
have caused one more problem. When the tariffs for the population were increased, the volume
of benefits  provided to various groups of population for payment for housing and utility services
also increased. Pursuant to legislation, the allowances provided should be compensated to the
city from federal and regional budgets. For calculation of the allowance amounts, federal and
regional standards for the level of residents' payments are used, which are 10% and 20% lower
(respectively) than the level established by the city. Only 15% of the required amount (RUR 240
mln.)was allocated to the city from the federal and regional budgets. Thus, residents become
hostages of a state which does not fulfill its obligations. As a result, several residents' claims
were tried in court and there are endless audits, including those made by oblast officials, who
claim that the debts under allowances appeared because the Mayor had introduced new rates of
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housing and utility payments without sufficient budget resources for the compensation of such
allowances.
As a summary, it should be noted that:
- the transition to full payment by population of the cost of housing and utility services under
conditions of uncoordinated actions of federal, regional and municipal authorities has
resulted in the involvement of the city Mayor, who made an unpopular decision, into
political games.
- the transition to 100% payment by the population proved to be unbeneficial for regional
authorities, as the expenses for the compensation of benefits provided increased
- also, the transition was not beneficial for the city itself, as, first of all, each time when the
budget is planned for the next year, the share of tax allocations which remains at the citiy's
disposal is cut, and secondly, the Mayor who made such an unpopular decision, is being
criticized everywhere and his rating has dropped almost 3 times.
At the same time, the introduction of 90-percent payments for housing and utility services was
planned in a number of subjects of the Russian Federation for late 2002 or early 2003. Such
payments conform to federal requirements and are quite close to the cost-recovery level. The
regions that planned such measures included Nizhni Novgorod, Smolensk, Irkutsk, Belgorod,
Sakhalin, Kirov and others, the Krasnoyarsk and Primorsky Territories and the Republics of
Chuvashia, Udmurtia and Buryatia. Moreover, from 2002 through 2003 a number of municipal
formation introduced rates covering the costs of housing and utility service in full. They included
the city of Kaluga, Kovrov in the Vladimir Region and Arzamas and Borrowing in the Nizhni
Novgorod Region. The 90-percent coverage of housing and utilities costs is already the usual
practice in tens of Russian cities. It should be pointed out that such payments are already a usual
thing in many cities in Siberia and Russia's Far East, while only a year ago there were a lot of
discussions about Siberia's and Far East's special way.
The gap between the "established" share of residents' payments and the one actually effective in
the region reflects a lack of coordination of activities by regional and local authorities regarding
the housing policy. The gap between the "established" level of residents' payments and the
respective federal standard characterizes the efficiency of the federal policy in encouraging the
given region to make the transition to the new system of housing and utility payments.
Slow transition of municipalities to a new system of payments is often associated with the
situation when the authority for setting rates of housing and utility payments is exercised by
bodies of representative power (town and raion meetings). This norm is often included Charters
of municipalities. Obviously, in such a situation the housing and utility payments policy turns
into a highly politicized, unpredictable and controversial issue.
As far as social assistance to the population for payment of housing and utility services is
concerned, housing allowances programs implemented in many municipalities also differ from
the principles declared in the Law "On Foundations ..." and in Government Resolutions.
As mentioned above, after the enactment of Government Resolution # 887 in August 1999,
approval of the procedure for provision of housing allowances was no longer a matter of
municipal jurisdiction alone, but became a task of both the municipality and the subject of the
Russian Federation. Also, the right to establish the maximum allowable share of household
expenditures for housing and utility payments by total family income was transferred to local
self-governments.
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The current situation leads to considerable differences between the maximum allowable share of
household expenditures for housing and utility payments by total family income established
locally and the federal standard. Another important difference is related to the introduction in
1996 (by addition to the Law "On Foundations ...") of the second principle of provision of
housing allowance, which sets the limit for housing and utility payments for all families, whose
income is below the minimum subsistence level.
Table 13. Selective data on basic principles of provision of housing allowance in Russian
cities (as of April 2002)
City Payments
for housing
and utility
services in
standard
apartment
per person
(RUR)
Minimu
m
subsiste
nce level
(RUR)
Maximum
allowable
share of
household
expenditures
for housing
and utility
payments by
total family
income (%)
Second
principle
Amount of
income per
person,
which makes
the family
eligible for
housing
allowance
under
federal
standard of
22% (RUR)
Estimated
maximum
allowable
share of
household
expenditures
for housing
and utility
payments
based on
minimum
subsistence
level, %
Ryazan
176 1715 16 (previously
20)
yes 800 10
Novgorod 243 1786 20 yes 1104 14
Vladimir 138 1349 8 (previously
15)
no 627 10
Nizhnii
Novgorod
191 1717 18 no 868 11
Cheboksary 133 1582 20 yes 604 8
Saratov 146 1535 20 yes 663 9
 
For municipalities, the introduction of the second principle  means a considerable increase in
budget expenses for payment of housing allowances, a more difficult prognosis of the need for
allowances, problems in operation of housing allowance offices, and an increased probability of
receiving falsified information from families applying for allowances. The practice shows that
regions and municipalities have dealt with this situation in two possible ways:
-  by calculating housing allowances using the first principle only, justifying it by the absence
of established regulatory methods of determining the minimum subsistence level;
- by  not allocating enough funds in the budget for the provision of housing allowance based
on both principles, which leads to a duplication of the situation with housing and utility
benefits, when the lack of budget coverage for benefits and housing allowances  results in
missing revenues for housing and utility enterprises. In Russia as a whole, after Goscomstat,
about 60% of housing allowances obligations are being fulfilled; however, in a number of
regions only 10 - 20% of the amount of housing allowances granted to the population is
transferred.
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In a number of cities, decisions not to introduce the "second basis" were made together with
decisions to reduce the share of citizens' expenditures on the housing and utility services (See
Table 13). In such cases, all families with personal incomes below the subsistence minimum
were included into the housing subsidy provision programs.
Although the second principle for the provision of housing allowances, introduced by the Law
"On Foundations ...", has been in effect for 6 years already, the number of municipalities which
have not introduced the provision of housing allowance based on the second principle is still
rather high - about one quarter of all municipalities (e.g. Vladimir, Ryazan and others). However,
the number of territories where the second principle is in effect has been growing, although
slowly, from 1996 to this day. It should be noted that in these regions the percentage of families
receiving housing allowance based on the first principle is reducing, while the percentage of
families receiving the allowance under the second principle is growing (the family has a right to
choose the most beneficial formula for calculating the allowance). For example, in the city of
Omsk, given the insignificant change in the total number of recipients of housing allowances, the
share of families who chose the method of calculation based on the second principle came to
13.6% in 1998, 30.8 % - in 1999, and over 70% - in 2000.
The uncertainty of legal acts concerning the issue of distribution of authority on establishing the
procedure for provision of housing allowance has lead to disagreements between the subjects of
the Russian Federation and municipalities. As an example, let's review the procedures for the
housing allowance provisions, which are currently in effect in Belgorod Oblast and in the city of
Belgorod. Under the procedure adopted by Belgorod Oblast in 2000, targeted allowances for
housing and utility payments are provided "within the limits of the social norm of floor area of
housing and typical standards of consumption of utility services, based on the distribution of
households by income groups, total family income and existing benefits". The maximum
allowable share of expenditures for housing and utility payments by total family income is set as
follows: for a household with an income of up to RUR 700 per person - 10%, with an income
between RUR 701 and RUR 1200 - 15%, and with an income over RUR 1201 - 22%.
Table 14. The discrepancy between the maximum admissible share of utility and housing
costs in the family budget which are established at the federal level and those which are
established at the levels of subjects of the Russian Federation and municipal formations (by
the examples of the Belgorod Oblast and city of Belgorod)
Maximum allowable share of household
expenditures for housing and utility
payments established in Belgorod Oblast
Average per
capita income
per person per
month, RUR
Maximum allowable
share of expenditures for
housing and utility
payments (%)
Maximum
allowable share of
household
expenditures for
housing and utility
payments
established in the
city of Belgorod
(%)
Federal standard
of maximum
allowable share of
household
expenditures for
housing and utility
payments (%)
up to 700 10
from 701 to
1200
15
over 1201 22
19 22
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Thus, in Belgorod Oblast the procedure for calculating housing allowance is based on the first
principle, i.e. the share of household expenditures for housing and utility payments is
differentiated based on the household income. In the city of Belgorod, pursuant to municipal
regulations, issued as well in 2000, but before the issue of the Oblast's regulations, housing
allowances are calculated based on both the first and the second principle and the maximum
allowable share of household expenditures for housing and utility payments by the total family
income is in accordance with the first principle - at 19%. After the Oblast's regulations were
issued, the city of Belgorod continued to provide allowances in accordance with municipal
regulations.
Based on the above, we can conclude that the process of implementation of the state policy
regarding payments for housing and utility services at the local level is influenced by the
specifics of economic situation of every region, as well as by the local political situation and the
short-term goals set by the leaders of regions and cities.
3.2.3 Hypotheses
Over the decade, after the enactment of the Law "On Foundations ..." in 1992, the reform of
housing and utility payments was hindered by the inherent difficulty of finding the right balance
between the goals of increasing economic efficiency of the housing sector and providing social
protection to the population, as well as by external factors associated with the problems of
reaching macro-economic stabilization while the progress of structural reforms remains slow.
Based on the analysis of the goals and objectives of the housing and utility payments reform,
indicated by the legislative authorities and the Government of the Russian Federation, as well as
on the analysis of the reform progress in different Russian municipalities, a number of
hypotheses were made regarding the factors which have positive or negative impact on the rates
and results of reforms in the sphere of housing and utility payments.
All the hypotheses involve the dynamics of the rates of housing and utility services. The authors
are fully aware of the fact that each increase in housing and utility rates can be caused by an
increase in the level of residents' payments in covering the costs of housing and utility services,
as well as by increase in prices for one or another service. However, the analysis of dynamics of
the level of residents' payments does not seem reasonable. The data on the level (share) of
residents' payments, included in statistical form 22 -ZHKH, became available only after great
delay and usually represented the level of residents' payments "declared" by local self-
government, which does not correspond to the actual correlation between the rates of payments
and the cost of services. On the other hand, it is virtually impossible to estimate the real share of
residents' payments in covering the cost of housing and utility services, as there is no accurate
information available on the full cost of housing and utility services in the cities. Therefore, in
this analysis, instead of using the data on the level of residents' payments, we use the data on the
rates of payments for housing and utility services in surveyed municipalities, the accuracy of
which is confirmed.
Factors influencing the dynamics of the rates of payment for housing and utility services
In recent years, almost all municipalities have displayed the tendency toward in increase in  rates
for housing and utility services. At the same time, research shows that rates of housing and
utility services, set for the population at the municipal level, are being changed randomly and
without any system. The most probable cause of this situation is that economic and political
factors influencing the process of reforming housing and utility payments are in constant
54
contradiction with each other.  The"freezing" of tariffs, it seems, is caused by political reasons,
while decisions on raising the tariffs for housing and utility services are made under the pressure
of economic factors.
On the one hand, the authorities of the subjects of the Russian Federation and of local self-
government raise the tariffs and rates of housing and utility services, set for consumers, in an
attempt to stop further deterioration of the housing and utility sector, which is caused by the
chronic lack of financing of housing and utility enterprises accompanied by the strengthening of
discipline regarding payments to energy providers. Also, the  reduction in the  revenue base of
local budgets and their dependency on regional and federal transfers force authorities to adopt
decisions on the reduction of budget allocations to the sector and, consequently, on transferring
the burden of expenses for housing and utility services to the consumer. However, it should be
noted that the latter factors may be viewed as political, rather than economic, as they are a result
of the federal policy of strengthening the state vertically17.
On the other hand, the political situation characterized by the succession of elections to the
bodies of power of different levels, including the elections of leaders of local self-government,
does not provide a good environment for making serious strategic decisions; such a situation
leads to the  attempts to keep the amounts of housing and utilities payments at the same level for
as long as possible. The majority of local leaders set only short-term political goals for
themselves, which do not always correspond to the goals of long-term housing policy.
Hypothesis 1.1. Political situation associated with elections of leaders of local self-government
leads to keeping the amounts of residents' housing and utility payments at the same level.
Factors influencing the dynamics of payments for housing and utility services by the
population
Raising the residents' payments is an unpopular measure. Politicians, as well as mass media,
when opposing the increase of rates of housing and utility services, argue that the population is
unable to pay. Demonstrations protesting housing reform in Voronezh in 2001, despite being a
specially organized political act, served to many local politicians as a good illustration of the fact
that any increase of payments for housing and utility services would unavoidably have a negative
response from the population. Local self-governments are also frightened by the possibility of a
sharp reduction in collection of payments for housing and utility services.
However, the practice of reforming the system of housing and utility payments in a number of
cities which have consistently increased the share of residents' coverage of the housing and
utility costs and, consequently, the rates, shows that the reaction of the population to the local
housing policy is not harshly negative.
Hypothesis 2.1. An increase in rates for housing and utility payments does not lead to a
decrease in the level of payment collection.
Factors influencing the dynamics of the number of participants in the  housing allowance
program
                                                
17 The impact of these factors on the dynamics of payments for housing and utilities services was not analyzed in
this report as information on these factors is too general and the data, which would allow to perform analysis with
the use of statistical methods, are difficult to obtain.
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Politicians and the mass media present the goal of reaching full self-sufficiency in the housing
and utility sector as a refusal of the state to support the population. However, the purpose of the
reform is completely different; the policy of supporting enterprises in the housing and utility
sector is shifted to the population and the population only, specifically to those population group,
which are really in need of support. Thus, the goals of housing and utility payments reform are
formulated for achieving full payment for services by consumers with  the simultaneous
provision of targeted social assistance to population.
The Law "On Foundations…" of 1992 has introduced a special form of targeted social protection
allowance to low-income families for payment of housing and utility services (hereinafter -
housing allowances). Housing allowance is an "additional payment" which covers the difference
between the amount of payments for housing and utility services (calculated based on the
established rates of housing and utility payments, norms of consumption and the social norm of
housing floor area) and the established maximum allowable share of household expenditures for
housing and utility payments by total family income. Thus, when the rates of housing and utility
payments are increased, the expenditures of households for housing and utility services also
increase and consequently a larger number of households are eligible for housing allowances.
This thesis is used by politicians as an argument against raising housing and utility payments;
they argue that this measure will put a heavier burden on the  population and sharply increase the
need for budget funds for housing allowances. The results of the implementation of the housing
allowance program in many Russian municipalities demonstrate that no sudden changes were
observed.
Hypothesis 3.1. An increase in the  rates of housing and utility payments does not lead to
significant a  increase in the number of citizens applying for housing allowances18.
Hypothesis 3.2. The growth in  the number of housing allowance recipients is limited by social
and psychological factors, and is determined by the efficiency of operation of the allowance
offices.
3.2.4. Methods of information collection and processing and evaluation of
results
The analytical hypotheses on the impact of various factors on the progress of the reform of
housing and utility payments are here tested on the basis of gathered statistical information,
normative documents and interviews.
Information necessary for analysis was received from the following sources:
- federal legislation
- regulatory acts of Ministries and Departments
- regional and local regulatory and legal acts
- the following statistical data:
- data of the State Statistics Committee of the Russian Federation (Goskomstat) for the
period of  1997 through 2001;
                                                
18 The authors of the report realize that hypothesis 3.1. is probably self-evident and needs no proving, especially for
specialists working in the housing and utilities sector and social-security workers. However, we include it in our
analysis intentionally in order to verify all the political factors that affect raising of housing and utility service rates.
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- data contained in state statistical survey forms 22, "Reform of the Housing and Utility
Sector", compiled in the surveyed municipal formations;
- data from "elite cities" based on interviews with representatives of local authorities.
Our data was collected in ten different Russian cities with a total population ranging from 45
thousand people (Shumerlya) to 1020 thousand people (Perm). The sample included seven cities,
including three regional administrative centers and three cities under the regional authorities'
jurisdiction.
The information was collected in administrations of cities and oblasts, statistical committees,
housing organizations, cash-settlement and information centers of housing and utility sector,
housing allowance offices and social protection departments of different municipalities. In the
cities, data was collected with the use of a specially designed unified analytical form, which
included:
- quantitative parameters (data on budget expenses of municipalities, population of cities,
population income in regions of Russia, dynamics of housing and utility rates, monthly data
on billing and collection of payments from the population, data on provision of housing
allowance, including number of recipients, amounts of allowances, data on the number and
workload of staff of allowance offices, etc.);
- qualitative parameters (general principles of state and local policy of housing and utility
payments, trends in development of political ideas at the local level, reaction of population
to housing policy of local self-government, principles of provision of targeted social
assistance to population for housing and utility payments, etc.).
Various methods were used in order to test the proposed analytical hypotheses, including the
methods of statistical and graphical analysis, expert evaluation, the interviews with stakeholders.
The methods applied and results received are described for each hypothesis.
3.2.5. Analysis results
Hypothesis 1.1.
The political situation associated with the  election  of leaders of local self-government leads to
keeping the amounts of residents' housing and utility payments at the same level for as long as
possible.
This hypothesis was tested using the results of the survey of municipal administration officials
who are involved in managing the housing and utility sector. Employees of bodies of local self-
government in 8 Russian cities were interviewed.
Respondents were asked five questions concerning the reform of housing and utility payments,
which were worded based on the goals of the survey and the proposed hypotheses. In order to
receive more accurate answers, the interviews were taken anonymously.
When answering the question, "What do you think is the main goal of the changes which are
being implemented as part of the housing and utility sector reform?", 83%  of respondents said
that they see the goal of the reform as creating an efficient and reliable system in the housing and
utility sector, ensuring  the high quality of housing and utility services. However, 17% of
respondents think that the whole reform was started only for the purpose of a  transition to 100%
coverage of housing and utility costs by the population. This indicates that not all leaders in the
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housing and utility sector have a deep enough understanding of the essence of the reform, which
they are supposed to implement.
The next question was about the influence of elections of leaders of local self-government on the
policy of housing and utility payments in the city. Almost all respondents admitted that the
process of setting the rates of housing and utility payments is more or less politicized and tied to
election dates. Moreover, 60% indicated that candidates for leading positions in the cities use the
stabilization or lowering of payment rates as a slogan in their election campaigns. At the same
time, after being elected and accepting the responsibility for the state of the municipal economy,
newly elected city leaders very often "betray" the slogans declared before the elections and raise
the rates of housing and utility payments. Some examples demonstrating the degree of
politicization of the process of setting housing and utility rates are given in Appendix 1.
Also, the respondents were asked about the expected reaction of the population to the actions of
the administration in the event of a introduction of full payment of housing and utility costs by
the population, as well as about the current opinion of the population on the policy of increasing
housing and utility payments. Sixty percent of the  respondents said that the full payment of
housing and utilities costs by residents will cause a negative reaction among the population. At
the same time, over 80% said that the population is currently against raising housing and utility
payments but this does not lower the collection of payments; about 10% (one city) said that
when payments are increased, collection of payments drops, and another 10% (one city) said that
there were protest rallies against the increase of housing and utility payments in the city. These
results will be tested when hypothesis 2.1. is analyzed.
Thus, the results of the survey of leaders and specialists in the housing and utility sector in
Russian cities show that the political situation associated with local elections does not encourage
bodies of local self-government to raise payments for housing and utility services. As some
respondents indicated, this is most evident when the authority for setting rates and tariffs is
assigned to the deputies of representative bodies, who are very reluctant to adopt such measures.
In order to test this assumption, let's compare the dates of elections to local self-government and
increase in rates for housing and utility payments in several Russian cities.
It has to be noted that electricity and gas rates paid by the population are established at the level
of the subjects of the Russian Federation in accordance with the recommendation of the regional
energy commission. Consequently, the amount of payments for housing and utility services for a
standard apartment can be increased following the decision of local, as well as regional,
authorities. In this analysis we review the factors influencing the decision of local self-
government.
Table 15. Comparison of dates of elections to local self-governments and increase in  rates
for housing and utility payments for a standard apartment 9, from January 1998 to March
2002 (based on the data of the Institute for Urban Economics")
City Election date How many months
prior to election did
the last increase of
rates occur?
Was this the case
of raising
electricity or gas
rates?
Cheboksary 01.2001 8 no
12.2001 3 yes
                                                
9 Apartment with total floor area of 54 square meters for a family of 3
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City Election date How many months
prior to election did
the last increase of
rates occur?
Was this the case
of raising
electricity or gas
rates?
Cherepovets 03.1998 More than 3 yes
12.1999 8 no
03.2000 4 yes
03.2002 4 yes
Ulianovsk 12.2000 4 yes
02.2001 2 no
Volhov 03.1998 More than 3 yes
12.2000 5 no
Kovrov 12.2001 2 no
Orenburg 09.2000 6 no
Perm 12.2000 2 yes
Petrozavodsk 04.1998 10 no
03.1999 3 no
It is interesting to note that, in 2001, in Ulianovsk the rates of housing and utility payments were
increased by the mayor's decision two months before the elections of the deputies to the city
council, but one month later, i.e. one month before the elections, the rates were lowered again.
Table 15 shows that when housing and utility rates for a standard apartment were increased
without an increase of electricity and gas rates, i.e. by decision of local self-government, the
increase closest in time to the election date occurred no later than 2 months before the election
(Ulianovsk, Kovrov), which is the length of the election campaign, according to the law. But on
the average this period lasted 6 months.
Thus, the research confirms the hypothesis that the political situation associated with local
elections forces local leaders to keep the rates of housing and utility payments at the same level
artificially.
Hypothesis 2.1
An increase of rates of housing and utility payments does cause a decrease in the level of
payment collection.
Raising the residents' payments is an unpopular measure. Politicians, as well as the mass media,
when opposing the increase of rates of housing and utility services, argue that the population is
unable to pay. However, in Russia as a whole, given the  general increase in tariffs and residents'
share of payments in covering housing and utility costs over the past few years, no decrease in
payment collection was observed. At the same time, almost everywhere in Russia, low-income
families were provided with allowances for housing and utility payments. Below is some data
and the  results of the analysis of the system of housing and utility payments in different Russian
municipalities.
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Table 16. Comparison of the dynamics of housing and utility payments and the dynamics of
payment collection for the period between January 1999 and June 2002 (based on the data
of the Institute for Urban Economics).
 
 City  Year  Increase in
housing and
utility
payments in
one year, %
 Amount of
payment for
standard
apartment as of the
end of the year,
RUR
 Level of
payment
collection, %
 Velikii Novgorod  1999  48  262,98  97,2
  2000  37  360,18  94,2
  2001  26  453,6  94,6
  2002 (June)  33  605,34  96,3
 Perm  1999  25  143,52  91,8
  2000  92  276,06  91,7
  2001  75  483,66  93,1
  2002 (June)  29  624,12  89,9
 Ulianovsk  1999  75  162,12  82,6
  2000  48  239,37  92,5
  2001  92  458,61  91,7
  2002 (June)  4  474,72  91,1
 Cheboksary  1999  24  165,96  98,3
  2000  42  235,29  97,6
  2001  70  400,68  92,9
  2002 (June)  7  430,98  89,7
 Rostov-on-Don  1999  28  406,62  92,4
  2000  15  466,87  93,1
  2001  60  745,22  99,1
  2002 (June)  26  940,68  97,2
The table data on the  comparison of dynamics of the rates of housing and utility services,
established for the  population, and the dynamics of payments by the population in 5 Russian
cities of different size enable us to draw some conclusions:
1. Given different rates for housing and utility payments in monetary terms for different cities
(the amount of payment for standard apartment is between RUR 400 in Cheboksary and
RUR 940 in Rostov-on-Don), the level of payment collection is approximately the same for
the five cities - about 94%.
2. The Table indicates that in 1999 - 2002 the rates of housing and utility payments, established
for the population, were constantly growing. In a number of cities, the growth was
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considerable, with  rates incresing 1.5 - 2 times. At the same time, the average annual level of
payment collection for these years has been fluctuating insignificantly and is still within the
range of 90 - 95%.
3. In a number of cities, given the increase in the rates of housing and utility payments, the level
of payment collection not only did not drop, but even increased. This is well demonstrated by
the city of Ulianovsk, where in 2000 the rates increased 1.5 times while payment collection
also increased - by 10%. Next year, the rates were increased 2 times, while payment
collection remained almost at the same level  (92%).
Thus, the general conclusion can be made that the tendency toward raising the rates of housing
and utility payments, observed in recent years in Russian cities, does not cause a significant
decrease in level of payments made by the population.
In order to confirm this hypothesis, a graphical analysis of the dynamics of payment collection in
1999 - 2001 was performed. Chart 1. illustrates that the average yearly level of payments
remained at the same level in 1999 - 2001 and was the same for different cities. At the same
time, the Chart shows that each year the level of payment collection changed considerably from
month to month: between 50% and 135%. Chart 1, reflecting the dynamics of payments
collection (as a percentage of billed amounts) in five cities of the project in 2000 demonstrates
the following general trends:
- the highest level of payments collection, as a whole, is observed at the end of calendar year;
due to tradition, citizens who have outstanding debts for previous months try to repay them
before the new year. Moreover, at the end of the year some families can receive additional
income (for example, bonuses)
- a sharp reduction in level of payment collection is usually observed in January, after the new
year and Christmas holidays, as well as in September – October, as during this time many
families have large expenses from preparing children for school
- an increase in the level of payment collection also occurs in May and August, respectively,
the beginning of the vacation season, when many citizens pay in advance, and the end of
vacation season, when they pay debts.
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Chart 3. Dynamics of payments collection (%) in 1999-2001.
As far as the impact of tariff increase on payment collection is concerned, almost everywhere
the same tendency is observed, which is especially evident in Rostov-on-Don (Chart 4.). The
Chart indicates that raising the tariffs leads to a decrease in the level of payment collection for
the same month. However, in the month following the month of the tariff increase the level of
payment collection grows sharply, as the majority of the population not only starts to pay under
the new tariff, but also repays the accumulated debt.
62
В.Новгород
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
ян
в.
99
м
ар
.9
9
м
ай
.9
9
ию
л.
99
се
н.
99
но
я.
99
ян
в.
00
м
ар
.0
0
м
ай
.0
0
ию
л.
00
се
н.
00
но
я.
00
ян
в.
01
м
ар
.0
1
м
ай
.0
1
ию
л.
01
се
н.
01
но
я.
01
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
140%
Платеж  за ЖКУ на 1чел. по
стандарт.(18 кв.м), руб. в месяц
Уровень сбора платежей
населения, %
Пермь
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
ян
в.
99
м
ар
.9
9
м
ай
.9
9
ию
л.
99
се
н.
99
но
я.
99
ян
в.
00
м
ар
.0
0
м
ай
.0
0
ию
л.
00
се
н.
00
но
я.
00
ян
в.
01
м
ар
.0
1
м
ай
.0
1
ию
л.
01
се
н.
01
но
я.
01
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
140%
Ульяновск
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
ян
в.
99
м
ар
.9
9
м
ай
.9
9
ию
л.
99
се
н.
99
но
я.
99
ян
в.
00
м
ар
.0
0
м
ай
.0
0
ию
л.
00
се
н.
00
но
я.
00
ян
в.
01
м
ар
.0
1
м
ай
.0
1
ию
л.
01
се
н.
01
но
я.
01
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
140%
Чебоксары
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
ян
в.
99
м
ар
.9
9
м
ай
.9
9
ию
л.
99
се
н.
99
но
я.
99
ян
в.
00
м
ар
.0
0
м
ай
.0
0
ию
л.
00
се
н.
00
но
я.
00
ян
в.
01
м
ар
.0
1
м
ай
.0
1
ию
л.
01
се
н.
01
но
я.
01
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
140%
Ростов-на-Дону
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
ян
в.
00
м
ар
.0
0
м
ай
.0
0
ию
л.
00
се
н.
00
но
я.
00
ян
в.
01
м
ар
.0
1
м
ай
.0
1
ию
н.
01
се
н.
01
но
я.
01
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
140%
Chart 4 Comparison of dynamics of payments collection (%) and tariff growth
in 1999-2001
Thus, the hypothesis that increasing the rates of housing and utility payments does not lead to a
significant decrease in the level of payment collection is confirmed by the research results.
Hypothesis 3.1.
An increase in  rates for housing and utility payments does not lead to a significant increase in
the number of citizens applying for housing allowance.
The hypothesis was tested with the help of a graphical analysis of the dynamics of changes in the
housing and utility payment rates and the number of recipients in eight Russian cities. As a
whole, it should be noted that in 1999 - 2000, the dynamics of the number of program
participants was highly irregular (Chart 5).
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Chart 5. Comparison of the dynamics of tariff growth and share of families receiving
housing allowances
In 1999, an increase in the number of housing allowance recipients was observed in many cities
(Velikii Novgorod, Ulianovsk, Cheboksary, Ryazan); however, in 2000, almost everywhere, a
decrease was noticeable. Possibly, the economic crisis of 1998 was one of the reasons
determining the large number of allowance recipients, but the following stabilization of the
economy and the growth of the population’s income 10 has led to a decrease in the number of
recipients.
A reduction in the number of program participants in 2000 was observed even in the case of
raising the rates of housing and utility payments, for example, in Ulianovsk, Velikii Novgorod,
Ryazan. The main cause of this process was the growth in the population’s income. The repeated
increase of pensions in 2000 has resulted in almost all pensioners leaving the allowance program.
                                                
10 It can also be assumed that reduction in the number of allowance recipients was caused by increase of standard of
maximum allowable share of household expenditure for housing and utility services by total family income - from
20% in 1998 to 22% in 2001. This  assumption will be tested in the analysis of hypothesis 3.2.
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Starting from mid-2001, simultaneously with a strengthening of the tendency toward the increase
of the share of residents' payments in covering the expenses for housing and utility services,
there is again some growth of the number of allowance recipients in a number of cities
(Shumerlia, Perm, Dimitrovgrad, Vladimir, Ryazan). An increase in the rates of payments for
housing and utility services in some cases lead to an immediate increase in the number of
recipients, as it was in Dimitrovgrad and Ryazan. More often, the increase in the number of
allowance recipients occurred gradually, over 3 - 6 months after increase in the rates.
Based on the graphical analysis conducted, we can make a conclusion that the increase in the
level of payment for housing and utility services by the population in 1999 - 2002 did not cause a
significant increase in the number of citizens receiving housing allowances. At the same time,
the charts show that change (growth or reduction) in the share of families receiving housing
allowance often occurs regardless of the change in the rates. Obviously, the dynamics of the
number of recipients is influenced by other factors. Among them, we can name changing the
principles of the housing allowance program itself (introduction or elimination of the second
principle, changing the maximum allowable share of household expenditures for housing and
utility payments and some others), as well as changing the level of a citizen's income. The latter
factor was not analyzed due to a lack of accurate information on the income of the population in
municipalities11.
Hypothesis 3.2.
Growth in the number of housing allowance recipients is determined by a number of factors,
among which is the  changing of principles of the housing allowance program itself
(introduction or elimination of the second principle, changes in maximum allowable share of
household expenditures for housing and utility payments and some others), as well as efficiency
in the  operation of housing  allowance offices.
Available data on the provision of housing allowance in several Russian cities presents a
sufficient number of samples for performing a graphical, as well as regression analysis of this
hypothesis. The following information was collected for the analysis:
? monthly data on the share of families receiving housing allowances in municipalities in 1998
- 2001
? information on principles of the housing allowance program in municipalities
? monthly data on the average amount of housing allowance in municipalities in 1998 - 2001
? data on the quality of work of housing allowance offices.
Information collected in six cities was analyzed: Velikii Novgorod, Cheboksary, Ulianovsk,
Dimitrovgrad, Ryazan and Vladimir.
A number of quantitative and qualitative indicators were used in order to test the hypothesis,
including regression with account for certain assumptions.
1. The established maximum allowable share of household expenditures for housing and utility
payments by total family income. Pursuant to the Law "On the Foundations…", as amended
in 1992, families are provided with housing allowances if housing and utility payments
exceed the established maximum allowable share of household expenditures for housing and
                                                
11 The only officially published information is the data on average per capita income on the average for the subjects
of the Russian Federation. The use of such information would void the analysis of its accuracy. Collection of data on
population income in municipalities presents considerable difficulties.
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utility payments by total family income. This is the first principle (basis) for providing
housing allowances. The federal standard for the share of household expenditures
accountable to  housing and utility payments, set by the Government of Russia, has been
increased from 10% in 1994 to 22% in 2002. However, local self-governments are authorized
to set independently the amount of this share for  the calculation of allowances in the
territory of municipalities, and in many cities this share is lower than  the federal standard. It
should be assumed that the increase in the share of maximum allowable household
expenditure for housing and utility payments by total family income will lead to a reduction
in the number of housing allowance recipients.
2. The absence or availability of the second principle (basis) of providing housing allowances.
For citizens applying for housing allowances, it is more beneficial to receive them under the
second principle, as all families whose total income is within the limits of minimum
subsistence level receive the same amount of allowance, regardless of specific income data.
Based on this, let’s assume that when the second principle is in effect, the share of allowance
recipients will increase.
3. The use of the technique of calculating total family income, taking into account family
members registered in the housing. As of today, there is no unified technique for calculating
total family income, which would be compulsory for all housing allowance offices. Such a
technique can be approved by executive authorities of the subjects of the Russian Federation
and municipalities. The Ministry of Labor of the Russian Federation recommends that this
calculation be made based on the incomes of family members occupying the housing
together.  The main difficulty is presented by the issue of the proof of "joint occupancy". In
practice, housing organizations bill the families for housing and utility services taking into
account family members registered in the housing. In a few cities, there is a practice of
transferring the housing and utility payments of a tenant to the apartment where he actually
resides, although not registered (e.g. in Velikii Novgorod). Consequently, housing allowance
offices in different municipalities can calculate total family income using, as a rule, two
possible techniques based on family members actually residing in the apartment or on family
members registered in it. The first option implies a more accurate calculation of total family
income based on the income of all family members, regardless of registration. Application of
the second option means that if a family of three occupies an apartment, but only two of them
are registered, the income of the third family member will not be taken into account when the
total family income is calculated. In this case, the estimated total family income will be less
than the actual total family income, which improves the chances of a number of families of
being included into the housing allowance program, though it lowers the level of social
justice in the distribution of the means of social assistance. Thus, we may assume that the use
of the calculation of the aggregate family income on the basis of the number of family
members registered in a particular apartment will increase the share of families that receive
housing subsidies.
4. The introduction of restrictions for participation of citizens in housing allowance program.
The Law does not provide for any other grounds for denying the provision of housing
allowances to a family than the sublease of the housing. However, in different municipalities,
local regulatory documents or instructions of housing allowance offices have introduced
some other grounds for denying the provision of housing allowances to a family. For
example, there are some restrictions regarding the participation of entrepreneurs in the
program, as well as participation of citizens with zero income not registered with
unemployment service, citizens having outstanding debts toward housing and utility
payments and others. Lets assume that the introduction of such local limitations reduces the
share of allowance recipients.
5. The average amount of housing allowance. The amount of housing allowance is determined
in general as the difference between the amount of payment for social norm of housing floor
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area and the maximum allowable share of household expenditures for housing and utility
payments by total family income. In other words, when family income increases, the amount
of allowance decreases. The practice of housing allowance offices demonstrates that many
families see no sense in applying for an allowance, the amount of which is small. The survey,
conducted by housing allowance office in Vladimir in 2001 among low-income families who
did not apply for housing allowances, revealed that the amount of time which has to be spent
on undergoing all the procedures, collecting all the documents, and sometimes the
transportation expenses for getting to the location of housing allowance office all
"outweigh", in citizens' opinion, their desire to receive social assistance for housing and
utility payments. Often the citizens evaluate the attractiveness of allowances by determining
the significance of its absolute amount, without trying to establish a correlation between this
amount and their income. Especially in cases when the second principle of allowance
provision is being used in the municipality and many families receive allowances of the same
amount, it seems quite possible to assume that the bigger the average allowance amount
provided to families in the city, the more attractive the allowance program becomes to the
citizens.
6. The efficiency of municipal housing allowance offices. In order to perform regression
analysis, the estimated aggregate index of efficiency was used. The following indicators were
taken into account when determining this index:
- the role of housing allowance offices in the structure of municipal housing services (housing
and utility sector and social assistance);
- whether or not means testing was conducted by housing allowance offices;
- availability and accuracy of information and databases;
- availability and quality of computers and office equipment;
- effectiveness of the work of dispute committees;
- correlation between the number of in-take staff and  the total number of staff in the office;
- number of cases a day (per  staff member);
- correlation between the number of applications and the number of families participating in
the program.
The above indicators were collected and evaluated for the surveyed cities. Each indicator was
assigned values from 1 to 3 depending on its presence and development in a particular city.
Numerical values of the indicators reflect the assumption that the higher efficiency indicators of
the subsidy provision problem result in an increase in the number of the participants in the
program.
Then we summed up indicator values for each city. As a result, the computed indicator could
assume values between 1 and 24. As Table 7 shows, the average index amounted to 13. The
highest index of efficiency of the subsidy-provision service was obtained in the city of Novgorod
(16), while the lowest was in Dimitrovograd and Cheboksary (10).
3.2.5.1 Graphical analysis results.
In order to test the hypothesis, two types of analysis were performed: graphical and regression.
In the course of regression analysis, the dynamics of the share of allowance recipients were
compared to the dynamics of the average allowance amount and the established maximum share
of household expenditures for housing and utility payments by total family income. The results
(Charts 6.) did not provide a definite answer to the question (which of the factors plays the
decisive role).
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Chart 6. (continuation)
The examples of six cities, shown in Chart 6, indicate that in Vladimir and Ulianovsk the
increase in the established maximum allowable share of household expenditures for housing and
utility payments by  total family income led to the decrease in number of allowance recipients; in
Dimitrovgrad and Velikii Novgorod the number of recipients rose slightly; in Ryazan the number
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of recipients decreased, while in Cheboksary it increased, although the standard of maximum
allowable share of household housing and utility expenditures remained the same.
The average allowance amount differs greatly from month to month, and only in two cities are
the dynamics of this indicator somewhat close to the dynamics of allowance recipients.
However, the charts do not prove a clear correlation between these two variables.
In order to determine which of the factors are significant for changing the share of recipients and
establish which factors are more significant and which are less significant, a regression analysis
was performed.
3.2.5.2. Regression analysis results.
In order to test the hypothesis and identify the degree of influence of each of the above factors,
the following regression model was used.
Table 17. Variables, employed in regression analysis.
Variable Defenition Mean
value
SF dependent variable; share of families receiving housingallowance 5,515
T established maximum allowable share of household
expenditures for housing and utility payments by total family
income
14,5037
SB dummy variable, showing availability (1) or absence (0) of thesecond principle (basis) for provision of housing allowance 0,4375
TFI dummy variable, showing, which technique is used for
calculation of total family income. If total family income is
calculated based on income of all family members, regardless
of their registration, the variable assumes a value of 1. If total
family income is calculated based on income of family
members who are registered at the given housing, the variable
assumes a value of 0. It is assumed that calculation of total
family income under the former technique decreases the
number of allowance recipients19
0,8235
EL dummy variable showing availability (1) or absence (0) of
local eligibility restrictions for the housing allowance
program20
0,4338
A Average amount of housing allowance, per month 102,4306
HAO aggregate index of efficiency of operation of housingallowance offices; may vary from 1 to 24 13,1801
                                                
19 Using of the design procedure of  total revenue of a family, taking into account all the members of the family
regardless of  registration place, reduces quantity of the families which get the allowances.
20 Introduction of local limitations decreases the number of allowance recipients.
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Coefficients of regression show the estimated influence of each independent variable on the
amount of dependent variables, given that the factor of influence of all other variables on this
variable remains unchanged. Comparison of b coefficients, corresponding to each of the
independent variables, allows us to identify the most strong and weak factors (variables)
determining the nature of the dynamics of the dependent variable. Regression analysis also
allows us to evaluate the significance of the estimates for each coefficient.
The results of statistical analysis indicate that the independent variables, included in our
hypothesis and placed into the regression equation, explain well enough the nature of the
dynamics of the dependent variable. The coefficient of determination R2  equals 0.398, which
means that independent variables selected, together with the probability of about 40%, explain
the nature of the dynamics of the dependent variable. The regression equation, where the
dependent variable is the share of families receiving housing allowances, looks as follows.
Table 18 Regression Results
Variable Regression coefficient
-3.141SF (const.)
(-2.103)
0.107T – max. share of income
(1.764)
1.695SB - second basis
(4.537)
-5.035TFI - aggregate income
(-5.075)
0.416EL - local restrictions
(0.897)
0.012A - amount of subsidy
(4.687)
0.685NAO - efficiency of subsidy-provision
service (4.344)
(Absolute t-statistics values are shown in parentheses)
R2 0.397
F-statistics 29.070
Durbin-Watson statistics 0.176
df (degrees of freedom) 265
In order to explain the results of regression, we have to take into account two aspects: the value
of coefficients, reflecting the degree of impact of this factor on the dependent variable, and  the
"significance" of coefficients, as the essential significance of coefficients for the independent
variable determines its influence on the dependent variable in 95% of cases in the given sample.
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Coefficient b for variable T (established maximum allowable share of household expenditures
for housing and utility payments by total family income) is positive. The significance test of this
coefficient indicates that in 95% of observations this variable exerts a less serious influence on
the behavior of dependent variables than other factors. This fact indicates that, contrary to the
above mentioned assumption 1, changes in the maximum allowable share of household
expenditures for housing and utility payments by total family income lead to less significant
changes in the number of allowance recipients than expected.
This behavior of the variable can be explained by the fact that the regression equation also
includes the factor of introduction of the second principle (basis) in the calculation of
allowances, against which, as we know, the factor of the established maximum allowable share
of expenditures cannot manifest itself the fullest. Thus, assumption 1 is neither confirmed, nor
clearly disproved in this equation.
The b coefficient, given qualitative “dummy” variable SB (availability or absence of the second
principle (basis) for provision of housing allowances) is positive, more than 1. This means that
the presence of the second basis for the calculation of subsidies will lead  to nearly 2% of
families enrolled in the housing allowance program. Given the average value for the sample of
5.515%, this would mean a nearly 1.5-times increase. Thus, this equation confirms assumption 2.
The significance test for this coefficient indicates that the influence of the availability of the
second principle on the number of recipients is very significant.
Assumption 3 is completely confirmed by the value of coefficient b, given the fictitious variable
TFI (indicator of the technique used for calculating total family income). The negative sign and
value of the coefficient indicate that calculation of total family income based on the number of
all family members, regardless of their registration, leads to the reduction of the number of
allowance recipients. The significance test for this coefficient, given this variable, confirms the
significance of the factor of calculation technique for determining the dynamics of the number of
recipients.
As far as availability or absence of local restrictions of eligibility is concerned, it can be said that
this equation neither confirms nor denies assumption 4, concerning the negative influence of this
factor on the number of allowance recipients. According  to the results received, coefficient b,
given variable EL, is not valid. However, as in the case of the LHS factor for calculation of
allowances, it can be assumed that the obvious influence of local restrictions of eligibility on the
number of recipients is not reflected in this equation because of the influence of other significant
factors.
The value of coefficient b under the variable A (average amount of housing allowance) is
positive, and the test indicates its clear significance for the equation. This confirms assumption
5: an increase in the average amount of housing allowance leads to the increase in the number of
recipients.
Finally, the positive value and obvious significance of coefficient b under the variable HAO
(aggregate index of efficiency of operation of housing allowance offices) confirm assumption 6:
the more effectively housing allowance offices work, the bigger the number of allowance
recipients in the city. The value of this coefficient is not as high as the "second principle" and
"calculation based on family members" coefficients; however, it can be said that if the efficiency
of operation of the housing allowance office is increased by 1 point, about 1 more percent of
families will come to the housing allowance offices.
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Thus, regression analysis results justify in part our hypothesis about the influence of various
factors on the share of families receiving housing allowances. Analysis of the amounts of
regression coefficients shows that with the increase of the established maximum allowable share
of household expenditures for housing and utility payments by total family income, the share of
families receiving housing allowances should decrease sharply. However, in 95% of the cases in
our sample the influence of this factor was "complicated" by the influence of other variables, the
most significant of which are the availability of the second principle (basis), the use of
calculation technique based on family members registered in the housing and efficiency of
housing allowance offices. At the same time, the influence of such a variable as the average
amount of allowance, which, in our opinion, reflects indirectly the existence of a psychological
factor, is not big, though it is present in 95 cases out of 100.
3.2.6. Conclusions
Analysis of the proposed hypotheses indicates the following:
1. Although the necessity of improving the financial situation in the housing and utility sector,
as well as the policy of reducing local budgets, encourage local self-governments to reduce
subsidies to housing and utility sector and, correspondingly, increase the rates of housing and
utility payments, there are certain factors of political nature which hinder the process of
transition to the new system of housing and utility payments. The process of setting the rates
for housing and utility payments is politicized and elections to local self-governments do not
provide any incentives to increase housing and utility payments.
2. At the same time, the argument used by some politicians and mass media that the population
is not able to pay and that collection of payments will be reduced is not confirmed by the
practice. Analysis shows that the existing tendency toward increasing housing and utility
payments does not lead to sharp decreases in the level of payments collection.
3. Also, analysis confirmed that increase of housing and utility payments does not play a fatal
role in determining the number of low-income families eligible for housing allowances. The
dynamics of the growth of the number of housing allowance recipients are determined by a
sum of various factors, including - the principles (bases) of the program of allowance
provision, socio-psychological factors, as well as efficiency of housing allowance offices.
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3.3. Development of Competition in the Delivery of Housing and
Communal Services
The development of real competitive relations is one of the key tasks of the housing and
communal service sector reforms which, if resolved, will allow for increasing the service quality,
curtailing unproductive costs, and boosting the attractiveness of the sector for private businesses.
The economic analysis of the activities of different segments of the housing and communal
services market revealed that along with realistic opportunities for the development of
competitiveness in maintenance of the housing stock, there are serious technological limitations
on the market for utility services (water, heat, gas, and electricity). Federal-level regulations,
such as presidential decree No. 425, On Reforming the Housing and Communal Service Sector in
the Russian Federation (with the Concept for Reforming the Housing and Communal Service
Sector in the Russian Federation), which concerns development of competitive relations in the
delivery of housing services is identified as one of the priority tasks.
This section presents an analytical overview of the formation and development of competitive
relations in the management, maintenance and repair of multifamily buildings in the ownership
(or, to be more exact, jurisdiction) of municipalities, as well as buildings in the departmental
stock, and buildings managed by homeowners’ associations. The research was intended to
identify the factors which promote competitiveness in the housing sector or obstruct the
development of competition. The overview covers the period from 1992 (the beginning of mass
privatization of housing in the Russian Federation) to the end of 2002.
3.3.1. Legal Framework for the Development of Competition in the Housing
Sector
In the period preceding the reforms the housing and communal service sector was characterized
by the rigid state regulation of all housing relations and the predominance of state ownership.
The distinctive features of this system are:
• state monopoly in housing maintenance and utility services, with the loss-bearing
activities of respective organizations strongly subsidized by the state;
• deep subsidizing of the initially loss-bearing operations of the housing and utility
companies;
• the rights of housing owners were practically no different from the rights of tenants in the
state housing stockownership rights;
• state enterprises were assigned the function of providing housing to their employees and
maintaining this housing.
The preconditions for housing and communal service sector reforms were created by the law On
Ownership in the Russian Federation <18>, which eliminated the quantity and value restrictions
on the citizens’ rights to own property, including residential premises. Ownership was also
granted to members of housing and housing-construction cooperatives who have paid for their
units in full.
Pursuant to resolution of the RF Supreme Soviet as of December 27, 1991, No. 3020-1 (<19>),
some state properties were conveyed into ownership of municipalities (except cities in raion
jurisdiction) and raions (except raions in cities). The properties conveyed to local governments
included housing and utility facilities:
• residential and non-residential stock;
• municipal engineering infrastructure;
• enterprises engaged in the operation, maintenance, and repairs of these properties.
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Since the responsibility for organizing management of the municipal housing stock has been
placed within local governments. Divestiture of the state and departmental housing stock was
most active in mid-90’s. The share of state property in the housing and communal service sector
decreased during this period from 42 to 5 percent. Additions to the municipal housing stock
confronted local governments with the alternative: to create new municipal agencies for
maintaining this stock or to attract private businesses on a competitive basis.
The law, On Privatization of the Housing Stock in the Russian Federation (<13>), permits the
privatization of residential premises. Pursuant to this law, owners of privatized premises in the
state or municipal housing stock are co-owners and users of internal engineering equipment and
common areas in the buildings. Thus privatization of residential premises has lead to a situation
where one real estate object (a residential building) may have several owners who enjoy equal
rights under the RF Constitution. The privatization law identified two types of properties in a
multifamily residential building: residential and non-residential premises in the possession of
private individuals and legal entities, and the common property. The law, On Homeowners’
Associations (<14>), classifies common property as property serving more than one owner:
stairways, landings, elevators, elevators and other shafts, corridors, roofs, crawling spaces and
basements, load-bearing and non-load-bearing structures, as well as mechanical, electrical,
sanitary or other equipment outside or within residential premises serving more than one unit.
Individual units are managed by their owners. The common property is managed on the basis of
the decisions of the general meeting of unit owners.
The law, On Homeowners’ Associations, created the legal framework for the owners’
participation in the management of the common property. It was intended to promote the
transition to an object-based management of multifamily buildings and, subsequently, promote
the demand for various housing maintenance services. However, the process has been very slow,
and municipalities have retained their monopoly for the procurement of housing services, which
is a major obstacle to the development of a competitive environment.
The regulatory framework currently in effect in Russia (see <2>, <3>, <4>, and <20> at the end
of the book) envisages a three-level system of management for the multifamily stock:
• owners of the residential building;
• management company;
• contractors for the delivery of goods, works, and services required for the management
function.
Using the system, it follows that competition in the housing stock is possible both for the
management of multifamily buildings and for the delivery of products and services.
The formation of an economically efficient management system in the housing sector starts with
the structuring of relations between property owners and management companies. The effective
law permits management of the property to be organized in the following manner:
• by conveyance into economic jurisdiction;
• by conveyance into operative management;
• under a contract of trust management ;
• under a contract for the delivery of property management services for a consideration.
The right of economic jurisdiction and the right of operative management are special types of
real estate rights not found in any other legal system. These rights are granted to legal entities for
an undefined term and include possession, use, and disposition of the owner’s property. An
enterprise having economic jurisdiction over a property may possess, dispose, and use the
property at its own discretion. The right to possess, use and dispose of the property conveyed
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into economic jurisdiction or operative management may not be restricted by a contract and is
regulated solely by the Civil Code.
The property conveyed under the right of economic jurisdiction or operative management is
withdrawn from the physical possession of the conveying owner, and is placed on the balance
sheet of the holder. Thus the owner may no longer exercise the rights associated with the
possession and use (and, to a large extent, disposition) of the property. Importantly, enterprises
holding the property under the right of economic jurisdiction are liable for their debts at the
expense of this property, but do not answer for the debts incurred by the owner, because the
property is treated as the “allocated property”.
The existence of legal entities which are not owners of their property but which may act as
independent participants of economic transactions with it is the direct consequence of the
transitional status of the economy and the heritage of the “state” economy, of which the said
types of legal entities are an example.
Evidently, at the present phase the legislation adopted for the period hinders further development
of an efficient system for management of the housing stock. They do not allow the owner to
manage the housing stock to the extent desired by the owner, and block the development of
competition in this area.
Under a contract of trust management the trustee exercises the owner’s rights with respect to the
property to the extent provided for by the law or contract. The trustee has no ownership right to
the property and acts in the interests of the owner (or the beneficiary indicated by the owner),
though acting in his own name.
Trust management of the property may be established by any owner. The contract of trust
management is a fixed-term contract and may be signed for a term not exceeding 5 years. By the
general rule, upon the expiry of the contract the property should be returned to the owner.
It should be noted that the property conveyed into trust management is segregated from any other
property of the conveying owner, as well as the property of the trust manager. For this purpose,
the property is recorded in a special balance sheet and records. Moreover, settlements associated
with the trust management of the property are made through a separate bank account.
These features make a contract of trust management preferable to contracts of economic
jurisdiction or operative management. Nevertheless, this contract has several defects which limit
its usefulness.
Pursuant to the Civil Code, a trust manager may be an individual entrepreneur or a for-profit
company, but not a unitary enterprise. Therefore, it appears impossible to form equal conditions
for the management of the housing stock by organizations of different ownership form.
The act of conveying a property into trust management should be executed in accordance with
the rules for the sale/purchase of real estate. In particular, it is necessary to obtain an inventory of
the property, an independent auditor’s report on the composition and value of the property and
an inventory of all debts. In addition, one should bear in mind that transactions with real estate
are subject to the state registration.
Also, it should be taken into account that debts under the obligations arising in connection with
the trust management of the property are settled at the expense of the property, which may result
in the loss of the property by its owner.
It is thus obvious that practical use of a contract of trust management faces severe difficulties
which do not allow for realizing the advantages of this type of contract.
Under a contract for the delivery of services the contractor undertakes the obligation to perform
specified actions in the interest of the client or a third party – beneficiary. Municipal
procurement orders for the housing and communal services and contracts for management of the
housing stock are characteristic examples of this type of contract.
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A municipal procurement contract has several advantages as compared to economic jurisdiction
or operative management, and certain advantages as compared to a contract of trust management.
A municipal procurement contract enables the owner to decide at his own discretion what
portion of the management activity should be assigned to the management company. Being a
fixed-term contract, a municipal procurement contract can create efficiency incentives for the
management company. It may be concluded with an entity of any ownership form, including
municipal unitary enterprises and institutions.
At the same time, a municipal procurement contract has several defects which make it
inapplicable for the delivery of housing and communal services. In accordance with the RF
Budget Code <23>, a municipal procurement order is an agreement between a local government
and a contractor for the performance of works (delivery of services) financed out of the local
budget. Judging by this definition, one may conclude that use if the term “municipal
procurement order” with respect to the housing and communal services delivered to the
households is incorrect. These services are funded by two sources – the budget and the
population, and the share in the cost coverage of the latter is growing steadily. It is of course
possible to segregate the housing and communal services financed by the budget from the total
volume of services, and to form a procurement order for this portion of the services. However,
making a contract for these sums would be legally incorrect because the obligation to finance
these services out of the budget arises by force of the laws and implementing acts. However, a
municipal procurement order would be appropriate, for example, with respect to urban
environment services, because the services are financed by the budget. Again, the delivery of
housing and communal services is a different case.
One form of a service delivery contract is the so-called management contract, which is used by
some cities to attract private companies to the management of the housing stock on a competitive
basis.
In this contract the owner has the right to define the list of functions assigned to the management
company. For example, the owner may assign the management company with the keeping of the
inventory of the property, recording the property off-balance.
The contract can take into account all conditions required for the efficient performance of the
management company, without restricting the initiative of the latter. A single format of the
contract may be used for all housing owners, including owners (natural persons) of individual
premises. The only difference may lie in the right of the management company to conclude main
contracts.
The federal regulatory acts promoting competition for the housing maintenance services urge
local governments to reorganize the sector by segregating the management and maintenance
functions. However, the implementation of this theoretically correct approach into practice has,
regretfully, failed to create a competitive environment for contracted maintenance and repair
works.
Moreover, the competition for contracted services is negatively affected by the tax benefits
provided for by the effective law, in accordance to which households’ payments for housing
services are exempted from the value-added tax (VAT). The exemption applies to payments to
the management company only, while contracted services for maintenance and repairs of the
housing stock are subject to VAT. Thus the tax law encourages the merger of management and
maintenance functions, at the same time hindering the development of competition for contracted
services. At present the entire sum of the VAT collected in a jurisdiction is transferred to the
federal budget, and local administrations regard the search for legal ways of avoiding this tax as
one of their main tasks. Placing the management and maintenance functions within one entity is
one such way.
In light of the above, this report analyses the impact on the competition for management and
maintenance of multifamily buildings of the segregation of management and maintenance
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functions, and of the conveyance of the housing stock into municipal ownership with the
subsequent segregation of its management and maintenance functions by the municipalities.
3.3.2. Practical Experience of Developing Competitive Relations
At present, the sphere of housing services is characterized by underdeveloped market
mechanisms and lack of real competition. The predominance of administrative command and
inadequate financing (first of all, from the budget) of the housing and communal service sector
leave the enterprises operating in it is no the incentive for reducing unproductive costs. There are
many instances of municipalities collecting households’ payments and using the money in
violation of the intended purpose. For example, this may be done through the municipal cash and
settlement centers created by the RF Government resolution No. 887, On Improving the System
of Payments for Housing and Communal Services, and Social Protection Measures. These
centers process all households’ payments for housing and communal services for the purpose of
their “splitting”.
For all the talk about competition and opening the housing services market to private businesses,
the number of municipal unitary enterprises in the sector has increased. There were 9,200 such
enterprises in 1999 and over 10,000 in 2002, and the figure tends to grow. Total employees
number about 2 million.
Admittedly, the policy of segregating the customer and contractor functions with the creation of
customer services for the municipal housing stock has failed to produce market-oriented
transformations in the management of multifamily buildings, because the activity has remained
under the control of municipal bureaucrats. Even when several customer services were created in
one municipality, the market was nevertheless rigidly divided between municipal administrative
units. At the present time, a competition for housing management services in Russian cities is the
exception rather than the rule.
The picture is better in contracted works for maintenance and repairs of multifamily buildings.
The segregation of management and maintenance functions liquidated the monopoly of
municipal enterprises on contracted works. As a result, private companies began to enter the
market. Competitions for capital repairs contracts have become a universal phenomenon. In
some cities 100 percent of capital repairs are performed by companies selected through a
competitive process.
The main economic potential for the development of the property management business in
residential real estate is resource-saving focused on individual buildings. To implement resource-
saving, the management company should be able to use all financial resources (households’
payments and budget funds) provided in payment for housing and communal services, and to
make independent decisions about how, for example, to maintain the required temperature in the
building  (by buying the initially requested volume of heat, or by buying less but winterizing the
building). There is every technological and economic reason to presume that the second option is
preferable. In turn, it will lead to the gradual reorientation of current expenditures for heat supply
toward capital expenditures for insulating the building, rationalization of the payment structure
and, ultimately, decrease in the cost of utility services. However, the current practices in forming
the municipal procurement order for utility services, according to which heat is purchased for the
entire municipal housing stock, and the “splitting” of housing and utility payments at the cash
and settlement centers without the participation of management companies or any contractual
obligations, along with direct contracts for heat delivery between households and heating utilities
create strong barriers for the development of a competitive housing management business.
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3.3.3. Analytical Hypotheses
Based on the results of the analysis of the practical reform experience and the effective
regulatory framework, several hypotheses were formulated about the factors affecting the
development of competition in the management, maintenance, and repairs of multifamily
buildings.
The key action for changing the situation in the management of multifamily buildings was the
decision on housing privatization. The federal legislation was expected to give rise to the
associations of homeowners for management of their properties and, as a result, to the
emergence of a broad spectrum of demand for housing services and the development of
competitive environment in the management of multifamily buildings.
Privatization of housing made it necessary to regard multifamily buildings as objects held by
many owners. Each owner has the right to participate in the management of his property
(common areas of the building), and to be informed of the management plans. It may be assumed
that privatization of housing has lead to an object-based system for planning the work.
These assumptions were tested with the use of the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Housing privatization promoted associations of unit owners in multifamily
buildings for management of the property.
Hypothesis 2: Housing privatization has lead to an object-based approach to the
management of multifamily buildings.
Hypothesis 3: The volume of housing maintained by private companies is bigger in
municipalities with a bigger number of homeowners’ associations.
The normal development of competition in the management and maintenance of the housing
stock needs the legislation that creates equal conditions for the economic activities of companies
of all ownership forms in operating on the market for housing management services. Therefore,
it is necessary to review the opportunities for the formation of competitive relations in the
property management business created by the effective legislation. The civil law provides for
four property management forms: operative management, economic jurisdiction, trust
management and delivery of services for a consideration. It is necessary to learn whether their
use promotes the development of equal competition. This assumption was tested with the use of
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: The property management forms provided for by the civil law assure equal
conditions for organizations of different ownership structure for the development of
competitiveness in the management of multifamily buildings.
The state authorities have adopted mandatory Rules and Norms for Technical Maintenance of the
Housing Stock (hereinafter – the Rules) <24>. The right to adopt tariffs for housing and utility
services is placed with the local governments (with respect to municipal and departmental
housing stock and utility services provided by municipal enterprises) and the state authorities
(with respect to utility services provided by non-municipal enterprises). Compliance with the
Rules involves certain costs. Establishing tariffs at a level below that required for implementing
the state standards will hinder the development of the competition. In order to assess the impact
of the Housing Code on the development of competitive relations in the housing sector, the
following hypothesis was proposed.
Hypothesis 5: Competition for housing management services is more intense in
municipalities where compliance with the Housing Code is secured by the appropriate
financing.
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The incidence of competitions for management and maintenance of the housing stock was
selected as an indicator for characterizing the development of competitiveness in this area. The
influence of various factors on a municipality’s decision to hold a competition was studied. The
following hypothesis was proposed:
Hypothesis 6: The likelihood of a housing management or maintenance competition is
higher in municipalities if:
• total floor space of multifamily buildings exceeds 2 million square meters;
• management companies have the form of a municipal unitary enterprise or the
functions are performed by private companies;
• housing management and maintenance functions are assigned to different
organizations;
• the competition is initiated by the local government (local government issues the
administrative decision to conduct the competition); and
• management companies comply with the Rules.
Data Collection Method Used for the Analytical Overview
Factors affecting the development of competitive relations in the management and maintenance
of the housing stock in the cities of the Russian Federation were studied with the use of the
following data sources:
• federal, regional, and local regulations;
• Goskomstat of Russia, data from 1997 to 2001;
• Local statistics (Form 22 ZKH – Reform);
• Data provided by municipal administrations and administrations of the Federation
Subjects;
• Sociological surveys.
Source data was collected from municipal administrations, administrations of the Federation
Subjects, statistical authorities, and enterprises. In order to identify significant factors for the
formation of competitive relations in the housing sector and calculate statistical regularities in
their development, the data were collected with the use of a special unified questionnaire,
designed to support subsequent analysis of:
• quantitative parameters:
- number of private companies engaged in maintenance of the housing stock;
- number of competitions held for housing maintenance services;
- number of competitions held for capital repairs of the housing stock;
- number of competitions held for special types of work;
- percentage of the multifamily stock maintained by competitively selected companies;
- percentage of capital repairs performed on a competitive basis;
- percentage of the multifamily stock maintained by non-municipal companies;
- percentage of capital repairs of the housing stock performed by non-municipal
companies;
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- level of payables and receivables of the enterprises selected through competitive
procedures;
• qualitative parameters:
- availability of contractual relations:
- correspondence of the cash flows and contractual obligations;
- assessment of the performance of the maintenance company by:
housing management company;
city administration;
population;
- assessment of capital repairs by:
housing management company;
city/raion administration.
The identification of factors affecting the competitive environment for housing management and
maintenance services necessitated the analysis of:
• financial indicators:
- cost and inventory of the services which are put up for the competition;
- correspondence of actual financing and the level declared at the competition;
- correspondence of the cost of services and actual financing;
• organizational structure of the sector in each particular city:
- segregation of the housing management and maintenance functions;
- organizational legal form of housing management companies;
- participation of the city administration in the conduct of the competitions;
• compliance of municipal regulations to the new economic conditions created by the
housing sector reforms, from the viewpoint of:
- availability of contracts;
- availability of formal procedures for conducting the housing maintenance competitions,
the quality of these procedures, and other factors.
Respective data was summarized in a table that was used as a basis for identifying patterns in the
formation of contractual relations in the management and maintenance of the housing stock.
After a preliminary analysis and verification of the data collected, a sample was formed from the
data for 25 municipalities in the Russian Federation for the period from 1997 to 2002. The
municipalities differ in size, ranging from cities with over 1 million residents, such as Nizhny
Novgorod, to small communities, such as Bikinsky raion (Khabarovsk krai) with a population of
35 thousand. The municipalities also differ by the extent to which they have developed
contractual relations. On the one hand, the sample includes Bor raion (Nizhny Novgorod), where
competitions have been held for more than 5 years, and on the other – the city of Ulyanovsk
where not a single competition have been held. The municipalities surveyed are listed in
Table 19.
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Table 19. Municipalities in the Survey
Municipality Federation Subject Population,
‘000
Competitions
held in 1997-
2001?
Bikinsky raion Khabarovsk krai 35.0 No
Bor raion Nizhny Novgorod oblast 63.3 Yes
Buzuluk Orenburg oblast 86.7 No
Veliki Nobgorod Novgorod oblast 229.5 Yes
Vladimir Vladimir oblast 337.1 Yes
Volkhov Leningrad oblast 50.4 Yes
Gatchina Leningrad oblast 81.8 No
Gatchina raion Leningrad oblast 114.4 No
Gus-Khrustalny Vladimir oblast 73.4 Yes
Dimitrovograd Ulyanovsk oblast 137 No
Yoshkar-Ola Republic Marij-El 249.2 No
Luga Leningrad oblast 40.5 No
Magadan Magadan oblast 156.4 No
Nizhny Novgorod Nizhny Novgorod oblast 1,357 Yes
Novocherkassk Postov oblast 184.4 Yes
Orenburgh Orenburg oblast 523.6 Yes
Lazo district Khabarovsk krai 60.0 No
Perm Perm oblast 1,009.7 Yes
Petrozavodsk Republic of Karelia 282.1 Yes
Ryazan Ryazan oblast 529.9 Yes
Ulyanovsk Ulyanovsk oblast 667.4 No
Khabarovsk Khabarovsk krai 600.5 Yes
Tsyvilsk Chuvash Republic 11.3 No
Cheboksary Chuvash Republic 459.2 Yes
Cherepovets Vologda oblast 324.4 Yes
3.3.4. Results of the Analysis
The tests conducted with respect to the proposed hypotheses revealed that  neither an active
demand nor an active supply of the management and maintenance services has developed in the
past decade. Market relations have failed to reach their full force, as a natural environment for
their development has not been put in place.
The results of the tests are described below.
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Hypothesis 1: Housing privatization promoted associations of unit owners in multifamily
buildings for management of the property.
The research has shown that privatization of residential premises failed to generate activity and
interest among the unit owners in managing the property, and, as a result, did not promote the
development of competition for housing management services.
The criteria for determining the property management activity of residential and non-residential
owners was the number of various owner associations in multifamily buildings. In most of the
municipalities surveyed the number of multifamily buildings managed by an owners’ association
did not exceed 1 percent. Even in cities which have achieved the greatest success in the
formation of homeowners’ associations the share of multifamily buildings managed by these
associations does not exceed 10 percent (Cheboksary – 7.5 percent, Rostov-on-Don – 8 percent,
Volgodonsk – 10 percent).
The appearance of homeowners’ associations has failed to initiate the private property
management business or competition on the market for these services. This is most probably
explained by the low share of multifamily buildings with such associations. A greater portion of
the currently existing associations perform the management and maintenance functions with the
use of their own resources. In the cities covered by this survey their share exceeds 98 percent.
Only a few associations outsource management services, typically to municipal management
companies.
The lack of activity in managing the common property among owners of residential and non-
residential premises is explained by the following reasons:
• As proved by the reform experience, it is impossible in a small period of time to change
the behavior of the residents who have acquired ownership of their homes for free. The
many decades of the state monopoly in this field have taught people that management of
a multifamily building is the obligation of the public authorities. This is why residents
who have actually become owners of the building are unwilling to participate in its
management and demand a qualified service from the authorities for what is essentially a
private property.
• The inadequate budget compensation for the difference in the tariff rates for communal
services, and for the benefits and allowances granted to the households, the unavailability
of a real system of contractual relations in the housing and communal service sector,
along with the impossibility for private owners to influence the allocation of budget funds
for the sector create economic barriers for the formation of homeowners’ associations.
The artificially supported monopoly of municipal unitary enterprises or municipal institutions in
the management of multifamily buildings forces the newly created homeowners’ associations to
manage their buildings independently, which is not always reasonable from the economic point
of view, or to hire municipal organizations. Naturally, the lack of real demand for the housing
services among private owners results in the lack of supply and competition.
Hypothesis 2 – Housing privatization has lead to an object-based approach to the
management of multifamily buildings – was not confirmed.
In all municipalities surveyed the local regulatory framework does not require object-based
management or openness of the planning process to the public. Moreover, the regulations often
require management to be organized for the entire territory of the municipality (Vladimir, Veliki
Novgorod, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk), equalize owners’ payments or promote redistribution of
payments among buildings. The lack of object-based planning makes it difficult for home
owners to participate in the management of their buildings, reduces management efficiency and
obstructs the development of competition for management services.
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Hypothesis 3 – The volume of housing maintained by private companies is bigger in
municipalities with a bigger number of homeowners’ associations – was formally
confirmed.
The result was expected as 98 percent of homeowners’ associations manage their buildings
independently. However, the statistical reliability of this conclusion is low because of the small
share of buildings where such associations have been created. Moreover, the dangerous
orientation of the homeowners’ associations toward use of their own management resources does
not support the task of improving the quality of housing services or of forming a competitive
market for these services.
Hypothesis 4 – The property management forms provided for by the civil law assure equal
conditions for organizations of different ownership structure for the development of
competitiveness in the management of multifamily buildings – was proved wrong.
In all the cities surveyed, except Petrozavodsk, municipal housing stock, including privatized
units, is in the economic jurisdiction of municipal enterprises or in the operative management of
municipal institutions. The case of Petrozavodsk is exceptional in that a substantial portion of the
housing stock is managed by a private company under a contract for paid services – a contract
for management of the municipal housing stock.
A competitive environment presumes equal conditions for accessing the market for all
participants. By the beginning of reforms, providers of management services to multifamily
buildings were represented by  state and municipal organizations. The civil law (RF Civil Code)
made specific provisions for these organizations concerning the form of management of state or
municipal property, the right of economic jurisdiction and the right of operative management.
These special forms are inapplicable to either non-state or non-municipal entities.
Fig. 13. The legal form of management companies in the cities surveyed
Fig. 14. Relationship between the incidence of competitions and the legal form of the
management company
The rights of economic jurisdiction and operative management do not provide for the possibility
of making a contract between an owner and a party authorized by the owner. The owner cannot
dispose of or manage the property. The property held by right of economic jurisdiction or
operative management may not be alienated or reallocated without the liquidation or
reorganization of the enterprise or institution. Thus, the right of economic jurisdiction and the
right of operative management assign management of the property to municipal organizations for
an indefinite term. Early in the reform process, the majority of multifamily buildings were
conveyed to municipal organizations under the right of economic jurisdiction or operative
management. In this manner municipal authorities solidified the monopoly of municipal
organization for the management of multifamily buildings. The special operating conditions for
the state and municipal organizations hinder the development of competition for management
services.
However, a competitive environment cannot take form in the absence of equal conditions for
organizations of different ownership form. This is the core reason for the lack of competition in
the management of the housing stock. No such competitions were held in the 25 cities surveyed,
with the exception of Petrozavodsk. As of the end of 2002, competitions for management of the
municipal housing stock were held in two cities, Moscow and Petrozavodsk
The final phase of the competition for a contract for management of the municipal housing stock
took place in Petrozavodsk on October 30, 2001. A single lot was offered, containing housing in
several districts of the city with the totals area of 1,244 thousand square meters. The four bidders
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included the municipal Customer Service, which managed all municipal housing stock (4,200
thousand square meters), and three organizations, which at that time provided maintenance of the
housing stock, OOO Trial, and municipal housing enterprises.
Trial was named the winner. The company maintained the housing stock of 300 thousand square
meters in the district that was put up for the competition. Therefore, the company provided
combined management/maintenance services to one portion of the housing stock, and
management services only to another.
Before it could hold the competition, the city administration had to address some property issues.
At that time the municipal housing stock was held in the operative management and on the
balance sheet of the Customer Service. The administration had no right to assign management of
the stock to another organization, should that organization win the competition.
Thus prior to the competition the city administration, with the consent of the Customer Service,
withdrew the municipal housing stock from the operative management of the latter and
transferred it to the municipal treasury.
The City Department for Housing and Communal Services and Trial signed a three-year housing
management contract company. The contract established quality parameters for the management
of residential and non-residential facilities, rights, obligations, and for the liability of the
management company and the city administration.
Trial concluded contracts for maintenance services to the housing stock. The contracts are
structured in accordance with the principle of “volume of work matches the volume of money”.
As a result, Trial has no debts to contractors or its employees. The city heating utility and Trial
made a contract to which the city administration is a third party with the responsibility for
financing the budget component of the heating tariff (subsidies, allowances, and benefits). Thus
the management company can operate in a relatively stable environment, bearing responsibility
only for the timely collection of households’ payments for the heat in the maximum volume
possible.
While the time that has elapsed since the signing of the contract with Trial in Petrozavodsk is too
short for making final conclusions on the company’s performance, the very fact of a private
company entering the market for housing management services should be regarded as a major
step in the development of competition for these services.
Hypothesis 5: Competition for housing management services is more intense in
municipalities where compliance with the Housing Code is secured by the appropriate
financing.
In 80 percent of the municipalities surveyed, competitions for contracted works attracted
municipal enterprises only. The interviews conducted in the course of the survey revealed that
the unwillingness of private companies to enter the competition was caused by the vague
definition of the list of works in the draft contract and the perceived impossibility to ensure
compliance with all requirements of the Housing Code at the proposed tariff rates. At the same
time, local governments are not ready, for formal reason, to order work in accordance with the
actual financing available.
The obvious conclusion is that establishing tariffs for the housing services below the level
required for compliance with the Housing Code obstructs the development of competitive
relations in the housing sector. At the same time, the statistical data available present
unambiguous evidence that the Housing Code plays far from a key role in the determination of
the cost of housing services. In this context, let us consider the legal aspects of the issue.
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Fig. 15. Compliance of the management companies with the Housing Code in the cities
surveyed
Fig. 16. Relationship between the incidence of competitions and compliance with the
Housing Code by the management company
In 1997 Gosstroi of Russia issued an order approving the Rules and Norms for Technical
Maintenance of the Housing Stock <21>. According to the information published in the bulletin
of the RF Ministry of Justice No. 2, 198, this document was denied registration with the
ministry. Therefore, the Rules are not binding and have the nature of recommendations.
The Gosstroi order and the new Rules were designated to supersede the earlier Rules and Norms
for Technical maintenance of the Housing Stock approved as far back as 1989 by the order of
RSFSR Minzhilkomkhoz. The denial of the registration means that the “old” Rules and Norms
for Technical Maintenance of the Housing Stock remain in effect and are binding on the public
authorities. The evidence is provided by a great number of successful court suits against non-
compliance with this regulatory document. The contracts for maintenance of the municipal
housing stock originated by local governments contain contractor’s obligations to comply with
the effective Rules and Norms for Technical Maintenance of the Housing Stock. However, the
tariffs for housing services are set with regard to the actual budget capacity of municipalities and
the paying capacity of the households, rather than the requirements of the effective law. As a
result, actual financing does not match the contracted works, the volume of maintenance works
decreases, and the buildings deteriorate and become accident-prone. Under the pressure of the
local administrations, municipal entities are forced to agree to such conditions, while private
companies prefer not to enter agreements that they will be unable to respect. This is the reason
why competitions often attract municipal enterprises only or are declared unconstitutional.
The competitions were the most participated for capital repairs of the housing stock. In 6 out of
the 25 cities surveyed – Cheboksary, Orenburg, Veliki Novgorod, Nizhny Novgorod,
Petrozavodsk, and Perm – capital repairs are contracted exclusively on a competitive basis. In 5
cities the competition for capital repairs attracted over 15 bidders represented by companies of
different ownership structure. The high activity of private companies on the market for capital
repairs is explained by the fact that the volume of capital repairs usually matches the volume of
financing.
Many cities finance capital repairs of the housing stock at the expense of the budget only. Under
this arrangement, local governments are obligated to perform respective works within the
framework of municipal procurement orders, for which, according to the effective legislation,
competitive placement is mandatory.
Hypothesis 6: The likelihood of a housing management or maintenance competition is
higher in municipalities if:
• total floor space of multifamily buildings exceeds 2 million square meters;
• management companies have the form of a municipal unitary enterprise or the
functions are performed by private companies;
• housing management and maintenance functions are assigned to different
organizations;
• the competition is initiated by the local government (local government issues the
administrative decision to conduct the competition); and
• management companies comply with the Rules.
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The impact of various factors on the likelihood of a housing management or maintenance
competition being conducted in municipalities was investigated with the use of SPSS for
Windows 10.0, which, among other things, allows for the correlation and regression analyses of
the source data.
The correlation analysis methods were used to determine the links between all pairs of factors
characterizing the development of competition in the management and maintenance of the
housing stock. The factors most closely connected to the likelihood of a competition were
identified, as well as factors most closely connected with one another within the framework of
the initial sample.21
Selected results of the correlation analysis are presented in Table 20.
                                                
21 In accordance to the requirements to a regression model, a dependent indicator should be described by
conditionally independent variables. In this connection, the regression model describing, say, the influence of certain
factors on the likelihood of competitions, cannot use such factors as the area of the municipal housing stock and the
population of the municipality, because these factors are closely related to each other.
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Table 20. Correlation22 of the Factors Characterizing Competition for Housing
Management and Maintenance Services
Factor Link Number of
Observations
Coefficient of
Correlation
Area of the housing stock put up for the
competition
120 0.890
Area of the municipal housing stock put
up for the competition
120 0.905
Area of the housing stock conveyed to
private companies as a result of the
competition
114 0.941
Area of the housing stock managed by
homeowners’ associations
120 0.782
Area of the municipal housing stock put
up for the competition as a percentage
of the total stock
67 0.763
Number of municipal enterprises –
participants of the competition
120 0.994
Total number of bidders 120 0.997
The ratio of the initial competition price
and the established maintenance tariff
for the households
64 0.436
Number of
management and
maintenance
competitions
Population of the municipality 77 0.538
Area of the housing stock in the
municipality
120 0.339
Compliance with the Rules and Norms
for Technical Maintenance of the
Housing Stock by the management
company
120 0.331
Legal form of the management
company
120 0.248
Segregation of the management and
maintenance functions
120 0.489
Housing of homeowners’ associations as
a percentage of the total housing stock
120 0.331
The “political will” (decision of the
local government about holding the
competition)
120 0.887
The incidence of
a competition in
the current year
The ratio of the initial competition price
and the established maintenance tariff
for enterprises
64 0.701
                                                
22 The data presented here include only significant links (the coefficient of correlation > 0.7) of high reliability.
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The correlation analysis has established fairly close links23 between the number of competitions
for maintenance of the housing stock and the area of the housing stock put up for the competition
(coefficient of correlation – 0.881). The results of the correlation analysis were used to build a
regression model for testing the initial hypotheses.
At first, 6 linear regressions were built with the dependent factor being the likelihood of a
competition and one independent variable for each of the factors mentioned above.
Because the variable is dichotomic (i.e., may have one of the two values), the one-factor
regression models for the likelihood of a competition were built with the use of binary logistic
regression.
As a result it was learned that if the effect of the above factors are counted separately, the
greatest impact on the likelihood of a competition is produced by the availability of the
administrative decision to conduct a competition (Nadelkerke R-factor = 0.886), while all other
factors have little effect on the likelihood of a competition. The factors are listed above in the
order of diminishing importance:
• segregation of the management and maintenance factors (R-factor = 0.290);
• area of the municipal housing stock (0.188);
• compliance with the Rules (0.140);
• form of the management company (0.084).
This method, however, is unable to determine how the likelihood of competitions will be
affected by the combined force of all these factors. The answer to this question can be provided
by a multifactor analysis, which was also performed with the use of the binary logistic
regression.
The initial model contained the following variables:
CL – a dependent variable describing the likelihood of a competition. The variable equals 1
when the competition is held, and 0 in all other instances.
HS – a categorical variable describing the area of the municipal housing stock (0 – less than 2
million square meters; 1 – over 2 million square meters).
F – a dichotomic fictitious variable characterizing the form of the management company (0 –
municipal unitary enterprise, 1 – municipal institution).
S – a dichotomic fictitious variable characterizing the segregation of the management and
maintenance functions (0 – functions not segregated, 1 – functions segregated).
PW – a dichotomic fictitious variable characterizing the political will of the local government on
the issue of competitions (0 – no, 1 – yes).
A test of the model on the basis of the data available showed that the model allows for a fairly
accurate forecast of the likelihood of a competition being held (121 cases out of 125) with the
high level of statistical reliability. However, the significance of most of the variables in the
model turned out to be low. Therefore, it follows that, on the one hand, the model contains
variables which predetermine the incidence of a housing maintenance competition, and on the
other – that the model contains variables which do not affect the likelihood of a competition.
A step-by-step exclusion of insignificant variables (see Table 21) has produced only one
independent variable characterizing the “political will” of the local government on the issue of
holding a competition.
                                                
23 The link is regarded as close if the module of the coefficient of correlation exceeds 0.7 and the reliability level
does not exceed 0,005.
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The reduction in the number of variables did not affect the statistical reliability of the model, and
the new model allowed for a correct forecast of the likelihood of competitions in the same 121
out of 125 cases, while the significance of the remaining factors fully complied with the
established criteria.
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Table 21. Models Used to Determine the Factors Affecting the >Likelihood of a Competition
Variant 1 (one
independent variable –
PW)
Variant 2 (PW –
political will – factor
excluded)
Variant 3 Variant 4Mark Variable Variants
Initial model Final
model
Initial
model
Final
model
Initial
model
Final
model
Initial
model
CL Likelihood of a competition 0 –no
1 -yes
1.574 1.861 1.871 2.072 2.202 1.871R Compliance with the Rules 0 – no
1 – yes 0.298 0.008 0.006 0.001 0 0.006
-0.958 -0.983 0.42F Form of the management company 0 – MUP
1 –MU 0.544 0.127 0.352
0.661 2.648 2.073 2.073S Segregation of management and
maintenance functions
0 – no
1 –yes 0.671 0 0 0
0.863 2.319 2.156 2.104 2.198 2.156HS Area of the housing stock 0 – under 2 mln.sq.m.
1 – over 2 mln.sq.m. 0.863 0 0 0 0 0
13.691 7.008PW Political will 0 – no
1 -yes 0.747 0
-4.049 -4.369 -3.539 -3.574 -2.666 --2.564 -3.574Constant
0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0
R-factor (Cox and Snell) 0.651 0.641 0.369 0.356 0.253 0.247 0.356
R-factor  (Nadelkerke) 0.899 0.886 0.51 0.492 0.349 0.342 0.492
Doubled negative value of the logarithm 29.362 32.795 103.329 105.925 124.528 125.39 105.925
Note: The values of B-coefficient are printed in bold, the values of t-statistics are in italic.
91
The analysis of the resulting model shows a direct dependence between the likelihood of a
competition and the decision of the local government. In 42 cases out of 43 (97.7 percent) a
competition for maintenance of the housing stock was held as a result of pertinent decision of the
local government. The one exception was a city where no formal document was in place, but an
oral order was given to organize the competition. At the same time, in 79 cases out of 83 (96.3
percent) a competition was not held for lack of the appropriate administrative decision. Out of
the total number of observations, in 63.2 percent of cases the unavailability of such a decision
resulted in the absence of competitions, in 2.4 percent of cases the decision failed to result in a
competition, in 33.6 percent of cases the political will with respect to this issue resulted in a
competition being held, while in 0.8 percent of cases a competition was organized without the
interference of the local administration.
These results indicate that the main condition for the formation of competitive relations in the
housing sector is the political will, rater than economic reasons. This conclusion is well
illustrated by the following example. In the light of the concept for the housing and communal
service sector reforms, a local administration as the owner of the municipal housing stock must
select a management company, which, in turn, will either select contractors, or do the job with
the use of its own resources. In reality the local authorities interfere with the activities of the
housing companies and demand competitions to be held for contracted services. Appropriate
regulations are issued for this purpose.
An administrative decision has the determining role in the organization of competitions for the
management, maintenance and repairs of the housing stock. However, in the 25 municipalities
surveyed, in the course of 5 years (1997-2001) competitions were held in only 14 municipalities
and three municipalities have conducted only one competition.
Fig. 17. Relationship between the incidence of competitions and the availability of pertinent
decision of the local self-government
Worthy of not is that, competitions often decreased the cost of services. The percentage of
municipalities where the cost of works put up for the competition was reduced as a result of the
competition is given in Fig. 18.
Fig. 18. Percentage of municipalities where the cost of works put up for the competition
was reduced as a result of the competition
Taking into account that the availability of political will largely determined the likelihood of
competitions, all other factors turned out to be insignificant. In order to understand the actual
impact of these factors, new models, from which the political will factors was initially excluded,
were built (see variant 2). In this case the initial regression model included the following
variables:
CL – a dependent variable describing the likelihood of a competition. The variable equals 1
when the competition is held, and 0 in all other instances.
HS – a categorical variable describing the area of the municipal housing stock (0 – less than 2
million square meters; 1 – over 2 million square meters).
F – a dichotomic fictitious variable characterizing the form of the management company (0 –
municipal unitary enterprise, 1 – municipal institution).
S – a dichotomic fictitious variable characterizing the segregation of the management and
maintenance functions (0 – functions not segregated, 1 – functions segregated).
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A test of the model on the basis of the data available showed that the model allows for a fairly
accurate forecast of the likelihood of a competition being held (105 cases out of 125) with the
acceptable level of statistical reliability (Hedelkerke R-square = 0.510). Only one of the factors
(the form of the management company) turned out to be insignificant and was excluded from the
final model.
The elimination of the factor accounting for the form of the management company had
practically no effect on the statistical reliability of the model (the Hedelkerke R-square reduced
to 0.492, and the χ-square decreased by 2.596), and the new model correctly predicted the fact of
a competition in the same 105 cases out of 125, while the significance of the remaining factors
fully complied with the established criteria.
In the new model, the key factor determining the likelihood of a competition for maintenance or
repairs of the housing stock is the segregation of the management and maintenance functions. As
a rule, the segregation of these functions did not lead to the development of competition for the
housing management services, but fairly often promoted competition for the maintenance
services. It should be noted here that while the correlation analysis did not show any statistical
dependence of the PW (political will) and S (segregation of the management and maintenance
functions) factors, the dependence is nevertheless there, because competitions for contracted
maintenance services were initiated by the local authorities, rather than by the management
companies.
In big, medium-sized, and selected small municipalities; the segregation of functions has
stimulated competitions for maintenance of the housing stock, special works, and capital repairs.
In small municipalities the segregation of management and maintenance functions resulted in the
monopolization of housing management in 70 percent of cases, and, as a rule, did not promote
competition in the maintenance services. (The one exception is Bor.)
Fig. 19. Availability of the segregation of management and maintenance functions in the
cities surveyed
It should be noted that the administrative segregation of the management and maintenance
functions does not always lead to competition in the maintenance and repair services for the
housing stock. Small municipalities will find it more reasonable to demonopolize management,
rather than segregate management and maintenance. According to the economic analysis, the
minimization of unit costs under combined management and maintenance functions may be
achieved for a housing stock of about 200 thousand square meters of total floor space. Therefore,
the combination of these functions will make it possible to form several housing management
companies within the boundaries of the municipality.
Fig. 20. Relationship between the incidence of competitions and the segregation of
management and maintenance functions
The size of the city turned out to be an important factor. The bigger the city, the greater the
likelihood of competitions being held. Small municipalities hold competitions less often than
medium and big ones, as demonstrated by Figs. 21 and 22.
Fig. 21. Percentage of municipalities holding competitions, depending on the size of the
municipality
Fig. 22. The likelihood of holding a competition in relation to the total area of the
municipal housing stock
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The organizational legal form of the management company has little impact on the
competitiveness of the environment. In the municipalities surveyed management companies have
the form of a municipal institution or a municipal unitary enterprise (with the exception of
Petrozavodsk, as noted above). This factor does not affect the likelihood of competitions. At the
same time, the number of competitions actually held is a little bigger if the management
company is a municipal institution. The insignificant difference may be explained by the strict
administrative interference of the city authorities in the activities of housing management
companies regardless of their legal form. The civil law provides for the economic autonomy of
municipal unitary enterprises which, unlike municipal institutions, are commercial entities.
However, in reality municipal administrations interfere with the economic activities of municipal
unitary enterprises demanding unfunded services and use administrative levers to cause the
competitions to be organized dictating the size of the gap between the starting price and the final
price of contracted services, resulting in enterprises being unable to realize the financial benefits
of the competitions. Thus both the unitary enterprises and institutions in municipalities see the
competitions as the result of the administrative influence of the local government, rather than an
economic need. The dependence of competitions on the segregation of the functions and the
form of the management company is shown in Fig. 23.
Fig. 23. The dependence of competitions on the combined influence of all factors
(segregation of functions, form of the management company)
On the whole, 62.8 percent of the competitions were held by management companies established
in the form of a municipal institution, and 37.2 percent of the competitions were organized by
municipal unitary enterprises.
3.3.5. Analysis of the Survey of Officials and Specialists of the Housing and
Communal Service Complex in Different Municipalities
A survey conducted within the framework of this research targeted heads and specialist of the
housing and communal service departments of the local governments in different municipalities,
and directors of municipal housing and utility enterprises to reveal the extent of their
understanding of the goals and purposes of the sector reforms, and to identify local factors which
hinder the development of competition for housing services.
Based on the purpose of the research and the hypotheses proposed, 12 survey questions were
formulated about such issues as reform priorities, contractual relations in the provision of
housing and utility services, competitions for maintenance and repairs contracts, and the
adequacy of the municipal regulatory framework in view of the new economic conditions in the
sector.
The survey was held in 20 cities in Russia among 76 respondents, who included: 5 vice-mayors
responsible for the sector, 3 oblast administrators, 13 heads of departments and committees for
the housing and communal service sector, 18 leading specialists of departments and committees
for the housing and communal service sector, 16 directors of sector enterprises, and 21 medium-
level managers. The survey was conducted through personal interviews with IUE experts and by
electronic means. Some questionnaires were filled out in a phone conversation or mailed by post.
Data on the number of respondents in each city is given in Table 21.
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Table 21. Respondents and Cities
RespondentsCity
Administration officer Employee of sector
enterprise
Bor 1 2
Buzuluk 2 4
Veliki Novgorod 1
Vladimir 2
Volkhov 1 1
Rostov-on-Don 2
Dimitrovograd 2 2
Yoshkar-Ola 2 2
Moscow 3 6
Nizhny Novgorod 2 3
Novocherkassk 1
Orenburg 3 2
Perm 3 1
Petrozavodsk 2 3
Ryazan 1
St. Petersburg 2 3
Ulyanovsk 3 4
Cheboksary 2 2
Cherepovets 1 1
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk 3 2
Total 39 37
About 32 percent of the respondents identified the main goal of the housing and communal
service sector reforms as the formation of an efficient socially-oriented system which ensures the
appropriate quality of the housing and communal services and the development of
competitiveness; 27 percent of the respondents stated the goal of increasing the reliability of the
sector and of the entire life-supporting system by strengthening state support; 23 percent of the
respondents saw the goal of the reforms as the timely provision of high-quality services for
adequate pay; and 17 percent voiced the opinion that the only purpose of the reforms was the
transition to a 100-percent coverage of the service costs by the households. Thus more than one
half of the respondents defined the reform goals as increasing the efficiency and reliability of the
system for the purpose of improving the quality of the housing and communal services.
Speaking about specific reform areas in the cities, 22 percent of the respondents wanted to
reform “everything”, 34 percent proposed to “start with the management of the sector, including
mechanisms for tariff-setting and budget finance”, 25 percent spoke for the transformation of
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contractual relations in the sector, and 18 percent stressed the importance of reforming
communal heat and water systems.
As regards factors which hinder the development of competitive relations in the sector and the
improvement of the quality of housing services, 47 percent of the respondents see the key
problem as imperfect legislation at the regional and municipal levels, believing that federal
laws alone are insufficient; 19 percent stated that quality requirements should be demanded and
observed and subject to a 100-percent coverage of the service costs and named inadequate
budget financing as a negative factor; 17 percent noted the close links between the weak
contractual relations and lack of political will among the local governments; and 15 percent
believed that “the heart of the matter lies in poor management”.
The attraction of private companies to the delivery of housing services was supported by 89
percent of the respondents, and only 11 percent “do not find it necessary”. In answering the
question about which organizations– private or municipal – work better, 49 percent preferred
private companies; 15 percent named big municipal multifunctional companies; 21 percent
believed that “the ownership form does not affect the quality of the work”; and 14 percent were
of the opinion that judgments should be made on an individual basis depending on the
management quality of the organization and its financial status.
The main factor for the development of competitive relations in the management and
maintenance of the housing stock, stated by 70 percent of the respondents, is municipal
competitions for maintenance and repairs of the existing housing stock. However, 18 percent
of the respondents stressed that “competitions are effective only if all participants are treated
equally and there are clearly defined ‘rules of the game’”, and 12 percent were convinced that
competitions were not essential for promoting competitiveness.
In answering the question about the effect of contractual relations on the quality of housing and
communal services, 83 percent of the respondents spoke for “a clear system of contractual
relations which provides a basis for the development of competition and, as such, promotes
better service quality, because it allows for efficient use of economic mechanisms – as opposed
to administrative methods – for fulfilling the contractual obligations to quality standards and
timeliness of the services. Seventeen  percent of the respondents were convinced that the system
of contractual relations could function properly only subject to normal financing, a condition
which the majority of Russian cities are unable to satisfy.
Out of the 76 percent of respondents 51 percent supported contracting for maintenance and
utility services through a management company, arguing that “it is more convenient for the
population, and it is easier to enforce the quality and timeliness of service provision”; 32 percent
argued that “in the current situation it is preferable for the municipalities to use direct contracts
for utility services between the households and resources providers”, naming as one reason the
confusion of balance records for in-building nets; 17 percent stated that contracts for service
delivery to the households should have line committee or department of the local government as
one of the parties.
On the whole, the survey has confirmed the main analytical hypotheses. It has also revealed the
dissatisfaction of respondents with the progress of reforms. The respondents were almost
unanimous about the need for enacting “good regulatory and legal documents, which would
work under the new economic conditions” at all legislative levels in order to ensure normal
operations of the sector enterprises. The “good” documents named by the respondents included
broad program documents determining the development of the sector at the local level, ’normal’
transparent budgets with funds for the housing and communal service sector appropriated as a
separate budget line”, as well as applied documents regulating quality standards for the housing
and communal services, and regulations for organizing efficient energy-saving and metering of
power and water resources.
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3.3.6. Conclusions to Section 3.3
The comparison of the results of the survey and the statistical data on the qualitative parameters
of the development of competition in municipalities, which were collected in the course of
analytical research, allows for a number of general conclusions:
1. The privatization of residential premises failed to generate activity and interest among the
unit owners in managing the property, and, as a result, did not promote the development
of competition for housing management services. The enactment of appropriate laws at
the federal level did not lead to the expected mass creation of homeowners associations
for addressing the property management issues. Consequently, no developments occurred
in the demand for a broader range of housing services. This has negatively affected the
formation of a competitive environment in the management of multifamily buildings.
2. The competition for housing management services is obstructed by the special conditions
created by the effective civil law for state and municipal organizations based on the right
of economic jurisdiction and the right of operative management.
3. A serious obstacle to the development of competition for housing maintenance services is
the lack of coordination between the tariffs for housing and communal services, actual
budget capacity and population incomes.
4. In most of the cities which have provided data for this analysis there is little competition
for housing maintenance services, but a much better situation is observed for contracted
capital repairs of the housing stock.
5. The development of competition for housing management and maintenance services
depends on the political will of the local governments. While understanding the
importance and need for holding housing management and maintenance competitions and
the practical benefits of such competitions, local governments do not hold them for the
stated reasons of defects in the legislation, lack of budget funds, and increase in the cost
of work by the amount of VAT levied on contracted works.
6. The defects of the current legislation for the regulation of relations in the housing sphere
prevent the formation of preconditions for the development of competition in the housing
sector and create no incentives for the attraction of private businesses.
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3.4. Development of Associations Of Homeowners
3.4.1. Overview of legal pre-requisites for the Establishment and Activities
of Condominium associations
One of the objectives of the housing and real estate policy proclaimed by the RF government in
the early 90-ies of the XXth century was to transfer the management of the major bulk of the
housing stock including multifamily buildings to private homeowners.
As a result of free privatization of housing initiated by the federal Privatization Law (On
Privatization of Housing in the Russian Federation, #1541-1, issued on 07/04/91), the structure
of the housing stock in the Russian Federation has crucially changed. To date, private
homeowners occupy 64 percent of the housing stock, 40 percent of which are units in
multifamily buildings.
The massive home privatization in Russia has given rise to a situation when practically all
multifamily buildings in the country are now occupied by more than one or even many
homeowners. The ownership in housing implies the free right of an owner to manage his own
property. That is, to make decisions on its maintenance, repair and use. Moreover, the RF Civil
Code provides property owners not only with the right but also with the burden of maintaining
the property (Art. 210, Burden of Maintaining Property). Therefore, today the housing sector
reform is expected not just to boost the privatization process in the sector but also help private
owners become real managers of their property.
However, today in Russia, as in the early 90-ies, most of the multifamily stock is still managed
by municipalities. The unwillingness of residents to become participants of the housing policy
making process as well as to assume responsibility for maintenance and management of the
property they live in is rather favorable for municipalities, which continue to ignore the right of
homeowners to participate in the common property management. As well, they continue to use
administrative mechanisms of economic management, to hold a monopoly on delivery of utility,
property maintenance and renovation services, and to impede the creation of necessary economic
and administrative preconditions for the expansion of other models of property management. In
an attempt to instigate the involvement of private homeowners in the property management from
above the federal government issued a law welcoming the creation of associations of
homeowners as a new model of property management.
Condominium as a single property complex.
The Housing Policy Fundamentals law issued by the RF government on December 24, 1992 (On
Fundamentals of the Federal Housing Policy, #4218-1, hereinafter referred to as the
Fundamentals Law) stipulates that unit owners in multifamily buildings are considered co-
owners of common elements in their buildings. That is, “elements designed to service more than
one homeowner including staircases and hallways; elevators, elevator and other wells; corridors,
roofs, attics and basements; fencing, bearing and non-bearing structures, mechanical, electric,
sanitary and other equipment installed outside or inside a building and servicing more than one
units; adjacent land plots within the established boundaries including landscaping elements and
improvements located on them; as well as other objects designated to serve a single real property
complex” (Art. 8). The Fundamentals law was the first in the Russian law to use the term
“condominium”. The 1997 edition of the law interpreted this term as a single complex of real
property including units and common elements. The law also specified that common property in
a condominium is held in the shared ownership of the homeowners, and cannot be alienated from
their ownership (Art. 8, It. 2). These provisions were later fixed in the RF Civil Code (Article 29,
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It. 1 and 2)24, and the Homeowners’ Associations Law, (On Associations of Homeowners, # 72-
FZ, issued on 06/15/96, Articles 1 and 7).
The Homeowners’ Associations Law (hereinafter referred to as the HA Law) gives an extended
definition of the term “condominium”: a real property complex including a land plot within the
established boundaries and a building and other property objects located on it, some elements of
which (units) are used for accommodation or other purposes and belong to homeowners, and
some elements (common elements) of which are used as common property in a shared ownership
by the homeowners” (Article 1).
Today, most difficulties in condominium registration are encountered when it is necessary to
define the legal status of  condominium land. The HA Law (Articles 1, 5, 8) treats condominium
land as a common property of homeowners, and states that a person buying an apartment in a
multifamily building simultaneously acquires a share in the common elements and land
belonging to a condominium. Later, the provisions of the HA Law on land rights of
condominium members were confirmed by the Presidential decree # 485 (On Guarantying the
Right of Property Owners to Acquire Ownership to Land under their Property, issued on
05/16/97) and the RF Government resolution #1223 (On Approval of Regulations for
Establishing the Size and Boundaries of Condominium Land Plots, issued on 09/26/97).
However, neither the HA Law, nor other legislative statutes issued have clear provisions obliging
local governments to treat condominium land plots as common property of homeowners, no
matter whether there is or is not a registered association of them. Until 2001 this vagueness of
the law was widely used by local land administrators as a ground not to recognize the
homeowners’ right to hold  condominium land in ownership, which was in fact contrary to the
HA Law provisions. However, the situation did not change in favor of homeowners’ associations
even after the adoption of the Land Code. Russian cities set about to develop State Cadaster
formation procedures, but most programs neither took into account the interests of both existing
and future condominium associations nor aimed at the formation of condominiums as unified
property complexes.
Achievement of homeowners’ consensus on condominium management
Unit owners in multifamily buildings have to use housing and utility services collectively.
Therefore, in multifamily buildings, where residential and non-residential elements belong to
multiple owners, a consensus of all homeowners on the terms and methods of the property
management is required.
The Fundamentals Law in its 1992 version made no difference between the terms
“condominium” and “association of homeowners” thus making the registration of an association
of homeowners as the only possible way of management of property that could be held in
common share ownership. In particular, the Law stipulated that, “construction, maintenance and
renovation of multifamily houses, apartments and other residential units constituting a
condominium should be regulated by contracts (concluded between homeowners)” (Article 8).
(other than the registration of an association of home (unit) owners), the RF Civil Code (Part I,
Article 291 issued in 1994) also failed to suggest homeowners mechanisms for reconciling their
interests in order “to ensure the exploitation of a multiapartment building, the use of the
apartments and their common property”..
The HA Law was the first that proclaimed the right of homeowners in multifamily buildings to
create associations by their free will, and suggested several property management models for the
                                                
24 Unlike the Fundamentals Law, the Civil Code (Art. 290) does not treat adjacent land plots as a property held in
common share ownership of unit owners.
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management of condominium property.  Under this law, condominium homeowners are eligible
to decide themselves which of the suggested models suits them best. The law (Articles 20 and
21) suggests three property management models:
1) direct management of the property by all homeowners - for condominiums having no
more than four units and a limited (from two to four) number of homeowners;
2) delegation of the responsibility to manage the condominium property to a state or a
municipal property management company;
3) registration of an association of homeowners that may either manage the condominium
property itself or delegate this responsibility to a contracted property manager.
In view of the enactment of the HA Law, Article 8 of the Fundamentals Law was corrected in
1997 to read: “homeowners … may form an association of homeowners”. With this correction,
the formation of homeowners’ associations (HOA) is no longer treated as the only way for
reaching a consensus between homeowners on their property management.
Still, notwithstanding provisions according to which homeowners are considered eligible rather
than obliged to choose a property management model, the HA Law at the same time requires that
a fine be imposed on those who fail to do that within six months (Article 20). This penalty can be
applied only to condominiums where more than 50 percent of units are held in private
ownership. Still, the Law fails to specify who and how should apply this sanction in practice25,
and in addition local governments have no practice of monitoring changes in the rate of owner-
occupied units in multifamily buildings. Consequently, it is hardly possible to cite at least one
case of imposing this penalty in practice.
For a better understanding of how unit owners in condominiums may come to a property
management consensus, it is important to understand how the law regulates the problem of
condominium membership. Under the HA Law (Articles 32 and 49), the membership in an
association of homeowners was obligatory for all unit owners.  In 1998, the RF Constitutional
Court declared this requirement contradictory to the RF Constitution26 thus permitting
homeowners to stay apart of an association of homeowners and thus not to participate in the
collective management of their common property. Practically, the RF Constitutional Court
recognizes the prevalence of a private freedom of choice over joint interests of other
homeowners. However, the collective mode of consumption of housing and utility services in
multifamily buildings makes it impossible to leave a particular homeowner without them. So, by
refusing to participate in the joint management of the property a homeowner, in fact, infringes on
rights and interests of other homeowners in the building.
Worth noting is the fact that Russia is the single country in the world that legalize this
prevalence. Obligatory registration of homeowners’ associations in multifamily buildings is a
legitimate practice in many countries including Norway, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands,
Switzerland, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In Slovakia,
Romania, Bulgaria< Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus and Moldova associations are created on
a voluntary basis. But all countries are common in requiring the obligatory membership of all
homeowners in an association as soon as it is created in a particular building except Russia.
Encouragement of HOA formation.
The effective law suggests a series of incentives intended to create “a favorable environment” for
the formation and operation of associations of homeowners. Yet in 1992, the Fundamentals Law
                                                
25 Until July 2002, this was the responsibility of the State Housing Inspection, but on 12/30/01it was repealed by the
federal law #196-FZ.
26 Decree of the RF Constitutional Court #10-P as of 04/03/98.
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stipulated that the main advantage of HOAs was an opportunity “to control costs and service
prices and select maintenance and renovation service providers”.
The HA Law also permits HOAs to be autonomous in planning their cost and revenue budgets,
regulating membership fees, and contracting out management and maintenance services to any
type of provider. HOAs are also allowed to hold some units in a condominium in common
property and sell or lease them out in order to derive an income (Article 29).
Of particular importance is the provision about eligibility of condominiums to receive “grants,
money reimbursements and subsidies” (Article 19). The HA Law guarantees the right of
condominium homeowners and tenants to enjoy the social protection provided by effective state
and local programs of social safety. Specifically, this social protection implies “the transfer of
state and municipal subsidies to HOAs in order to help them finance their operating,
maintenance and capital repair costs, purchase some types of communal services and compensate
losses from providing discounted services to eligible population groups”. In other words, in
event of a creation of a HOA and it being allowed  to manage a building, this HOA will be
considered eligible to receive all types of grants, subsidies and benefits that are envisaged by
current laws and regulations. However, the Law fails to regulate who, in particular, should be a
recipient of this financial aid – an association, a management company or a provider of
maintenance or utility services – leaving these decisions at the discretion of the authorities that
provide this assistance.
When reviewing the provisions of the HA Law ensuring social protection to condominium
homeowners and tenants it is also worthy to note that these guarantees were later supported by
RF Government resolutions (#707 from 07/18/1996, and #887 from 08/02/1999) regulating rent
and housing allowance payment procedures.
Creation of HOAs in new construction.
One of the chapters of the HA Law specifically regulates the creation of HOAs in new
construction. This chapter was created in response to the need of many Russian municipalities to
find a management model for buildings constructed at the expense of private investors and sold
to private owners. Typically cities are reluctant to take on buildings in which they have no
ownership of the management. As a result, such buildings are frequently left “to the mercy of
fate”, meaning their occupants are left without housing and utility services, and the buildings
themselves begin to rapidly lose their value right after the commissioning of them.
The HA Law suggests solving this problem by permitting the registration of a HOA as a legal
entity both after and prior to the commissioning of a building and registration of a condominium,
as long as it is during the stage of construction (Chapter 6, Article 48). So, the Law makes it
possible for investors to register a HOA in advance and thus ensure the immediate transfer of it
after the completion of construction to the HOA for management. The Law also makes the
registration procedure for such HOAs, easier by only  requiring developers to submit an
application, a building permit and a draft charter of the HOA (Article 48).
3.4.2 Consistency of the practice of HOA formation with the federal housing
policy
Present-day Russia has no more than 5,000 registered associations of homeowners, or just a bit
more than 1 percent of the total urban housing stock. This is  clear evidence of the failure of the
ten years of housing sector reform to accomplish the task of the overall transfer of multifamily
houses with lands under them to owners of residential and non-residential units, for the purposes
of property management using the mechanisms suggested by the HA Law.
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Тable 23. Number of homeowners’ associations in several Russian cities in January, 2001
(according to local administrations’ data)
№№ п.п. City Number of HA
1. Moscow 384
2. Rostov-on-Don 261
3. Krasnoyarsk 121
4. Tiumen 115
5. Nizhnii Novgorod 110
6. Perm 100
7. Yaroslavl 96
8. Ryazan 87
9. Novocherkassk 83
10. Velikii Novgorod 60
11. Cheboksary 48
12. Orenburg 40
13. Vladimir 31
14. Dimitrovgrad 21
15. Saratov 6
What is the reason for such poor progress in the formation of condominium associations? The
HA Law suggested an instrument for achieving a consensus between homeowners, but it does
not work. Perhaps, to some extent it is the fault of lawmakers who failed to remove an array of
inconsistencies in the Law revealed in the process of its enactment. There are also discrepancies
between this Law and other legal acts; the solution of many vague issues is postponed to the
future. The need to improve the Law became clear several years ago, but neither the State Duma,
nor the federal government demonstrates their willingness to respond to this need despite the
manifold requests of the Gosstroy of Russia and regional and municipal governments.
At the same time it would be reasonable to note that the creation of a favorable environment for
the development of condominium associations is mostly the responsibility of regional and local
governments rather the federal authorities. In fact, real incentives – first of all, economic ones –
capable to boost the formation of HOAs are created very slowly in comparison to administrative
barriers, which grow much faster. Another serious obstacle for encouraging the self-
administration of homeowners is the inertness of the bulk of population, which prefers to protect
individual interests, doubts that joined efforts may produce better results, and mistrusts
(frequently quite reasonably) state and local authorities as well as their housing policy. Manifold
recent publications in the press reflect the general suspicious, and sometimes even critical,
attitude of the public to the idea of the formation of homeowners associations. The public is
more inclined to believe that it is just one more attempt by governmental authorities to shift the
burden of housing management and maintenance onto them rather than a chance to use the
capacities of self-administration as a solution to the common problems of the housing stock
management. Regretfully, very often such suspicions turn out to be true, and adverse experience
serves as a major disincentive for the creation of new condominium associations.
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Only a few regions in Russia fulfill the requirement of the HA Law to include land under
buildings into a common property of condominiums. At the moment, just a very small number of
HOAs have an opportunity to manage a totality of condominium property including land. In
many cases, the refusal to follow the Law requirement to transfer land to condominium
homeowners free of charge becomes a major obstacle for registration of a HOA because
registration authorities refuse to register condominiums if they do not have an ownership in the
land.
Another serious disincentive for the creation of associations of homeowners is the advisable
rather than obligatory nature of the HA Law requirement to provide budgetary subsidizing of
housing and communal services to condominiums. In addition, housing allowances and
reimbursement of HOA’s losses from discounted servicing of eligible households – are not
always paid in full and promptly, and, as a result, cause a gap in the HOA revenue budget. In
2000, the Gosstroy conducted a survey among non-profits in various regions of Russia in order
to investigate the most common difficulties HOAs face in their operations. The problems mostly
frequently mentioned by respondents were non-fulfillment by local authorities of their
obligations to finance HOA losses from social benefits and pay housing allowances and
subsidies that condominium homeowners are eligible for. As well, they cited the prevalence of
administrative barriers and the general lack of knowledge demonstrated by the public.
Noteworthy also is the fact that, as a result of non-fulfillment of the HA Law, difficulties are met
not only in the creation of HOAs but in the introduction of other models of property management
as well.  Notwithstanding the great number of “customer services” across Russia, they very
rarely use the management model according to which homeowners are expected to delegate the
management responsibility to them under the procedure specified in the HA Law. Typically,
residential buildings in Russian cities are managed by agencies appointed by local governments
rather than homeowners which, under the Law, should themselves delegate the property
management responsibility, in accordance with the model property management chosen by them
at their general meeting (Article 22).
Local governments, as owners of municipal property and holders of a large share of ownership in
residential buildings, simply undertake to act on behalf of all owners of common property in
condominiums without having any legal right to do that, which, in fact, is strongly reminiscent of
the property management practices of the Soviet-era housing authorities. The lack of detailed
regulations on how to manage residential property when a HOA is not yet created and the strong
financial reliance of housing agencies on the municipal budget made it possible for
municipalities to control the management of most  of the housing stock in urban localities. In the
majority of Russian cities, local administrations keep private producers away from the market for
housing and communal services and continue inventing mechanisms allowing them to dispose of
retail rent and utility fees as they will. This also substantially discourages the process of
formation of HOAs because homeowners do not believe that they will be able to get free from
the municipality’s control to enjoy the freedom in disposal of their resources and selection of
providers of property management and maintenance services.
The formation of HOAs requires huge administrative efforts in order to overcome the public
indifference and opposition of local bureaucrats and monopolists. Therefore, the progress in
restructuring the residential property management sector can be traced only in those cities where
homeowners have strong incentives to come through administrative barriers in order to establish
real control over the property management in line with the current state policy of the housing
sector reform.
As a rule, the progress in formation of condominiums and registration of HOAs is particularly
noticeable in regions and cities where local governments are in the lead of the housing sector
reform (Moscow, Saint-Petersburg, Barnaul, Tyumen, Yaroslavl, Nizhny Novgorod, Kirov,
Samara, Rostov-on-Don, Perm and several others).
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It was witnessed that the formation of homeowners’ associations on the basis of municipal and
housing cooperatives came to a halt in most cities. One exception was Rostov-on-Don, where the
city authorities' obligations to carry out capital repairs of the housing stock were a significant
factor behind the establishment of homeowners’ associations on the basis of municipal housing.
Rostov-on-Don's example is worth following. There are other examples of a different kind, too.
For instance, in Saratov and Orenburg large homeowners’ associations, which include one or
even several neighborhood units under the jurisdiction of one municipal housing-maintenance
enterprise, are established on the basis of municipal housing stock. When such a homeowners’
association is established, the housing maintenance enterprise is liquidated, while its employees
become the partnership's employees. In Orenburg, the establishment of such homeowners’
associations is initiated by municipal housing-maintenance enterprises because that makes it
possible for them to get into private hands without losing their sector of operations and technical
base and getting involved in competition with the housing-maintenance service market. At the
same time, they acquire tax incentives that are provided to non-commercial enterprises. In
Saratov, the establishment of such homeowners’ associations was initiated by the local
authorities, whose major objective was tax minimization and, in particular, profit tax avoidance.
It must be pointed out that such initiatives are spreading to other municipal formations in Russia
as they understand that such a noteworthy experience should be followed. This can hardly be
denied.
Undoubtedly, housing maintenance on the neighborhood unit scale is much more effective than
maintenance of a single house, while private maintenance enterprises are much more effective
than municipal ones. However, the interests of residents, who are housing owners, were hardly
taken into account during the establishment of such homeowners’ associations in Saratov and
Orenburg. The partnership establishment decisions were made by municipal governments, who
had the largest share in the condominium. In some cases, there were even serious violations of
legislation (no general meetings were held, fake tenant signatures were used).
Day-to-day activities of large homeowners’ associations also encounters problems in Orenburg
and Saratov. The main problem is the reconciliation of interests of a large number of owners.
The interests of people living in one particular house may be different from the interests of those
living in a neighboring house, which may give rise to conflicts in the partnership. An earlier
survey of these partnerships has shown that executive personnel are also elected representatives
of the owners and have all the powers of such representatives. As a result, the residents' interest
become subordinate to interests of the homeowners’ association as an enterprise.
Such examples are rare, though, as private initiative is becoming more visible in the process of
the homeowners’ association establishment. This is a positive process. What is important,
however, is that it must go on within the legal framework.
Condominiums and HOAs are mostly created in large cities on the initiative of developers
representing the private business sector, which use HOAs as an instrument for promoting their
products on the market. Currently, according to approximat evaluations, more than 70 percent of
registered associations of homeowners have been created in newly constructed buildings.
The registration of associations of homeowners in new construction is beneficial, first of all, for
developers themselves. It would be safe to state that most developers do appreciate this benefit,
because over the last few years the growth in the number of HOAs was mostly caused by rapid
registration of associations in new construction. However, many municipalities are also
contributing much to the process, as they are usually reluctant to bind themselves with the
responsibility to manage and maintain a property that will be sold to private owners. They prefer
to shift this responsibility to developers in return for promises to help the latter with the
registration of a HOA. Accordingly, in most cases the registration of HOAs in new construction
is the result of an agreement between developers and a city rather than the deliberate will of
investors and the consequence of developers’ “work” with clients. With all apartments sold and
104
all warranted obligations fulfilled, the developer will most likely go away, leaving occupants of
the property with a registered association of homeowners that will have to operate in a rather
disadvantageous economic environment (See above).
So, the provision of terms and conditions at least equal to those provided to municipal property
management companies is considered to be a task of prime importance the implementation of
which will ensure success in HOA operations, help to make the idea of self-administration more
attractive for homeowners and give an impetus for the growth of HOAs.
3.4.3. Hypotheses
As is evident from current practices, the rate at which the cities register homeowners’
associations and make them responsible for the management of residential property depends on
the homeowner’s motivation to create an association and the availability of necessary economic
and administrative incentives.
Findings of the legislative analysis and statistics showing the number of registered HOAs in
various Russian cities as well as the progress in their operations and types of support provided to
them by local administrations serve as the basis for making a series of hypotheses about factors
which are capable of  encouraging or discourage the creation of homeowners’ associations in
Russia.
Hypothesis 1. In  the initial stages, the key factor in HOA formation in Russia was the
demonstration by top governmental officials of their political will to allow private owners
themselves to manage their property, which was then addressed in the Law, On Associations of
Homeowners.
In the Russian Federation, by 1996, privatized housing units made up 39 percent of the total
housing subject to privatization.27 Nevertheless, a certain number of homeowners still remained
unable to manage their privately owned multifamily housing stock themselves. The low
efficiency of municipal property management, unreasonable maintenance and repair costs and
the lack of direct homeowners’ control over spending of resources and quality of services caused
a deterioration of living conditions and a fall in quality of life standards. So, the need of a
mechanism to transfer the property management responsibility to private homeowners has
become evident.
The HA Law suggested principles for the formation of condominiums and registration of
associations of homeowners and confirmed their right to hold common property of
condominiums in shared ownership as well as their right to manage this property. The enactment
of this law was a serious step forward towards liberalization of the housing sector, and therefore
it was enthusiastically welcomed by most active representations of the public community and
municipalities as a key to success. Within a year and a half after its enactment in many Russian
cities associations of homeowners were created in full compliance with this law.
But soon it became evident that the law merely legalized the idea of homeowners’ self
administration in the housing sector and suggested a juridical form for such self-administration,
leaving the provision of necessary incentives capable of encouraging the creation and expansion
of condominium associations at the discretion of local governments. It failed to provide any
advantages and benefits to HOAs as compared to municipal management agencies as well as to
oblige local governments to support HOAs by transferring assets and funds to them. When, at
last, many understood that the law failed to provide the best favorable treatment for HOAs and
that the management of condominium property required much time, skills and effort, the public
enthusiasm gave place to skepticism. As a result, over the last few years the rate of HOAs
                                                
27 Annual Statistical Handbook. Goscomstat of Russia, 1996.
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creation has subsided in contrast to the period between 1996-1997, and it has become evident
that not all HOAs are able to manage their common property effectively.
Hypothesis 2. The support provided to HOAs by local governments is a major factor
advantageously affecting the growth of HOAs.
Initially, local governments demonstrated a rather great variety of approaches to associations of
homeowners. There were cities (Petrozavodsk, Vladivostok) that treated HOAs as a universal
remedy for the vast  array of housing sector problems. Such cities even quite seriously studied
the feasibility of a quick, in a year or two, substitution of all current housing agencies for HOAs
and the subsequent termination of the sector subsidizing from the municipal budget. The
approach of other cities was quite the opposite. These cities remained indifferent to the idea of
registration of HOAs on their territory. If there was still a group of enthusiasts willing to insist
on the registration of an association, the city did register it and then stopped thinking about it.
This approach is still very popular in many Russian cities.
However, there were cities where local administrations were very active in reforming the
housing sector, and (in particular). stipulation of formation of HOAs, In fact, the local
governments’ approach to HOAs was the main factor affecting the start-up terms of their
operation. In Russia, HOAs were created mostly in those cities that were ready to provide both
financial and technical assistance to them.
Many cities started their HOA support programs with the opening of a special division in the
local administration authorized to work with HOAs. These divisions were obliged to draft
regulatory documents governing the provision of assistance to HOAs and their relations with
local administrations. As well, the helped HOAs in drafting their by-laws and rules and
registration, to estimate the size and methods of subsidizing HOAs, to control the appropriate use
of subsidies by them, and also provided consultations and organized training for HOA chiefs and
board members.
The creation of financial incentives for HOAs was one of the most important tasks the HOA
divisions of local administrations were supposed to deal with. For example, in Ryazan the city
decision to subsidize HOAs’ maintenance and repair costs taken in 1994 played the key role in
the rapid growth of associations in the city. As a result, housing cooperatives that had been
earlier deprived of such subsidizing, from this moment on were financially stimulated to re-
register as a HOA, and many of them did that. In Perm, the city decision to subsidize capital
repair costs of condominium associations became a decisive factor for the growth of HOAs.  In
Novocherkassk, the authorization to immediately receive a cash reimbursement for losses from
the delivery of discounted services to eligible condominium members served as the principal
factor for encouraging the homeowners’ motivation to register an association. Of particular
importance is also the question of whether such subsidies and compensations are paid directly to
a HOA account or not. If yes, then homeowners would receive a good opportunity to
autonomously dispose of their funds, contract out or do the work themselves as well as exert
influence on utility service providers in case of undersupply. However, our investigation has
proved that many municipalities fall far short of providing such subsidies to HOAs. Actually, the
consent or reluctance of local governments to subsidize HOAs may serve as an important
indicator showing the city’s motivation to support the development of self-management trends in
the housing sector  and, in particular, the formation of HOAs.
Some of the sample municipalities have the practice of reducing of a registration fees for HOAs
and providing other incentives and preferences on local taxes and charges including land tax,
local police tax, education tax, and sometimes even pollution fees. Other cities practice such
types of HOA support as the reimbursement of land survey costs to HOAs when they register
their land rights, or the transfer of  municipal shares in condominium properties to those HOAs
responsible for their management.
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As is evident from the investigation, all aforementioned types of HOA support – every one
specifically and all of them in total – serve as a major impetus for HOA formation, because they
create better opportunities for homeowners to manage their common property more or less
efficiently. However, such incentives are not provided everywhere and at every time. Often they
are used as a temporary instrument and may be easily cancelled by a city in case of a lack of
budgetary resources or a lack of interest in the HOAs problems.
Hypothesis 3. HOA partnerships and HGO support centers may contribute to the
encouragement of HOA formation
When HOAs were first created they were patronized by local governments. On the one hand, this
was rather encouraging for HOAs, but on the other, it substantially limited their autonomy and
initiative. However, with time, local governments became less interested in providing active
support to HOAs. The lack of consulting or any other types of assistance, particularly, in the
removal of financial difficulties and in establishing relations with utilities, as well as in the risk
to be left without any external support, has pushed many active homeowners and enthusiasts
away from the idea, of creating an association. In such circumstances, the role of community
organizations and NGOs specifically established to represent and protect the interests of HOAs,
housing cooperatives, and TOSs, appears to be of particular importance. Now, many Russian
cities are witnessing a quick rise in the number of new organizations ready to provide assistance
in registering new HOAs, conducting public awareness campaigns among homeowners,
organizing  seminars and workshops for condominium property managers, providing financial
and legal advice to HOAs, protecting their interests in court and negotiations with third parties.
In the cities that do have partnerships and associations of HOAs, housing cooperatives, unit
owners and tenants (Tyumen, Novgorod, Moscow, Cheboksary) as well as NGO support centers
assisting the former in management of their property (Novgorod, Rostov-on-Don, Yaroslavl,
Perm), HOAs have demonstrated better performance results and may serve as a good example of
the realization of the citizens’ right to manage their own residential property.
Hypothesis 4. High rate of new construction in Russian cities encourages the growth in the
number of registered HOAs.
As we have already mentioned above, currently in Russia condominium associations are mostly
created in newly constructed buildings (See Table 24).
Table 24. Grouping of HOAs according to types of housing, in which they were created
 HOAs formed in a specific type of housing, %28: City
 municipal %  cooperative %  enterprise %  New
construction %
 Rostov-on-Don  71  3  22  4
 Cheboksary  0  69  0  31
 Orenburg  22  33  5  40
 Ryazan  6  34  2  58
                                                
28 This is a ratio showing the relationship between the number of HOAs formed in a specific type of housing and the
total number of HOAs registered in the city.
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 Veliky Novgorod  1  29  0  70
 Dimitrovgrad  3  10  3  84
 Perm  0  20  0  80
 Moscow  4  10  0  86
Almost everywhere new residential construction is financed by private investors and sold by
apartments to private owners. Local governments typically (with rare exceptions) refuse to
become the owner and manager of newly constructed residential buildings. If a municipal
management company still agrees to become the manager of a newly constructed building, it
does it only on the condition that homeowners will register an association so that the company
can conclude a contract with it.
So, it appears reasonable to assume that in cities where new housing is constructed at high rate,
the number of newly formed HOAs is also growing faster.
3.4.4. Data collection and processing
The suggested hypotheses about factors influencing the rate of HOA formation were subject to
testing based on the statistics of 18 Russian cities concerning the number of HOAs registered
then, and  on data collected by the project team in these cities from their investigation of the
HOAs’ performance and of local administrations’ support of HOAs. For conducting a
comparative analysis for the purposes of testing the hypotheses, only data within this sample
frame was used. Data from federal sources was not used for the purposes of this analysis,
because neither Goscomstat, nor Gosstroy of Russia carries out centralized monitoring of HOA
formation and the growth of HOAs’ role as a property manager. Up to 2000, the number of
registered HOAs was reflected in the standard forms of state statistics29. These forms were filled
out by statistic committees on RF subjects which then file them to the federal statistics
committee (Goscomstat of Russia). In 2000 this indicator was removed from the standard forms
of state statistics, and in 2001 it was also removed from departmental forms of statistics. From
time to time, the Gosstroy requests subfederal governments to provide data on the number of
HOAs and types of support rendered to them, but this data flow appears to be rather spontaneous
and inconsistent, and thus can hardly serve as a reliable source of information.
However, even the available statistics gives rise to doubts. Now and then standard forms of the
Goscomstat are filled out by unqualified specialists, and the Goscomstat is not authorized to
check the authenticity of collected data.30 Frequently, the statistical forms show the number of
HOAs including both HOAs and housing cooperatives, which means that provided indicators are
apparently overestimated.
                                                
29 Form 22-ZhKH (reform)
30 For example, according to the Goscomstat, in 1999 Dagestan Republic had more HOAs than any other region in
Russia (267), although there was registered none of them in the Republican capital, Mahachkala. But it is commonly
known that in Dagestan as well as in any other republic in the Caucasus  individual one-family houses is the main
type of residential property; the stock of multifamily buildings (where condominium associations may arise) is
rather small and is concentrated mostly in urban areas, in Mahachkala, first of all. So, it is clear that the presented
data was untrue. This conclusion was confirmed by the Republican Ministry for Construction and Housing in its
reply to the Gosstroy request made in 2000.
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However, in cities that have a special division or at least an officer responsible for maintaining
relations with community associations and NGOs working in the housing sector (for example,
Orenburg and Yaroslavl) HOAs statistics are collected and processed regularly, and thus appear
to be much more trustworthy.
The data used in this survey was received from those municipal formations in which, according
to the information available to the authors, the establishment of homeowners’ association has
been going on most rapidly during the last few years. In such formations, either the number of
homeowners’ associations grew rapidly or measures to support then were implemented or both.
We requested the following information.
Specifically, the cities were requested to provide the following data:
- quantitative indicators (number of registered associations of homeowners, total area of
property managed by HOAs, housing construction rates – by years from 1993 to 2001
with HOAs grouped by types of the housing stock, in which they were created);
- qualitative indicators (formation of a special division in a local administration for the
work with HOAs; types of support provided by the local administration to HOAs:
subsidies, reimbursement of losses from discounted services; transfer of municipal
subsidies directly to an HOA account; granting of tax incentives and reduction of
registration fees; compensation of land registration costs, organization of training etc.)
It is essential to note that the importance of a city program for developing  condominium
associations can be assessed most accurately by analyzing data that shows what share of the
housing stock in a city is managed by HOAs. There are various ways to measure this share (these
measurements will produce different values): HOA as a percentage of the total number of
multifamily buildings in a city; the total area of housing managed by HOAs as a percentage of
the total area of the housing stock of a city; the size of the city population living in buildings
managed by HOAs as a percentage of the total population of a city.
Considering the unfeasibility of obtaining all necessary data for determining these indicators and
analyzing changes in them over a long time period, the suggested hypotheses were made on the
basis of an analysis of the impact of different factors on the rate of HOA development.
3.4.5 Research findings
Chart 5 showes the HOA creation dynamics in the sample cities.
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 Chart 5. (continuation)
Although the sample is not large, the dispersion of data showing the number of HOAs in the
cities is rather significant: from 12 in Saratov to 659 in Moscow (as of the end of 2001).
Annually, the number of HOAs grew in average by 20, but, as is evident from Chart 1, this
growth was rather irregular, with sudden changes. According to the chart, the sharp growth in the
number of HOAs was registered in 1996 – 1997 versus the previous year. This fact stands in
favor of our hypothesis that the HA Law enacted in mid 1996 gave a strong impetus to the
creation of condominium associations in many Russian cities.
The validity of this hypothesis is also confirmed by findings of the regression analysis of the
available statistical data. Bearing in mind the suggested hypotheses, we determined independent
variables that, in our opinion, affect the number of HOAs most of all. The regression equation
was formulated for one dependent variable (the annual growth of HOAs in each city) and four
independent variables specified in Table 11, below.
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In the regression analysis, the index showing the HA Law factor has a value of 1 in 1997: the
Law was issued in June 1996, and then for a year and a half it was “coming into force” in various
regions, meaning its impact was particularly strong in 1997.
A complex index showing the local government support of the HOA formation was estimated
separately for every city and year. Its value was determined with the help of the following
indicators:
- Formation of a special division in the local administration to work with HOAs (NGOs
operating in the housing sector);
- Municipal subsidizing of HOAs to cover price differences in maintenance, repair and
heating services;
- Municipal subsidizing of capital repair costs of HOAs
- Municipal subsidizing of gaps in HOAs revenues caused by the necessity to service
eligible households at a reduced price;
- Transfer of municipal subsidies directly to a HOA account;
- Compensation of land registration costs of HOAs;
- Reduction of registration fees for HOAs;
- Granting of tax incentives to HOAs (on local taxes only);
- Transfer of ownership of non-residential premises in condominiums to HOAs;
- Organization of training in HOA formation and condominium property management.
Each indicator was assigned a value of 1 if the city did provide the indicated type of support in
the indicated year, and 0 if this type of support was not provided. Then, the total of these
indicators was determined for each city and each year, which accordingly might vary from 0 to
10. From Table 2 we see that the average complex index is 4.6, which signifies that during the
surveyed period local governments in the sample cities provided, on average, 4 -5 types of
assistance to HOAs. The highest index of HOA support, 7, was demonstrated by Perm and
Rostov-on-Don in 1997 – 2001. Value 0 of the complex index was registered only in two cities –
Veliky Novgorod and Orenburg, and only in 1995. That is, prior to the enactment of the HA
Law.
For indicating the HOA partnership factor, a simple qualitative variable was used. If there was
such partnership in the city the indicator had a value of 1, otherwise it had a value of 0. For
indicating the new construction factor, a simple quantitative variable, the volume of new housing
commissioned, was used.
Table 24.
Indicator
standing for a
variable
Variable Average
value
ACG Dependent variable – annual growth of the total number of
HOAs
20.1368
CL The HA Law factor – the rapid growth of the number of HOAs
in 1997 after the enactment of the law. Value (1) in 1997, and
(0) in other years
0.1453
PАP Local government support of HOA formation - a complex
index showing how the formation of HOAs was backed up by
the city in every year of the surveyed period. May vary from 0
4.6068
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to 10.
AC The HOA partnerships factor: value (1) if there is a partnership
in the city, and (0) if there is none of them
0.5214
NCI Annual growth of new residential construction (RF subject’s
total), mln sq. m
0.7388
Results of the regression analysis are shown in Table 25.
Table 25. Regression Results
Variable Regression Coefficient
-26.203ACG (const.)
(-3.272)
18.167CL – the HA Law factor
(2.343)
3.997PAP - support of HA by the administration
(2.471)
13.952AC – associations of homeowners’ associations'
(2.495)
24.383NCI - new construction
(6.185)
(Absolute t-statistics values are shown in parentheses)
R2 0.4
F-statistics 18.633
Darbin-Watson statistics 0.815
df (degrees of freedom) 116
Significance level: 5% 31
From the resultant regression equation it is evident that the regression coefficient for all variables
is positive and rather high, showing that all variables have a significant value. All the variables
have no value of more than 2. This means that all the indicated factors significantly affect the
dependent variable in 95% cases of the sample. Therefore, the regression analysis supports all
the hypotheses stated above.
The fact that quantitative variables have positive regression coefficients signifies that the number
of HOAs grows faster with the provision of every new type of assistance as well as with the
growth of new housing construction. The introduction of a new support measure results in the
establishment of four new homeowners’ associations, while the construction of a million square
meters of new housing increases the number of partnerships by 24, which, with the average
number of partnerships amounting to 20, amounts to a growth of more than 100%. Calculations
of the partnership number elasticity in respect to quantitative variables (change in the dependent
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variable in respect to a change in the independent variable by one measurement unit ) show that
these factors have a significant impact on the dependent variable: in both cases, elasticity tends
to one.
The high value of the regression coefficients of qualitative variables also demonstrates the high
rate at which the average value of this variable grows when the factor is in effect. One may see
that merely the enactment of the HA Law might, on average, result in the registration of still 18
HOAs more in any city in the sample, while the establishment of a partnership of HOAs in a city
might increase the number of HOAs by 14  a year.
Thus, the regression allows us to make the following conclusion: support of homeowners’
associations by the city administration or a non-commercial organization (an association of
homeowners’ associations) shows that the city takes a positive attitude toward the self-
administration of housing owners and promotes the establishment of new homeowners’
associations.
Table 26. Comparison of Cities Taking "Positive" and "Negative" Attitudes to
Homeowners’ associations
City: Establishment of
homeowners’
associations
supported by
administration --
composite index
(variable value)
Role of
associations of
homeowners’
associations
(variable value)
Growth of number
of housing owners
partnerships
according to
regression results
In case of "positive
attitude"
7 1 42
In case of "non-positive
attitude"
2 0 8
The hypothesis about the importance of local government support of HOAs was also tested by
conducting a survey among municipal administrators responsible for the housing sector
management. The survey was conducted in 8 cities32. Respondents had to answer 5 questions
about the process of formation of HOAs in their cities formulated in line with the research goals
and the stated hypotheses. The survey was anonymous.
The overwhelming majority of respondents (87 percent) believe that condominium associations
are a very promising form of residential property management, because HOAs can in practice
ensure the compliance of the quality of housing and communal services with the homeowners’
needs. At the same time only 60 percent of respondents confirmed that they observed progress in
formation and operation of HOAs in their cities.
When asked about obstacles hampering the HOA development, one third of respondents spoke
about the lack of financial resources, while two groups of respondents, each comprising 20
percent of the total, spoke about the poor physical condition of condominium property and the
lack of homeowner’s confidence in the local administration. Still three more groups of
respondents, each comprising 10 percent of the total spoke about the deficiencies of the law, the
high cost and intricacy of registration procedures, and the lack of qualified property managers.
                                                
32 Including: Velikii Novgorod, Cheboksary, Rostov-on-Don, Perm, Ryazan, Moscow, Dimitrovgrad и Nizhnii
Novgorod.
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At the same time, 80 percent agreed that homeowners themselves would hardly be able to
manage property better than the professional staff.
All respondents were unanimous in their opinion that local governments should provide
assistance to HOAs, with 80 percent of them considering financial support to be the main factor
in the successful operation of HOAs. Among other types of assistance mentioned by respondents
there were: procedural and technical guides, training of professional managers of condominium
property, development of the market for housing and communal services including services on
emergency repair, maintenance of elevators, meters, etc.
Thus, the survey results have confirmed that local administrators in Russian cities understand the
importance of the local government support of HOA, but, in general, fail to do it adequately.
3.4.6. Conclusions
1. A real start to the massive formation of HOAs in Russia was given by the HS Law
enacted in 1996. During the year and a half after its enactment several Russian cities
witnessed a rapid growth in the number of registered HOAs. However, time has passed
and it has become evident that the Law has failed to address many problems. The most
crucial ones, the economic ones, the solution of which is important for the successful
operation of HOAs and are, in fact, assigned to local governments. As a consequence, in
municipalities where local administrations had no political will to support HOAs, the
formation of them either has subsided or occasionally  just stopped.
2. In many cities, local governments are the initiators of HOAs formation. As a rule, they
start with launching a broad public awareness campaign, developing the necessary
regulatory framework, creating favorable conditions for HOAs (direct transfer of
municipal subsidies to HOAs’ accounts, granting of tax incentives, free transfer of land
plots and non-residential premises in ownership of condominium associations) and
organizating training seminars for HOA leaders. In such an environment the number of
HOAs grows quickly.
3. Over the last few years local governments have demonstrated a loss and even a full
cessation of interest in HOAs. At present, private developers and property managers have
taken an initiative in their creation. Thus, it is possible to say that today HOAs are no
more the concern of the local government, but that of private businesses operating in the
construction and property management market, for whom HOAs act as an efficient
instrument in regulating the demand for housing and services of a new type.
4. Local associations and partnerships of HOAs have begun to play a more active role in
organization of consultations and training for HOAs, as well as the representation and
protection of their interests. In increasing frequency they have started providing services
for condominium property management, thus drawing municipal providers of property
management and maintenance services into competition. Establishment and active work
of HOA partnerships gives confidence to current and future leaders of condominium
associations that they might receive necessary assistance and services when needed, and
in such a manner also encourage the formation of HOA in Russian cities.
3.4.7. Prospects for and Tasks of the Development of Homeowners’
associations in Russia
Our surveys have shown that the reforms in the housing sector which are currently implemented
in Russia, such as privatization of housing and reforms in the housing and utilities sector, fail to
help prompt activities or arouse the interest of owners of residential and non-residential housing.
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At the same time, many former Soviet republics and East European states (transitional
economies) whose housing sectors were also in government hands for a long period of time,
have made significant progress in the promotion of private enterprise in the housing and utilities
sector. For instance, in Kazakhstan, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech
Republic, a significant part of former municipal housing stock is now maintained by housing
owners' associations or private companies. It should be also pointed out that many of these
countries have passed through a period of "shock therapy" in the housing sector. The abolition of
government and municipal subsidies to the housing and utilities sector, large-scale compulsory
privatization and other measures made it possible to quickly transfer the housing sector into
private hands.
One question arising in connection with this is what should be done in Russia in order to catch
up with neighboring countries in the development of self-administration of private owners of
housing. Should we aim at universal condominium introduction? Is it reasonable to expect that
sooner or later Russia's entire housing stock will be placed in charge of homeowners’
associations? This will hardly be possible, but the potential for further growth in the number and
role of homeowners’ associations is significant.
At present, more than half of Russia's apartment house stock is already privatized, while
apartment owners pay for the larger part of utilities costs. This state was reached gradually, in
the course of ten-year reforms. It should be admitted that the rejection of  shock therapy and of
gradual liberalization of prices for utilities could hardly help speed development of private
enterprise in the sector or promote apartment owners' initiative. At the same time, the
forthcoming transition of the housing and utilities sector to the complete cost recovery basis,
along with the completion of free privatization of housing, is likely to boost development of
private enterprise in the housing sector. However, a certain part of residential housing stock will
remain in municipal government hands and will be used for social purposes.
It should also be noted that the purpose of homeowners’ associations, as seen by the Russian
government and law-makers, consists not only in the demonopolization of the market for
housing maintenance services or in the replacement of municipal ownership by private
ownership, but it also includes the demonopolization of utility services. A diversity of owners,
along with a diversity of management forms, is more likely to lend stability to the housing sector
and make services affordable.
Thus, the gradual development of housing owners' self-administration seems more preferable
and reasonable now than the rapid and universal introduction of condominiums. As already
pointed out above, it is possible to affect the process through the creation of local incentives and
favorable conditions for the establishment of homeowners’ associations.
 The priority measures that must be implemented in order to support homeowners’ associations
should include the following:
- obligatory transfer of budgetary funds allotted to homeowners’ associations in accordance with
the current legislation (subsidies and other appropriations) to the partnerships;
- demonopolization of housing maintenance services and creation of competition in the housing
and utilities sector;
- popularization of the homeowners’ association establishment experience and distribution of
information about positive examples;
- training of administrative personnel for the housing sector and training of homeowners’
associations' leaders in the basics of self-administration.
116
CONCLUSION
The realized model of housing and utility sector reforms has produced certain positive results:
household payments for the housing and utility services increased substantially; a new form of
non-municipal ownership – homeowners’ associations - appeared in multifamily buildings; and
the demonopolization processes started in the maintenance services, with private capital
penetrating the market. However, these processes have failed to change the inefficient
management systems of the housing and utility sector, or to create strong barriers against the
return of non-market management mechanisms. Gradual, partial modifications under the rigid
control of state and municipal authorities did not allow for a quick qualitative transformation or
sustainable self-development of the sector.
The deepening of the crisis in the housing and utility sector that revealed itself so visibly last
winter has posed a fundamental dilemma: whether to tighten administrative control of the sector,
to strengthen the “management vertical”, to increase budget investments in the sector as the main
source of compensation for the inefficiency of its institutional mechanisms, or to move quickly
to create preconditions for real market transformations, as opposed to the imitated ones, as until
has been the case until recently.
The first approach would essentially solidify for a long time to come the non-market regulation
of the housing and utility sector, whose destructive potential was convincingly demonstrated in
the past decade. The absence of real economic entities in the system of service production and
sale, which are strongly motivated and interested in the efficiency of their operations, the high
politicizing of every reform in the sector that distorts or results in the suspension of long-overdue
reforms and the deep subsidizing of sector enterprises, which deflects a substantial portion of the
budget funds that are needed for developing budget services and for supporting low-income
households, all leave little hope for real growth in the efficiency of the housing and utility sector
or for moving funds to those public services which are not be provided without budget support
(education, health care, social policy). The only viable alternative is the transition of the sector to
market-oriented functioning and development mechanisms.
As of this time the economic and political prospects for the housing and utility sector reforms
look much more favorable than before. The reasons are several.
First, after a long period of stagnation the economy started to grow and substantial political
stabilization has been achieved. Therefore, increases in tariffs for the housing and utility services
to households and the termination of flat subsidies to the service providers raise fewer concerns.
Second, the most painful period of tariff hikes is almost over – the overwhelming majority of the
regions have achieved 80 to 90 percent coverage of the service costs by households. If it were
not for the likelihood of substantial future increases in the tariffs charged for electricity and gas
by the key national monopolies, increases in housing and utility tariff would have gradually
ceased to be an issue. However, even with account for this growth, tariffs for the housing and
utility services will no longer be increased by several times. In addition, the almost universally
introduced housing allowances address the task of protecting a substantial portion of low-income
households.
Third, in view of the limited margin of safety of the existing life-supporting systems, there is a
real political will at the federal level to achieve radical changes in the situation in the housing
and utility sector. For all the demagogy around this process, the development of economic
relations has no realistic alternative.
Fourth, the growing interest of the businesses on the one hand, and the activity of the households
as service users on the other restrain state and municipal interest in the management of the
housing and utility sector. More and more examples of successful solutions to the housing sector
problems with the use of a market approach are appearing at the local level. Moreover, this trend
is fairly stable.
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For these tendencies to strengthen and develop, it will be necessary to introduce adequate
policies at the state and municipal levels. This presumes both the priority tasks, which may not
be postponed, and the strategic tasks that ensure the sustainability and irreversibility of the
reforms.
Important priorities include:
1. Terminating budget subsidies to housing and utility enterprises. In our opinion, the discussion
of this task should replace the fashionable political topic of 100 percent coverage of service
costs. The key to this task lies in the transfer of budget funds for the support of the housing and
utility services to the households, as has been done by several regions within the framework of a
federal experiment with housing allowances. But this is not enough.
The efficiency of budget expenditures may be improved not only through targeted social
assistance to low-income households, but also by replacing budget subsidies to enterprises with
budget-funded investment programs for the development and modernization of the housing stock
and utilities. The simplest example of such program is capital repairs of the housing stock and
utility infrastructure. One the one hand, this approach will put a check on tariff increases and on
the other, it will ensure control over the efficient use of budget funds in accordance with their
targeted purpose. These efforts should be made soon and on a mass scale.
2. Reducing the level of benefits and ensuring their financing. The inefficiency and
expensiveness of the current system of benefits in housing and utility payments is obvious. The
inability of the budget to finance these benefits essentially means that benefits to eligible persons
are paid for by their neighbors, which is particularly well pronounced in condominiums and
gives rise to serious social problems.
As long as this task is not addressed, it will be unrealistic to expect the housing and utility
complex to achieve financial stabilization or to become attractive to investors.
It should be admitted that the in new version of the law, On the Fundamentals of the Federal
Housing Policy, this issue was raised but failed to get addressed. Once again benefits became the
subject of political bargaining in anticipation of the pending elections of the deputies. The 15
billion rubles allocated in the 2003 Federal Budget will, of course, alleviate the situation with
compensations for the benefits, but they cannot solve the problem that is estimated to require
another 46 billion rubles in 2004.
The task should be declared a priority for 2004 once the election season at the federal level is
over.
3. Restructuring and liquidating the debts of housing and utility enterprises. The debts of
housing and utility enterprises, which reached over 270 billion rubles by the beginning of 2003,
are caused primarily by the non-payment of budget compensations for the benefits and
allowances provided by these enterprises, and by the non-payment of utility bills by budget-
funded institutions. The second important factor is the lack of balance in the tariff policy, that is,
cases when tariffs for utility enterprises are not changed following changes in the tariffs for gas
or electricity.
The solution of this problem is associated with such unpopular measures as recognizing debt
obligations to housing and utility enterprises at all levels of the budget and including these
obligations in the next budgets, and increasing tariffs by way of partial compensation of the
accumulated misbalance.
The year of 2003 should be devoted to the analysis and formulation of solutions so that practical
work for liquidating the debts can start in early 2004.
4. Creating an efficient tariff regulation system. Problem issues associated with tariffs and
contracts may be addressed by changes in the regulatory framework. The key tasks in this area
are:
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• to give municipalities the regulatory authority over tariffs of all natural monopolies on
the local market, rather than municipal enterprises only;
• to harmonize the tariff regulation principles and mechanisms at the regional and
municipal levels;
• to establish principles for the formation and operation of tariff regulators at the regional
and municipal levels ensuring representation of all stakeholders, transparency and
openness of the regulator’s activities;
• to establish clear tariff regulation procedures taking into account the regulation period,
factors necessitating a tariff review, information required by the regulator to establish the
tariff rate, and other factors;
• to terminate the practice of counting profit in the tariff rate as a percentage of the service
cost, building the profit into the tariff rate with regard to concrete investment goals and
based on the monitoring of these goals by the regulator;
• to ensure the possibility of incorporating the special tariff regulation conditions stipulated
in contracts with investors into the general tariff regulation process.
However, artificially curbing tariff increases by means of administrative pressure on the tariff
regulation process is a policy that has no prospects. Apart from failing to reduce unreasonable
costs, this approach is a major obstacle to institutional transformations. Ultimately, delayed
increases will have to be implemented, inevitably with additional losses in the efficiency of the
communal sector. Economic benefits may be produced only if market participants are strongly
interested in improving the efficiency of their operations.
In order to implement the tasks identified, it will be necessary to adopt a federal law on the
general principles of tariff regulation. In view of the political demand for this law, it may be
adopted by the Duma.
5. Creating the legal environment for government – business relations in the communal sector.
The main reform task in this area is to create real economic relations, abandoning administrative
management patterns in favor of entrepreneurial initiatives. This task should be addressed
through partner relations between governments and businesses operating in the communal sector,
when the public authorities guarantee the reliability and affordability of maintenance and utility
services at the same time that private companies ensure higher efficiency and lower resource
consumption in the delivery of the services.
The attraction of private businesses to the communal sector will both improve management of
the sector and turn it into an attractive investment.
Ownership in the utility sector is a critically important issue for both the governments and
investors. The responsibility of local government for life-supporting services in their
jurisdictions which is stipulated in the legislation may be realized only if utility infrastructure,
first of all, the nets, is in municipal ownership. In this context, a preferable arrangement will be
that of a contract of concession between a local government and a private company under which
infrastructure facilities are retained in municipal ownership, while management of the facilities
and all associated commercial risks are transferred to the private company. However, its efficient
implementation depends on the creation of the appropriate concession laws. Pending its
enactment, a “prototype” contract may be used, stipulating a long-term lease with investment
obligations.
6. Promoting the property management business based on individual attention to residential
buildings and rational use of resources. At present it is becoming evident that the relative
shortcomings in the self-organization of private owners in multifamily buildings into
homeowners’ associations were caused by the unavailability of an alternative supply of
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maintenance services for their buildings. Under such conditions the newly created associations
had either to resort to a “natural economy”, or to apply to the municipal monopolies. At the same
time, the recent years saw a fairly broad use of the so-called municipal procurement for
maintenance and utility services, according to which heat or water was ordered for the entire
municipal stock, rather than for a particular building.
Major improvements in the environment for the development of market-based relations in the
housing sector may not be achieved through the forced creation of homeowners associations.
Rather, it depends on the formation of a competitive supply of services for management of the
housing stock. There is every reason to suppose that a variety of supply would promote a variety
of demand for these services, serving as a powerful incentive for the creation of homeowners’
associations.
An important task associated with the promotion of property management business in the
housing sector is the formation of economic incentives for resource-saving based on the
operating scheme of energy-saving companies. In such a scheme, the income of such companies
would depend on the reduction of resource consumption in buildings subject to compliance with
quality of living standards.
For this field of business to develop, the methodological framework for contractual relations in
the delivery of housing and utility services should be put in place.
The development of market relations in the housing and utility sector is strongly restrained by
the legal status of the prevailing number of sector enterprises. Most of them have the status of
municipal/state unitary enterprises and hold the municipal property by right of economic
jurisdiction.
Our analysis shows that political concerns play a key role in the efficiency of reform efforts in
the housing and utility sector. It is just as evident that with the pending elections of deputies to
the State Duma and of the President one can hardly expect hard political decisions in the area of
housing and utility reforms in the near future. In order to ensure people a comfortable winter, the
entire force of the administrative resource will once again be mobilized, attracting even Russian
oligarchs to the management of the sector. But later the same oligarchs will help to bring home
the idea that there is no alternative to market relations if the task is to create normal living
conditions for the people.
At present, the reformers’ task is to prepare the necessary instruments which, with a strong
likelihood, will produce radical improvements in the housing and utility sector in 2004 – 2005.
